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1Urban Solutions
More than half of the world’s population lives in urban areas today. According 
to United Nations estimates, four out of every five people might be living in 
towns and cities by the middle of the 21st century. More than sixty percent 
of the area expected to be urban by 2030 is yet to be built, and virtually all 
of this urban expansion will occur in cities of the developing world. These 
trends present tremendous challenges to ecosystems, infrastructure, and local 
government capacity, but at the same time urbanization offers a unique op-
portunity to shape a more equitable and sustainable global future.
Profound demographic and economic transformations are reshaping 
the world and how it works, demanding new policy frameworks for under-
standing and guiding urban growth. The United Nations will convene its 
bi-decennial Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development 
in October 2016. Habitat III creates an important opening for international 
cooperation and national action to integrate urban approaches into the 
global development agenda. Leading up to the conference, formal and infor-
mal channels create space for discussions about innovative urban solutions 
for global challenges. These processes will contribute to the formulation 
of the “New Urban Agenda,” the primary outcome document of Habitat 
III which will guide policy and planning for the world’s cities for the next 
twenty years, positioning urban areas as drivers of sustainable development.
A NEW GENERATION OF IDEAS
Evidence-based research is the foundations upon which decisions about 
urban policies and priorities must be made. To encourage a new generation 
of urban scholars, practitioners, and policymakers, and to disseminate their 
innovative ideas, the Wilson Center’s Urban Sustainability Laboratory, to-
gether with Cities Alliance, the International Housing Coalition, USAID, 
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and the World Bank, sponsors an annual paper competition for advanced 
graduate students working on issues related to urban poverty. The competi-
tion is designed to promote the early career development of young urban 
researchers as well as to strengthen the ties between urban policymaking 
and academia.
 This publication marks the sixth year of the “Reducing Urban Poverty” 
paper competition and includes a range of perspectives on urban challenges 
and policy solutions. The 2015 competition called for papers linked to one 
of the following subtopics: metropolitan approaches for the urban poor, 
making smart cities inclusive, innovation in water and sanitation, and cit-
ies through a gender lens. A panel of urban experts representing each of 
the sponsoring institutions reviewed 137 abstract submissions, from which 
21 student authors were invited to write a full-length paper. From these, 
seven papers were selected for this publication. Each chapter in this volume 
critically examines existing urban policies and projects, offering original, 
solutions-oriented research and strategies.
CHAPTER SUMMARIES
Innovation in Urban Water and Sanitation
Rapid urbanization has brought unprecedented challenges for ensuring 
reliable access to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation. Substantial 
inequities in urban water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services produce 
negative health, infrastructure, and economic outcomes for the urban poor 
and women in particular. Yet urbanization brings important opportuni-
ties for more efficient water management and greater provision of services. 
Strategies to improve access, availability, affordability, and sustainability of 
water and sanitation in cities must be integrated with efforts to strengthen 
urban governance and planning, and support innovative, entrepreneurial, 
and locally-driven approaches.
In the first chapter of this volume, author Stephanie Butcher, assesses 
the local-level Delegated Management Model (DMM) of water service 
delivery in Kisumu, Kenya, a public-private partnership used to incentiv-
ize water utility development in informal areas. Butcher highlights the 
gains DMM has made in increasing access to basic infrastructure and en-
hancing the capacity of residents. The chapter also explores the challenges 
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arising from the  commoditization of water services and the devolution 
of responsibilities, drawing conclusions about the policy implications for 
scaling up the practice.
In Chapter 2, Gregory Pierce documents the engagement strategies of 
Basti Vikas Manch (BVM), a slum development platform operating in 
four notified slums in Hyderabad, India. Pierce evaluates the capacity of 
the BVM to satisfy short-term basic service needs and to achieve long-term 
goals of transforming state-society relations. 
Douglas McRae provides an historical overview of the politics of water 
supply in Brazil’s largest cities, focusing on the role of neighborhood as-
sociations in securing access to water and services in the favelas of Rio de 
Janeiro. McRae analyzes water-spigot politics to draw conclusions about 
citizenship and political participation in contemporary urban Brazil.
Metropolitan Approaches for the Urban Poor 
Metropolitan areas and their problems span multiple municipalities. Cities 
around the developing world are often jurisdictionally fragmented, which 
results in complex spatial and institutional structures and poor service 
provision. The urban poor suffer disproportionally from dysfunctional 
inter-jurisdictional governance. Metropolitan approaches to infrastructure, 
services, and planning can help realize the promise of urbanization as an 
engine for development and ensure opportunity and access for the poor.
Ei-Lyn Chia explores how existing governance structures and urban 
policies in Brazil can be reformulated to allow for new forms of sharing 
that focus less on ownership and accumulation and more on community 
and collaboration. Drawing from fieldwork conducted in São Paulo, Chia 
examines how technological innovation can empower communities and 
harness the potential of collaborative forces. 
Chloé Malavolti conducted research in two inner-city precincts in 
Johannesburg to look at housing informality not only as a factor of vul-
nerability, but also as a phenomenon that can enhance urban resilience. 
Malavolti finds that the informal housing market can adapt to meet the 
needs of low-income residents for flexibility and affordability. 
In Chapter 6, Adèle Charbonneau, presents a case study of the railway 
Relocation Action Plan in Kibera, Nairobi, Kenya, to analyze the dynam-
ics and the use of models for resettlement of the urban poor. Charbonneau 
concludes that adapting international models to the local informal context 
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requires a flexible approach shared by all stakeholders and the assistance of 
an experienced community-based organization. 
Making Smart Cities Inclusive
Cities around the world are seeking technologies, institutional structures, 
and policies to optimize operations. The challenge in developing countries 
is to go beyond the efficiencies offered by “smart city” approaches to focus 
on systems that foster inclusion. New technologies and institutional frame-
works can empower the poor to define and communicate their priorities, 
and hold governments accountable for the provision of services. 
In the final chapter of this volume, Jason B. Scott presents ethnographic 
fieldwork conducted in pacified favelas of Rio de Janeiro, focusing on digi-
tal inclusion. Scott explores how digital technology can serve as a local me-
diator of structural violence and develop new concepts of identity.
5The “Everyday Water Practices” of the 
Urban Poor in Kisumu, Kenya 
Stephanie Butcher
University College London 
ABSTRACT
Kisumu, Kenya, experiences acute difficulties with safe water supply and provi-
sion. Drawing on qualitative and participatory research in May 2014, this ar-
ticle examines the local-level Delegated Management Model (DMM) of water 
service delivery. It highlights gains the DMM has made in increasing access to 
basic infrastructure and enhancing the capacity of residents to tap into local 
political structures. However, it also reveals some of its limitations, particularly 
given a context experiencing the commoditization of services, devolution of re-
sponsibility, and unequal social relations. In doing so, it seeks to explore impli-
cations for equitably scaling up future practice in Kisumu and beyond. 
INTRODUCTION 
Spiralling out in concentric circles from the banks of Lake Victoria is the 
port city of Kisumu, Kenya. Hugging the lakeside waterfront is evidence of 
the enormous influence of the fishing trade, where small-scale fishermen’s 
daily livelihood activities vie with large-scale industries and major interna-
tional corporations. The lake looms large in the historical and prospective 
narrative of the city, even as it faces significant challenges related to envi-
ronmental degradation, uncontrolled growth of the water hyacinth, and de-
pletion of fish stocks following the introduction of the Nile perch. Fanning 
outwards, the lakeside gives way to the city’s central business district, the 
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small but growing hub characterized by high levels of formal planning and 
infrastructure provision. It serves as the historic and present-day host of the 
city’s commerce, government offices, and middle- and high-income hous-
ing. Further on, the major Nairobi and Nyalenda Ring roads act as a physi-
cal and symbolic barrier to the surrounding semicircle of unplanned settle-
ments, comprising 60% of the city’s land area. Lacking adequate access 
to water, sanitation, sewerage, and social services, these settlements have 
increasingly felt the squeeze of Kisumu’s urban development pressures, a 
response to rising demands for land close to the inner city.
Despite its location next to the largest freshwater lake in Africa, the city 
experiences acute difficulties with safe water supply and provision, the triple 
challenge of lakeside and soil contamination, ageing city infrastructure, 
and a historical legacy of stratified service provision—disproportionately 
affecting those citizens located in unplanned areas. The vast majority of 
homes in these settlements remain unconnected to the municipal supply, 
relying instead upon communal kiosks or standpipes, or collection from 
(often polluted) shallow wells and boreholes—ultimately paying higher fees 
for lower quality water, experiencing greater vulnerabilities and variabil-
ity in service provision, and holding a limited set of tools to challenge the 
unequal distribution of safe water. Such realities are deeply embedded in 
historical and political trends conditioning Kisumu and Kenya as a whole, 
shaped by a policy environment favoring the privatization of basic urban 
services, the often unregulated and profit-oriented patterns of land develop-
ment, and the introduction of the Kisumu Urban Project—a multi-million 
dollar upgrading scheme designed to transform Kisumu into a “flagship 
city” in line with Kenya’s Vision 2030. 
At the same time, residents of Kisumu’s unplanned settlements also en-
gage in a mosaic of practices, drawing on multiple relations and resources. 
These “everyday water practices”—from collection to usage, decision mak-
ing to management—help to reveal how citizens manoeuvre within their 
wider environment to access their basic citizenship rights. In particular, 
this article focuses on the local-level neighborhood planning associations 
(NPAs), which have experimented with the innovative delegated manage-
ment model (DMM) of water service delivery. The DMM, first proposed 
in Kisumu in 2004, represents a public-private partnership that seeks to 
create incentives for the water utility to operate in informal areas through 
the devolution of responsibilities for water management to the community 
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level. In the unplanned neighborhood of Kondele, the DMM has generated 
an increase in the quality and quantity in water services and sought to open 
up new arenas of decision making for residents. It is in this regard that the 
DMM has the potential to operate as more than a model of effective service 
delivery, allowing citizens greater control over their urban environment and 
deepening democratic practice. 
However, a close examination reveals critical gaps around the DMM, 
exacerbated by the wider environment within which it operates. These 
gaps revolve around two key challenges: the commoditization of water 
services and the devolution of risk and responsibility. These realities have 
confronted the deeper democratic potential of the model, with particularly 
visible impacts for more vulnerable residents. Adopting a gendered perspec-
tive throughout, this paper highlights the (significant) gains the DMM has 
made in increasing access to basic infrastructure and in enhancing the ca-
pacity of networked residents to tap into local political structures. However, 
it also offers clear reflections of the limitations of this approach in address-
ing persistent sociospatial inequities, particularly when dealing with issues 
of social relations and diversity. In doing so, it seeks to present a grounded 
analysis of localized infrastructure provision through the lens of one un-
planned settlement in Kisumu, exploring implications for equitably scaling 
up future practice. 
CASE STUDY SITE
Kisumu is Kenya’s third largest city, with a growing population of approxi-
mately 500,000. Despite its rich advantages in commercial trade, fishing 
and industry, access to natural resources, and position as a strategic trans-
port hub in Eastern Africa, severe inequalities in the city remain a serious 
challenge. Levels of poverty in Kisumu are higher than those of Kenya as 
a whole, with 49% living under the poverty line, as compared to the 29% 
national average. Sixty percent of the land area in Kisumu is unplanned, 
and only 40% of the total population has access to the Kisumu Water and 
Sanitation Company (KIWASCO) piped supply, with percentages signifi-
cantly lower in unplanned areas (UN-Habitat 2008).
The specific site for this study is the Kondele neighborhood, one of 
22 wards that make up Kisumu, located 2 km from the central business 
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 district. Kondele covers an area of about 2.4 km2, and contains an approxi-
mate population of 82,000 (GoK 2009). It is a low-income and unplanned 
settlement, with the majority of households earning less than 7000 KES 
(US$69) per month. The bulk of residents lack access to in-home piped 
water, drawing instead from a range of sources including kiosks, stand-
pipes, vendors, boreholes, or shallow wells. Residents expressed an astute 
and well-established system of calculated trade-offs in juggling these dif-
ferent supplies: boreholes and shallow wells were often cited as good for 
washing, but not drinking; travelling vendors might be more convenient 
but expensive; KIWASCO piped kiosks and standpipes (including those 
linked with the DMM) were perceived as the cleanest, but many residents 
still expressed a preference to use purification tablets at a cost. (As quipped 
by one resident: “The water is 98% safe—I say 98% because if you go 
into KIWASCO’s office you still see a dispenser [to purify their drinking 
water]...so how safe can it be?”).
METHODOLOGY 
The analysis of Kondele builds upon a review of work done (Walker 2013; 
Frediani et al. 2013) to monitor and evaluate the Peoples’ Plans into 
Practice (PPP) program undertaken between 2008 and 2013 by Practical 
Action, in collaboration with the Kenyan-based Shelter Forum and Kisumu 
Urban Apostolates Programme. This program focused on both the provi-
sion of “hardware” (pipes, kiosks, and taps), and on the capacity building 
of residents through NPAs to articulate, advocate, and manage community 
priorities in the Kisumu planning process. 
Building on this documentation, empirical research was gathered in May 
2014,1 including semi-structured interviews, focus groups, and participant 
observation in Kondele with residents both as individuals and as part of 
organizations such as the NPA. Key institutional interviews were under-
taken, including with KIWASCO, municipal authorities, and  practitioners 
1 Research was undertaken by the author as a part of a Masters of Research project with the 
Centre of Urban Sustainability and Resilience, University College London (UCL), and in 
collaboration with ongoing student research as part of the MSc Social Development Practice 
Programme, UCL.
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in locally based NGOs. A number of participatory methodologies were 
employed, including transect walks, institutional mapping, and a series of 
interactive focus groups. Findings were cross-referenced with a review of 
secondary literature and Kenyan policy. Through the adoption of a micro-
scale of analysis it seeks to highlight locally grounded voices and visions, 
gathering a series of vignettes from within the Kondele neighborhood, and 
drawing wider conclusions on the ways in which diverse residents under-
stand and use the DMM. 
POLICY CONTEXT
Before turning to the specific case of Kondele, it is critical to acknowledge 
the wider context within which the DMM operates. Three major trends in 
Kenya have had a significant impact on the possibilities and ways in which 
the DMM has been rolled out: the partial privatization (and commoditiza-
tion) of basic services, the devolution of governance structures, and an em-
phasis on citizen participation. Significantly, constitutional reforms in 2010 
saw a restructuring of governance, moving from city- to county-level gov-
ernments, and vesting greater responsibilities and authority from the cen-
tral government to counties.2 An emphasis on citizen participation through 
the newly devolved governance was reinforced through the Urban Areas 
and Cities Act (2011), which more specifically outlined the participation of 
residents in the governance of urban areas. This commitment was further 
iterated through the County Government Act (2012), which identified the 
mediums through which citizen participation might take place, including 
assemblies, town hall meetings, and budgetary preparation forums. Within 
this context, NPAs—legally registered as the lowest level of citizen repre-
sentation and linked to local politicians—exist as an important vehicle for 
residents to advocate and lobby for resources and authority. 
While divesting greater decision-making authority to lower levels, 
Kenyan policy has simultaneously devolved responsibility for the delivery of 
2 Prior to constitutional reforms, Kenya was lacking clear policies to guide urban 
development. Among other changes, the revised constitution stipulated for the first time 
the right to housing (Article 43[1b]) and clean and safe water (Article 43[1d]), as well 
as outlining new regulations for the participation of urban residents in urban planning 
(Articles 1[4]; 6[2]; 184[1]; 196[1], 232[1]).
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urban services to private operators, marked most prominently in the Water 
Act of 2002. This act set out the legal framework for the privatization and 
devolution of water services in Kenya, making the division between (private) 
water service providers and state-owned managerial asset-holding bodies. 
Although the Water Act defines cost recovery as a core principle of “sustain-
able service provision,” a “pro-poor” focus was added in 2007 through the 
Pro-Poor Implementation Plan (PPIP) for Water Supply and Sanitation. This 
includes stipulations related to the provision of low-cost technologies (such 
as communal kiosks), lower cost tariffs in unplanned areas, and the inten-
tion to replace informal systems with formal small-scale providers. 
Together, these reforms are emblematic of the triple trends of privatiza-
tion, devolution, and citizen participation being unrolled throughout the 
country. This configuration gains expression in a clear preference for priva-
tization and public-private partnerships, citing incentives of cost-efficiency 
and linking with mandates for greater public control over urban processes.3 
This logic similarly underpins the move towards the DMM, which has the 
aims of extending service provision, allowing greater citizen control over 
service management, and generating entrepreneurial opportunities for 
lower-income residents. 
However, and critically, this convergence of similar policy approaches 
has been examined in other contexts as symbolizing the withdrawal of the 
state, and the enablement of market mechanisms in its wake (Cheema et 
al. 2005; Griffin 2013; Raco 2000). In the UK, for instance, Taylor (2007) 
has explored how neighborhood planning initiatives established in line 
with the UK’s Localism Act discursively purported to increase citizen voice 
through the devolved management of community services, but did not 
subsequently attempt to meaningfully increase decision-making author-
ity. This has been similarly well documented in cities of the Global South, 
where more and more the challenges of service provision in unplanned or 
informal areas have been used to legitimate and encourage the devolution 
3 Public-private partnerships have been strongly promoted within Kenya’s Vision 2030 and 
echoed in various policy and programmatic approaches in the country, including through 
the 2011 Policy Statement on Public Private Partnerships, which articulates the government 
commitment: “to be able to attract both domestic and international private sector 
investment, where appropriate, to help address the deficiencies in productive and social 
infrastructure and, in this way, improve delivery of public sector services” (GoK 2011, 4). 
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of service  delivery responsibilities to managing community groups (Jaglin 
2002; Miraftab 2004; Muller 2007; Spronk 2009). While such shifts are 
often discursively portrayed as a commitment to “citizen participation,” a 
deeper examination of the various levels of responsibility and risk conferred 
through such arrangements often indicates a very limited power for manag-
ing communities—what Dagnino (2007) calls the “perverse confluence” 
of citizen participation and neoliberal governance. These critiques hold im-
portant implications in the context of Kenya’s shift towards greater citizen 
participation in planning, and in exploring the potential of the DMM to 
link with wider democratic ideals. 
THE DELEGATED MANAGEMENT MODEL 
Within this context, the delegated management model is an innovative and 
alternative service delivery arrangement, drawing on the model of public-
private partnership. It was first implemented in Kisumu in 2004 in the 
Nyalenda neighborhood, through a program partnership between the water 
utility (KIWASCO), the World Bank’s Water and Sanitation Program–
Africa, and the Agence Français de Développement (AFD). In this model, 
KIWASCO provides piped water to a bulk water point (the “master meter”) 
in informal neighborhoods at a subsidized rate. The operation and man-
agement of this system is then devolved to “master operators” (MOs), 
represented by either entrepreneurial individuals or community-based or-
ganizations. MOs in turn distribute the bulk water through smaller com-
munity-level meters, taking responsibility for all billing, maintenance, and 
complaints that emanate from this bulk point. Residents in close proximity 
to the master meter apply for a connection (available following a deposit, 
application, and meter purchase fee), generating a secondary network of pri-
vate household connections, communal standpipes, or commercial kiosks. 
As such, another key node in the DMM water chain is represented by the 
owners of community standpipes and/or water kiosks, where residents with-
out household connections (the majority of Kondele) can purchase water. 
Thus these standpipes and kiosks operate as businesses in their own right, 
affording individual entrepreneurs access to income-generating activities. 
Though still in a moment of transition, the DMM has emerged as an 
important manifestation of discursive commitments to public-private 
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partnerships, as well as new mandates for citizen participation. Mirroring 
wider commitments outlined in the PPIP, this model has been expanded 
to most informal settlements in Kisumu, as well as in various other coun-
ties in Kenya. Likewise, it has also been implemented in other diverse con-
texts with NGO support, including Ghana and Mozambique. From the 
perspective of KIWASCO, it has performed the important function of ex-
tending service provision—and the market—into previously unpenetrated 
spaces, as well as reducing revenues lost through illegal connections or 
burst pipes (World Bank 2009). It has also linked neatly to policy reforms 
in the 2002 Water Act stipulating community participation in the opera-
tion and management of services. For residents, the DMM has increased 
the incentives for KIWASCO to operate in areas of high risk or low profit-
ability, thereby extending coverage into underserved areas. The business 
orientation of the kiosks and standpipes mirrors wider international dis-
courses linking urban services, community management, and entrepre-
neurship. It has facilitated greater water access and created employment 
opportunities for economically marginalized residents. 
While recognizing the levels of mutuality in this arrangement, there is 
also a need for a deeper examination of how these relations have unfolded 
in everyday practice. In particular, if the critiques highlighted above regard-
ing the configuration of privatization, citizen participation, and devolution 
are heeded, then innovative arrangements such as the DMM could risk 
circumscribing participation to a service delivery role to fill the gaps of a 
retreating state (Allen 2013), and wider claims of empowerment may be 
reduced to its economic dimension (Miraftab 2004). 
The remainder of this article turns to an analysis of the DMM in this 
light. It explores two important tensions emergent within the Kenyan con-
text—the commoditization of services and the devolution of responsibili-
ties—as well as the gendered dimensions of these tensions, which may cur-
tail the DMM’s democratic potential. Critically, it highlights the ways in 
which residents’ “everyday water practices” offer valuable lessons through 
which these tensions might be addressed. Importantly, this analysis is not 
intended to generate a definitive assessment of the DMM, but rather to 
draw conclusions about the specificities of how this model takes shape 
within the wider structural environment of Kisumu. It concludes with a 
number of policy implications that build from and bolster these practices of 
residents, further supporting the potential of the DMM. 
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Commoditization of Services: It is certain that the implementation of 
the DMM has generated a higher level of service provision in Kondele. 
Evaluations undertaken in collaboration with Practical Action indicated 
that many residents responded favorably when queried on the implementa-
tion of the reticulated system, citing a range of contributions to wellbeing 
from perceived health benefits, greater community interaction, improved 
quality and quantity of water, and economic benefits felt from the subsi-
dized tariffs (Castro and Morel 2008; Frediani et al. 2013; Walker 2013). 
Studies undertaken in other unplanned neighborhoods of Kisumu have in-
dicated that the DMM has facilitated network expansion, improved billing 
collection, and generated employment and income opportunities for MOs 
and entrepreneurial residents (Castro and Morel 2008; Schwartz and Sanga 
2010). In the context of fragmented service provision, there is considerable 
scope for these small-scale providers to deliver a more flexible and accessible 
service through the DMM, as suggested in the PPIP. 
Nonetheless, many residents in Kondele still experience restrictions on 
the ways in which they can legitimately claim for water. Critically, there is 
a high level of differentiation within settlements, with trunk infrastructure 
tending to follow major roads, or located nearer to wealthier neighborhoods 
of greater profitability (UN-Habitat 2008). Even within its pro-poor orien-
tation, decisions to install master meters are based upon feasibility studies 
monitoring economic viability and the potential for cost-recovery (World 
Bank 2009). Unsurprisingly, residents in lower-income interior areas of 
Kondele are thus less likely to be considered for DMM service, and many 
pro-poor water and sanitation facilities tend to be located in denser, wealth-
ier, or roadside locations. Where households are located at a far distance 
from the main line, the lengths of pipe needed may prove prohibitively ex-
pensive. Similarly, an assessment undertaken by Schwartz and Sanga (2010) 
on the DMM in the Nyalenda neighborhood highlights the challenge faced 
by poorer residents unable to make the initial investments for a household 
connection. In these cases, residents continue to draw upon communal 
sources such as kiosks, paying on average up to three times more for water. 
Interviews conducted in Kondele, particularly with tenants, indicated the 
continued trade-off between desiring improved services in the household, 
and the fear of rising rents. These examples reflect the reality that invest-
ment in unplanned areas—where it occurs—will benefit some while rein-
forcing gaps in coverage for particularly vulnerable residents.
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However, although the prioritization of cost-effectiveness and the com-
moditization of water has been articulated at the policy level, this logic 
has not always been mirrored in the everyday water practices of residents. 
Critically, in Kondele the tender for master operator was awarded to the 
local NPA, named the Manyatta Residents Association (MRA). In Kondele, 
this association between the MRA and the DMM—bolstered by NGO 
collaboration4—has had a critical mediating role in the ways in which the 
DMM operates. For instance, interviews with leadership in the MRA often 
demonstrated a greater commitment to equitably providing for the neigh-
borhood, rather than an allegiance to the principles of cost recovery. This 
sentiment was expressed clearly by the founding chairman of the MRA. 
Describing the recent dispute with KIWASCO regarding the transfer of 
existing water lines to the DMM—which would lower the running costs of 
the DMM—he explained that a straightforward tactic for pressurizing the 
utility was to shut off the master meter, temporarily depriving KIWASCO 
of its revenue, and generating a level of unrest within Kondele. However, 
the MRA was unwilling to adopt this as an option, “at the expense of the 
neighborhood,” citing its wider role in working for residents. 
This sense of responsibility to serve the wider public good, rather than the 
goals of efficient service delivery, is perhaps related to the historical emergence 
of the MRA; originally formed in 2003, the group initially coalesced to “fight 
for the right to water access” (Founding Chairman of MRA). Only in 2005 
did the organization expand to address other concerns within the neighbor-
hood, supported by the programmatic work of Practical Action. In the words 
of one member of the MRA: “What is the point of KIWASCO? Water and 
sewerage—and they are not doing this! When there is no sewage line, we 
must put politics in it—this is a problem which individuals cannot address. 
Citizens cannot plan the town.” This acknowledgement suggests a deeper 
connection for residents between citizenship rights and service provision. 
Devolution of Community Responsibilities: The second important ten-
sion is related to the absorption of responsibility and risk. A key incentive 
4 In particular, the Kondele NPA was selected to be supported through capacity-building 
measures and trainings in the 2008–2013 Peoples’ Plans into Practice program instituted by 
Practical Action, Shelter Forum, and the Kisumu Urban Apostolates Programme. 
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for the implementation of the DMM is that it allows the utility to reduce the 
costs of water lost from burst pipes or vandalism, both of which represent a 
significant risk for KIWASCO. However, what is made less evident is that 
this risk does not simply disappear, but is rather absorbed by the managing 
MOs, who are responsible for paying back the bulk water fees, regardless of 
how this is distributed (or not) throughout the neighborhood. To address 
the incidence of illegal connections, rewards are offered by KIWASCO to 
residents who report these activities—unrolling a model of self-surveillance 
into the settlement.5 As stated by the PPIP officer of KIWASCO: “the re-
sponsibility [of KIWASCO] stops at the master meter.” This model thus 
equates “partnership” with the reduction of corruption, and the generation 
of enabling conditions for private-sector providers to operate. This becomes 
discursively couched as cost-effective service delivery, effectively hiding 
where these costs have been reallocated—from KIWASCO to the MOs. 
Meanwhile, continued disputes between the MRA and KIWASCO 
over the transfer of existing water lines to the DMM system have also fore-
grounded communication and accountability challenges. Members of the 
MRA expressed a general apprehension that the costs of transferring the 
existing lines to the DMM would not be absorbed by KIWASCO, concerns 
that were similarly documented in the Nyalenda neighborhood, despite 
contractual agreements (Schwartz and Sanga 2008). KIWASCO remains 
responsible for dictating the scope of MO authority, including whether 
MOs will have decision-making power over the expansion of the network, 
if capacity building and training for MOs will be provided, or whether the 
costs of pipes and labor to transfer existing customers to the DMM will 
be budgeted (Castro and Morel 2008). This perception of members of the 
MRA of an inability to effectively lodge grievances, or better dictate the 
terms of engagement, suggests that this relationship may not necessarily 
operate as a space for the exercise of deeper political authority, even where it 
operates as an effective form of service delivery. 
However, as before, a reading of the everyday practices of residents within 
Kondele also suggests that residents are working within these (sometimes 
5 This approach was adopted in 2004 during the first iteration of the DMM in the Nyalenda 
neighborhood, when heavy opposition from informal water vendors was expressed over the 
span of a year, manifesting in an extensive campaign to sabotage the meters and piping. 
Crow et al. (2013) document the slow assimilation of these “rogue” traders into the DMM 
network through community policing tactics, encouraged by KIWASCO. 
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unfavorable) terms to generate alternative meanings and outcomes. There 
is evidence that this notion of community responsibility—particularly 
where espoused by members of the MRA—may be founded upon differ-
ent symbolic understandings of roles and obligations. For instance, though 
the MRA keenly identifies with the notion of community responsibility as 
evoked through “community policing,” this has also been re-interpreted. 
As expressed by “Robert,” a member of the MRA, the mandate for com-
munity surveillance has been used as an excuse to undertake mapping and 
documentation activities within the settlement. Thus moving through the 
settlement has on the one hand served the instrumental function of polic-
ing the lines, as well as assessing the economic viability of an additional 
master meter through querying residents on their willingness to participate. 
On the other hand, it has also reinforced a level of ownership and solidarity. 
For Robert, this represents a moment for residents to report grievances, or 
to share daily experiences in relation to their water service, or other con-
cerns that fall within the wider remit of the MRA. As expressed by Robert: 
“This is now our area.” 
Gendered Dimensions: Critically, the DMM and these wider trends—
commoditization and the devolution of responsibilities—have had partic-
ular ramifications for women and girls. In Kondele, responsibility for daily 
decision making related to water collection and usage remains primarily 
the responsibility of women. Cases in Kenya and elsewhere have docu-
mented the multiple repercussions this association has held on the health, 
time, safety, and physical and emotional wellbeing of women (O’Reilly 
2011; Ahlers and Zwarteveen 2009; Harris 2008). And indeed, a key out-
come of the increased quantity and quality of water provision through the 
DMM is related to benefits experienced particularly by women in their 
daily lives. Such is the case for “Mary,” a lower income resident of Kondele 
who migrated to the area four years prior. She lives adjacent to one of the 
DMM community kiosks, and remembers the time before its implementa-
tion, recalling the long queues and the distance she was required to walk 
to fetch water. However, the kiosk has been valuable to her not simply 
because of the ease with which she can access her daily water, but also be-
cause of the familiarity that proximity has given her with the kiosk manag-
ers. Mary explained this allowed her the possibility to take water on credit 
when she was struggling with bills, as she was known and trusted at the 
17
A New Generation of Ideas
site. This demonstrates one of the key innovations of the DMM—allow-
ing a greater level of flexibility for residents to negotiate with each other, 
rather than with KIWASCO directly. Furthermore, the association of the 
DMM with discourses of community participation has also linked it to 
wider claims related to the “empowerment” of residents.6 Thus the struc-
ture of the MRA, as well as new entrepreneurial activities represented by 
managing community kiosks, are specifically designed to engage a range 
of defined identities—including women, youth, and people with disabili-
ties—with the assumption that this will support gender parity (Walker 
and Butcher forthcoming). 
Although the DMM has made important strides in this regard, it is also 
critical to examine the continued influence of gendered norms that may 
limit decision-making authority, detracting from the deeper democratic 
potential of the model. Within Kondele, many of the women interviewed 
confirmed the connection between women, water, and power, referring 
to themselves as the “household managers.” In a focus group with mixed 
single and married women, decision making on finances, water collection, 
and usage were overwhelmingly cited as remaining in their charge. In the 
words of “Jackie”: “Women know better, and so there we have power. Even 
if there is a water shortage, the man…doesn’t know where the water comes 
from. He could use 20 litres without even realizing.” It was felt that this 
traditional expectation that women maintain charge of household issues 
(including water use and collection) granted a measure of authority. For 
some women, including Jackie, this was used to bargain for opportunities 
to participate in extra income-generating activities, such as managing a 
water kiosk, especially where it was seen to contribute funds for the use of 
household expenditures. 
Nonetheless, this discussion also demonstrated an acute awareness of 
the limitations of this authority. In response to Jackie’s story, a young so-
cial worker, ‘”Dora,” was quick to counter: “Yes, we can do some things...
but we do not have all the power.” She referenced the distinction between 
private practices and those that were acknowledged outside the home. For 
6 In Kisumu more generally, this linkage between gender, participation, and empowerment 
has been reflected in the commitment to, particularly, women’s participation in the 
management of ‘pro-poor projects’ implemented through the local government, as well as 
within programmatic approaches by major NGOs operating in the city.
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some husbands, having an employed wife was problematic: “They know 
it happens, but they may not publically admit it.” While Jackie described 
the sense of satisfaction gained from maintaining her own small business, 
women’s opportunities to move from the fulfilment of “practical” needs 
related to responsibilities as wives and mothers, towards wider “strategic” 
needs (Moser 1989) related to roles in society, were not always recognized. 
As interpreted by Dora, women’s work was legitimated and accepted where 
tied with reproductive concerns related to the household or community 
care, while publically obscured or devalued where related to productive or 
political roles. She cited, for instance, the fact that even while they are con-
sidered “household managers,” decisions still primarily had to be channelled 
through the male head of house rather than approaching landlords or other 
authorities directly (though this process might be made simpler in cases 
where the landowner was a woman). Reflecting on this, another woman 
shared her experience on queues at her nearby kiosk, where she perceived 
men—when they collected water—received preferential treatment on busy 
mornings. She attributed this to the widespread recognition—espoused by 
both female and male kiosk operators—that men might be pressed for time 
before the working day. Querying this logic, she turned to the rest of the 
group: “But don’t I have jobs to do too?” 
Such experiences are not confined to Kondele, and the reduction of wom-
en’s labor to a reproductive recognition alone has been systematically docu-
mented in other contexts (Ahlers 2002; Kabeer 2002; Cleaver and Hamada 
2010). This example conforms to Kabeer’s rich analysis, which found in 
diverse contexts that even where women had a measure of autonomy in the 
household, “what remains non-negotiable is men’s overall control of house-
hold land, capital, and other valued resources” (Kabeer 1994, 225). This 
recognition becomes particularly important in a context where responsibili-
ties for community services are being devolved to the individual, and the 
distribution of basic necessities is dictated (to a certain extent) by principles 
of cost recovery. Though the presence of women in the MRA, or in com-
munity employment opportunities, has certainly created more spaces for 
women’s public participation, challenges to the equitable access and control 
of water, strongly linked with identity, remain very present within Kondele. 
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Emerging from the experiences explored above—the commoditization of 
water services, the devolution of risk and responsibility, and the influence 
of embedded gender roles—it is possible to identify a range of practical 
implications. First, the DMM was made possible in Kenya because of 
a supportive regulatory environment that explicitly acknowledged the 
role of small service providers and offered subsidized tariffs for low-income 
areas. The willingness of the utility to allow a more flexible network, and a 
political commitment to citizen participation, supported the development 
of community management capacity. 
Second, while recognizing the significant network expansion of the 
DMM, even “pro-poor” service delivery may not be the same as univer-
salized or equitable models. The siting of trunk infrastructure, household 
income levels, and tenure status have generated a differentiated access to the 
DMM for residents of Kondele. This experience suggests that in particular 
circumstances, subsidies or the loosening of cost-recovery principles may 
play a crucial role if the necessary infrastructure is to be implemented in 
hard-to-reach or lower-income areas. Similarly, agreements with landlords 
to maintain rents at comparable rates for a set period following improve-
ments, as was implemented by a Federation of the Urban Poor managed-
project in Dar es Salaam (Banana et al. 2015), could offset the process of 
rapid land price increases, already happening throughout the city. 
Third, the decision to link the MOs with the Kondele NPA en-
hanced the possibilities for the DMM to relate to a broader citizenship 
project. This is a critical point in light of the shifting tendering process of 
the DMM. In the neighborhood of Nyalenda, where the DMM originated, 
the MO tendering process has now been opened to private entrepreneurs, 
potentially moving away from management by a community-based orga-
nization (Castro and Morel 2008). Although this is intended to stimulate 
a climate of competitiveness to encourage better service delivery, there is a 
critical difference between the empowerment of savvy entrepreneurs and 
that of an elected community representation structure. 
Fourth, capacity-building measures for both utility staff and MOs 
remain key. The experience in Kondele demonstrated the wider benefits re-
sulting from the training provided through Practical Action’s PPP process, 
which has supported the MRA more generally to embark upon different 
20
Urban Solutions: Metropolitan Approaches, Innovation in Urban Water and Sanitation, and Inclusive Smart Cities
forms of advocacy across the settlement. Yet there is also still room for a 
deeper engagement—particularly in moving beyond managerial and finan-
cial training for the MOs. For instance, renegotiating channels of commu-
nication and accountability between MOs and KIWASCO could help to 
better embed water services management into existing governance channels. 
Last, the influence of embedded social and cultural norms continues 
to play a significant role in mediating access to and control of water 
services. This calls for further research on the everyday ways in which 
water management occurs at both the neighborhood and household level, 
exploring interventions that can address those perceptions reinforcing iden-
tity-based inequities. 
CONCLUSION
Both Kenya and Kisumu are poised on the edge of major change, with 
particular implications for the service experiences of the urban poor. In 
Kondele, while the DMM has demonstrated key successes in extending net-
worked service in unplanned areas, it has also been unrolled in a particular 
configuration as a result of the wider trends of devolution, privatization, 
and citizen participation. In some cases this has generated gaps for par-
ticularly vulnerable residents. However, and critically, there is also evidence 
of opportunities to leverage this model to build towards a deeper demo-
cratic project. In particular, an examination of the everyday water practices 
of Kondele’s residents demonstrates how the challenges presented by the 
DMM are already being addressed at the settlement level, offering valuable 
reflections on how these activities might be bolstered more systematically. 
Furthermore, an examination of embedded gender norms also demon-
strated the range of processes, networks, and spaces through which interests 
are articulated—not only operating in the formal or public sphere. That is, 
as residents move through a range of networks, interact in different ways 
with physical technologies, or engage in various sets of public and personal 
politics, these form important terrains for broader struggles around the con-
stitution of citizenship. What this indicates is that supporting the negotia-
tion capacity of marginalized groups requires not only strong institutional 
responses, but also attention to the underlying norms present in everyday 
practice, which might equally reproduce wider structural  inequalities. 
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Exploring this position offers the potential to develop and bolster innova-
tive strategies represented by the DMM, going further in linking urban 
services and citizenship.
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Engaging the Local Public Sector to 
Meet Slum Residents’ Practical and 
Strategic Service Needs:  
Evidence from Hyderabad, India
Gregory Pierce
University of California, Los Angeles
ABSTRACT
Service provision remains woefully insufficient to meet the basic needs of slum resi-
dents across many low- and middle-income countries, but particularly in India. 
Consequently, resident movements, NGOs, and state and central government 
agencies have formed initiatives to improve Indian local government service per-
formance. Based on multiple years of fieldwork data, this study uses the method of 
process tracing to evaluate the capacity of the Basti Vikas Manch (BVM)—a slum 
development platform operating in Hyderabad, India—to meet slum residents’ 
practical and strategic basic service needs. Findings inform broader policy efforts 
to support low-income community engagement with public agencies.
INTRODUCTION
Urban public sector service provision remains woefully insufficient to meet 
the basic needs of slum residents across low- and middle-income countries 
(LMICs), but particularly in India. Consequently, bottom-up resident move-
ments, intermediary NGOs, and top-down initiatives by state and central 
government agencies have formed to improve Indian local  government service 
24
Urban Solutions: Metropolitan Approaches, Innovation in Urban Water and Sanitation, and Inclusive Smart Cities
performance. The success of these efforts, however, has been mixed at best. 
Using data collected over multiple years of fieldwork, this study documents 
the origins and engagement strategies of the Basti Vikas Manch (BVM), a 
unique slum development platform operating in four notified slums (for-
mally recognized by the Indian government) in the greater urban area of 
Hyderabad, India. The BVM originated due to an acute crisis of public water, 
sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) provision in slum settlements. BVM groups 
accomplish short-term service outcomes by employing several unique strate-
gies. They attempt to not only intensively learn from and exploit the formal 
structures of local public agencies, but also to engage local power brokers in 
a manner that escalates from constructive cooperation to increasingly adver-
sarial techniques as needed. This study evaluates the success of the BVM in 
terms of both its ability to satisfy short-term livelihood necessities and to ef-
fect long-term transformation in state-society relations. 
THE BVM AT THE INTERSECTION OF URBAN ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
SLUM UPGRADING INITIATIVES
The Basti Vikas Manch can only be understood as a product of relatively re-
cent top-down government accountability reforms, and decades of bottom-
up and intermediary slum upgrading programs in Hyderabad specifically, 
and India more broadly. 
Top-down Urban Accountability Mechanisms
The Indian central government did not pass legislation granting urban 
areas status as official governing entities—urban local bodies (ULBs)—
until 1992, much later than most comparable LMICs and in stark contrast 
to the country’s long-established rural administrative structure. Since the 
onset of national reforms to enable local urban administration, state gov-
ernments and ULBs across India have nominally adopted the language of 
decentralization, accountability, and participation in decision making re-
garding urban service delivery (De Wit, Nainan and Palnitkar 2008). The 
national government’s emphasis on decentralized service delivery has taken 
place concurrently with rapid urban population growth. 
In practice, however, non-state stakeholders place little faith in the per-
formance of ward committees, the lowest level of official government 
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 decentralization. De Wit, Nainan, and Palnitkar (2008), in a review of ward 
committees across major cities in India, and Ghosh and Mitra (2008), in 
an assessment of committee performance in West Bengal, found them to 
be completely noninclusive and thus unaccountable to residents. Among 
large ULBs, Hyderabad is reputed by some scholars to operate at the fron-
tier of governance reforms to enhance the representation of resident concerns 
(Caseley 2006). Ward committees in Hyderabad, however, do not function 
in a more egalitarian fashion than in other cities. Only municipal corpora-
tors and government officers are allowed to attend committee meetings, ef-
fectively ruling out public participation, and it often requires the involvement 
of a member of the national legislature to access committees’ funds for service 
upgrades (Kennedy 2008; M. Chand, personal interview, August 13, 2014). 
Consequently, a host of other local initiatives have emerged to improve 
the representation of resident service concerns to ULBs. Scholars have 
documented the robustness and diversity of middle class collective action 
to improve neighborhood conditions performed through resident welfare 
associations (Kamath and Vijayabaskar 2009; De Wit and Berner 2009). 
No equivalent institutional form has emerged, however, to effectively air 
grievances regarding service provision on behalf of residents of low-income 
housing settlements. Negotiated, informal relationships rather than formal, 
transparent mechanisms remain low-income households’ primary means 
for grievance redress with public agencies. 
Bottom-up or Intermediary Slum Upgrading Programs
Many studies argue pessimistically that intermediary institutions or plat-
forms between low-income residents and government agencies are invari-
ably co-opted by local power brokers and NGOs (De Wit and Berner 2009; 
Landy and Ruby 2005; Zerah 2009). Despite the preponderance of nega-
tive experiences, counter-examples suggest that constructive communica-
tion between local government and disadvantaged urban communities can 
bring about the gradual satisfaction of residents’ practical and strategic 
needs (Carmin, Anguelovski, and Roberts 2012; Berquist, Daniere, and 
Drummond 2014). 
Hyderabad and Slum Upgrading Efforts
The Hyderabad local government’s Urban Community Development (UCD) 
Project was one of the great success stories featured in the early literature on 
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slum upgrading programs (Moser 1989a; Rao 2000). Initiated by UNICEF 
in 1967, the self-help housing program established slum welfare committees, 
which were led by existing slum leaders and local community-based orga-
nizations (CBOs). This program fit into the “sites and services” approach to 
slum upgrading popular across LMICs (for instance, see Mayo and Gross 
1987). Since that time, however, local experts have observed that the UCD 
has become increasingly ineffective as a result of institutional turmoil (Kar 
2014; personal interview with A. Maringanti, August 9, 2014).1 The UCD 
still nominally supports slum resident groups, but these are non-operational 
due to election uncertainty. 
Current efforts to improve service conditions in Hyderabadi slums and 
low-income communities draw on international and national support. The 
national Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, via funding 
obtained under the Rajiv Awas Yojana program, purports to carry out infra-
structure improvements within all 1,476 slums in the city proper (GHMC 
2012). Robust community consultation and participation in planning meet-
ings is also reported to have been mediated by the city government. The 
country’s Urban Poverty Reduction Strategy, required by the UNDP, also 
involves the Urban Community Development department in a “National 
Strategy for the Urban Poor” (Center for Good Governance n.d.). Despite 
the promising rhetoric of these initiatives, none of the residents interviewed 
in this study had observed the operation of these programs in their commu-
nities. From the perspective of slum residents, there was no coherent, effec-
tive representation to local government agencies of low-income community 
concerns regarding services. This is the gap which the BVM aimed to fill. 
DATA AND METHODS
Data for this study were collected via fieldwork conducted in Hyderabad 
in 2013–2014. All fieldwork was carried out with assistance from the 
staff of two NGOs supporting the BVM, the South Asian Consortium of 
Integrated Water Resources (SaciWATERs) and the Society for Participatory 
Development (SPD). The four slums involved in the BVM—Addagutta, 
Ambedkar Nagar, Bholakpur and Rasoolpura—comprise the study areas. 
1 Repeated requests by the author to interview current officials within the UCD were ignored.
27
A New Generation of Ideas
Field visits to the study areas varied from formal transect walks and 
BVM meeting attendance to informal conversations with individual resi-
dents. To describe the history of basic service conditions and engagement 
efforts carried out in the study areas over the period 2008–2014, this study 
draws on previously unanalyzed program files maintained at the BVM of-
fices in the study areas. The most relevant program data to this study were 
paper records of representations and media reports on basic service condi-
tions in the study areas. 
To corroborate personal observation and analysis of primary program 
documents for this study, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
26 stakeholders. These individuals included all SaciWATERs and SPD staff 
involved in the BVM (5), BVM conveners in each informal settlement (4), 
BVM locality leaders at the neighborhood level (9), female non-leader slum 
residents (5), and representatives from other NGOs and government of-
ficials (3). Finally, supplementary data are derived from an anonymous sur-
vey of 31 BVM leaders. The survey was administered by the author and 
SaciWATERs staff on August 3, 2014, at an all-slum BVM summit. The 
survey queried leaders’ reasons for joining the BVM, current satisfaction 
with the initiative, and the major successes and challenges of the BVM in 
specific neighborhoods. 
This study employs the research method of process tracing. This method 
is a subset of case study analysis that typically utilizes multiple observations 
over time within a single case rather than across disparate cases (Tansey 
2007; Méndez-Lemus and Vieyra 2013). Process tracing draws on data 
sources such as elite interviews, archival documents, and other historical 
sources to establish the course of an intervening causal process. 
MOTIVATION OF THE BVM: HOW THE PLATFORM STARTED
The long-term institutional fracturing of the Urban Community 
Development and the more recent, ineffective attempts of slum residents to 
participate in ward committees help to explain the broad need for an inde-
pendent effort to improve service delivery in Hyderabad’s slums. The more 
proximate inspiration for the BVM, however, was an acute failure of pub-
licly provided water and sanitation services. In May 2009, water and sewer-
age lines provided and maintained by the city utility mixed with each other. 
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Consequently, the public water supply within Bholakpur was polluted with 
E. coli; residents were not immediately informed. Consumption of the con-
taminated water led to the death of at least 14 people, as well as hundreds 
of cases of serious illness (Iftekhar 2011; Times of India 2010). This public 
provision failure caught the attention of local and national media, and years 
later is still referred to in public debates (Deccan Chronicle 2014). 
The Bholakpur water tragedy motivated residents to demand better pub-
lic services and effectively forced local government agencies to pay more 
attention to these complaints. The incident also prompted a prominent 
activist for water equity in the Hyderabad area to work with community 
leaders in several slums for better public service provision. The prompting 
of tragedy to bring about collective action among low-income urban resi-
dents has numerous precedents (Walton 1998). An initial period of activism 
led to a more formal capacity-building program to improve WASH condi-
tions. This program, the “Citizen First Campaign for Water Supply and 
Sanitation Accountability,” was funded by the UK charity WaterAid. 
The Study Areas 
The housing settlements involved in the Citizen First program—Addagutta, 
Ambedkar Nagar, Bholakpur and Rasoolpura—are situated north of 
Hyderabad’s historic core, but are centrally located in the twin-city area 
of Hyderabad-Secunderabad. Addagutta, Ambedkar Nagar, and Bholakpur 
are located within the service area of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal 
Corporation (GHMC), while Rasoolpura is situated on the border between 
the GHMC and the Secunderabad Cantonment Board (SCB). Together 
these settlements house more than 150,000 people. 
Each settlement is recognized as a notified slum by the Indian govern-
ment. Notification confers a degree of legitimacy on residence in these com-
munities (Nakamura 2014). Moreover, each slum has been settled for forty 
to fifty years, has a fairly permanent built environment, and has received 
some level of basic services from the nominally responsible public agen-
cies before the existence of the program. Figure 1 shows a government sign 
recognizing Ambedkar Nagar’s notification status, with publicly provided 
water tanks beneath it. In short, the classic concerns regarding clearance, il-
legality, or lack of formal recognition from the government that have domi-
nated the literature on slums and service provision are not especially press-
ing in the study areas. Rather than the complete absence or antagonism of 
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the public sector, it is the slow and uneven pace of public improvements 
relative to needs and infrastructure obsolescence that demonstrate the need 
for an intervention such as the Citizen First program. 
First Phase: Water Quality Improves but Broader  
Engagement Stalls
The Hyderabad-based NGO Joint Action for Water (JAW) oversaw the ini-
tial phase of the Citizen First program (2010–2013). Since inception, the 
program has emphasized enhancing the capacity of slum residents to im-
prove their water and sanitation access; no hardware or funds are provided. 
The first phase of the initiative also aimed to increase resident awareness and 
compel the government to conduct more consistent testing of water qual-
ity. JAW focused on distributing water quality testing and purifying kits 
and conducting intensive water-testing trainings for residents in Addagutta, 
Bholakpur, and Rasoolpura, but kits were distributed more broadly in 76 
Hyderabad area slums. 
Ambedkar Nagar Settlement, Government Sign and Water Tanks (Gregory Pierce, 2014)
30
Urban Solutions: Metropolitan Approaches, Innovation in Urban Water and Sanitation, and Inclusive Smart Cities
In 2013, however, WaterAid transferred responsibility for the support 
of the Citizen First program from JAW to SaciWATERs and SPD. JAW’s 
failure to activate ward committees coincided with a generally shallow 
level of resident understanding of the service issues and involvement in 
collective action (Citizen First, 2013). JAW also contracted out much of 
the initiative’s work to local CBOs, which received payment for conduct-
ing the activities requested by WaterAid (JAW 2012). This outsourcing 
discouraged a significant proportion of slum residents from getting in-
volved and taking ownership of the initiative. Consequently, implement-
ers of the second phase decided to focus program efforts on a few promis-
ing slums (Kar 2014). 
The second phase aimed to conduct “regular training for members to 
build the capacity which ensures the well-built knowledge base of upcom-
ing policies and schemes to leverage support from public bodies and guide 
the communities for sustainable livelihoods” (Ramoji 2014). The envisioned 
means to ensure greater participation was the BVM, whose long-term aim, 
according to a letter to a government district collector, was “to empower the 
slum dwellers for accessing their entitlements” (Rasoolpura BVM 2013). 
THE SCALE AND CORE ACTIVITIES OF THE BVM 
BVM groups are organized at the slum scale, but the core activities of the 
BVM take place at the scale of the neighborhood. These neighborhoods con-
tain between one to three thousand people. Weekly meetings are held in each 
neighborhood in the slums where the BVM has been activated (see Figure 2). 
The meetings serve to solicit resident concerns and identify shortcomings 
regarding public services in neighborhoods. These concerns are communi-
cated to the slum-level BVM group, and are then used to file “representa-
tions” with relevant public agencies. Representations are service concerns 
or grievances of local slum residents presented to local, state, and national 
government agencies. The process of representation in the BVM involves 
soliciting the basic service concerns of local residents at the neighborhood 
level, putting these concerns in writing, and filing formal requests for service 
upgrades with local government agencies on a routine basis. Representations 
utilize formal grievance mechanisms that are built into many public agencies 
(Caseley 2006; Davis 2004), but are more accessible to slum dwellers. 
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To monitor progress on addressing service needs, staff from the support-
ing NGOs visit each slum area weekly. Other capacity training or engage-
ment strategies are also carried out by the supporting NGOs on an ad hoc 
basis. For instance, in Bholakpur and Addagutta, NGO staff have helped 
stage slum-wide events and public demonstrations annually on World 
Toilet and World Water Day, which have been publicized by the local press. 
PROCESS: MEETING PRACTICAL NEEDS
How can we evaluate the work of the BVM? In this type of engagement 
initiative, the definition of success or failure is not obvious (Joshi 2013). 
Donor, local implementer, and resident objectives and definitions of success 
are likely to differ. Accordingly, this study assesses the BVM based on its 
ability to meet residents’ practical and strategic needs while satisfying donor 
goals. The long-term success of initiatives such as the BVM requires a unique 
Meeting at BVM Office, Addagutta Settlement (Gregory Pierce, 2014)
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combination of patience and subversion to meet both practical and strategic 
needs (Moser 1989b; Mitlin 2008). Practical needs are met in three time 
frames: short-term improvements in service outcomes via the existing BVM 
structure, medium-term sustainability of engagement efforts without NGO 
support, and long-term transfer of responsibility to government agencies. 
Short Term
In the short term, the BVM operates to communicate pressing basic ser-
vice needs to local government agencies and incentivizes them to address 
these needs. During the period of February 2010 to August 2014, BVM 
groups filed 500 formal representations with local government agencies.2 
Filing representations epitomizes the unique way in which the Citizen 
First program learns the local government system and exploits new op-
portunities. The main government forum to which BVM groups make 
representations is the Prajavani (People’s Voice) program of the GHMC 
(New Indian Express 2013). The most successful representations were for 
one-off, short-term requests. For instance, representations made to the 
GHMC to do a special sweeping of streets in advance of Ramadan, to 
state power agencies to replace light bulbs and power lines, and to the 
city’s water utility to address contaminated drinking water, all quickly 
achieved their aims. Other issues raised via representations, such as the 
covering of nalas (open drains) and the provision of ration cards to eligible 
households, have only partially succeeded. By contrast, repeated repre-
sentations regarding issues such as school sanitation and the construction 
of community halls and health centers have received scant response. The 
lack of progress in resolving these service deficiencies appears to be due 
to their dependence on coordination between local and national agencies. 
Representations also appear less successful if made to national agencies, 
which easily ignore local concerns. 
Moreover, representations sometimes bring about the minimum re-
sponse to address a basic service deficit rather than satisfactory resolution. 
2 As an alternative measure of success, in the six months between the origin of the BVM phase 
and the end of 2013, the BVM leveraged approximately $18,500 of investment from public 
agencies that would not have otherwise been spent in the study areas. This compares to $15,600 
dollars in BVM program costs for the same period (email correspondence with C. Kar, January 
9, 2015). In other words, whether judged as a direct resource transfer from WaterAid to slum 
communities or via a full cost-benefit analysis, the BVM appears to be effective. 
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Still, the potential for lasting change in basic service security due to rep-
resentations should not be understated. In the Gun Huts Bazaar area of 
Rasoolpura, representations filed by residents successfully pressured the 
SCB to devote 7–8 lakhs ($11,700–$13,300) to regularly pick up solid and 
liquid waste in this area. This site’s status as an unauthorized trash dump 
had lasted for forty years, but it took only nine months of collective pressure 
to fully resolve the issue.3
Medium Term
Beyond the scope of the second program phase (through 2016), WaterAid’s 
goal is for the platform to carry out its work without external support. 
Since complete devolution of the platform to slum residents has always 
been envisioned, supporting NGOs have consistently provided training to 
increase the capacity of BVM conveners, neighborhood BVM leaders, and 
non-BVM leaders (BVM 2013; Ramoji 2014). In a 2014 survey, however, 
leaders of the BVM identified insufficient funds as one of the initiative’s 
biggest ongoing challenges. Neighborhood-level BVM groups must con-
sider creative means to raise funds for continued operations, or a system of 
dues, to prepare for the complete autonomy of the platform. Accordingly, 
Bholakpur’s BVM leaders are building a large base of participants with 
the goal of eventually collecting fees for program activities when external 
support is withdrawn. Moreover, BVM leaders in Ambedkar Nagar, who 
do not receive any funds from the Citizen First program, have actually 
requested more autonomy from program implementers in order to work 
on their own agenda. 
Long Term 
The long-term goal for the BVM is not only to be entirely self-run, but also 
for the majority of its current activities to become superfluous due to the 
 existence of reliable local public sector service provision. The BVM attempts 
to accomplish this long-term handoff to local government by treating local 
public officials as potential allies rather than inevitable enemies (personal 
3 From the perspective of residents, assessing short-term effectiveness involves a comparison 
to the status quo in the slums before the initiation of the BVM. Among BVM leaders, self-
reported satisfaction with the platform’s progress on achieving service outcomes was fairly 
high (4 out of 5 on a Likert scale).
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interview, C. Kar, July 19, 2014). If cooperative efforts are unsuccessful in 
eliciting public sector response, however, BVM groups do not hesitate to 
engage in confrontation and shaming of public agencies and officials. The 
ultimate goal of all engagement, whether cooperative or adversarial, is to in-
creasingly incentivize government officials and politicians to provide better 
services to slum residents (Allaby and Preston 2005). As detailed above, this 
mainstreaming of service tasks by the public sector has been successfully 
achieved with respect to water quality testing and solid waste collection. 
Government mainstreaming of other services will serve as a key indicator of 
success in the future. 
PROCESS: MEETING STRATEGIC NEEDS
In addition to meeting practical needs and bringing about government 
mainstreaming to meet these needs in existing program areas, the BVM 
maintains more strategic aims. Given its ambitious remit, the platform can 
be evaluated in terms of its capacity to increase the scale of its operations 
intensively (taking on a larger remit within existing program areas) and ex-
tensively (reaching more slums outside of original program areas). 
Intensive Scaling
Slum dwellers need more than consistent access to WASH. Supporting 
NGOs have long referenced the idea of the “right to the city” in envisag-
ing that the Citizen First program would also bring slum residents better 
livelihoods and bargaining power (J. Jairath, personal interview, August 15, 
2013). Dissatisfaction with progress on this broader remit in the program’s 
first phase led to the creation of the BVM platform. Without directly invok-
ing the right to the city, slum residents also clearly embrace a more ambitious 
agenda than WASH. Representations filed by the BVM have expanded to 
bring about improvements to basic health care, electricity, solid waste man-
agement, and education. Participation in the BVM has also raised a broader 
range of concerns among residents. In the Anna Nagar neighbourhood of 
Rasoolpura, for instance, residents have taken up emergency transportation 
services as a concern. In Ambedkar Nagar the BVM spends much of its effort 
demanding a new public school, and in Bholakpur women’s concerns regard-
ing domestic abuse are central. Coordination of BVM units across the slums, 
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if not coalitions at larger scales, is required in order to elicit a government 
response regarding these issues. 
Extensive Scaling
A focus on extensive scaling, before program design has demonstrated ef-
fectiveness or elicited interest from the supposed beneficiaries, is a common 
mistake made by NGOs (Uvin, Jain and Brown 2000). The first phase of 
the Citizen First program exhibited this type of over-extension. Program 
implementers envisioned the spread of the program across slums as a citi-
zens’ collective movement. Consequently, they immediately aimed to scale 
up collective action across seventy-five slums without sufficient momentum. 
The second phase, on the other hand, has made intensive efforts to activate 
the BVM in four slums and has consequently gained the trust and enthu-
siasm of residents. This divergence in outcomes suggests that program scal-
ing may be better pursued via demand from local communities rather than 
supply from program implementers. The spread of the BVM to Ambedkar 
Nagar in 2013 demonstrates horizontal scaling of the initiative. The success 
of the BVM has prompted other slums to request BVM activation, and 
residents from other slums have attended city-level meetings and leaders 
trainings of the platform (BVM 2013; personal interviews, C. Kar, July 9 
and September 11, 2014). 
CONCLUSION
This study explains the origins of and evaluates the engagement strategies 
employed by the Basti Vikas Manch in four slums situated in Hyderabad, 
India. The BVM effectively balances cooperative and combative engage-
ment with local power brokers to improve conditions for slum residents. 
Moreover, the BVM navigates the tension between meeting practical and 
strategic needs in the urban public sector. At the same time, since the BVM 
platform relies on the agency and efforts of slum residents to engage local 
government, it should not be expected to realize complete transformation 
of the service access status quo. Normatively, the onus should not be laid 
entirely, or even primarily, on disadvantaged residents to address their basic 
service deficits, much less their access to a broader set of rights and op-
portunities. In practice, the effect of participatory initiatives in bringing 
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about better service provision and large-scale social change is mediated by 
local government administrative structure (McCourt 2012). In this respect, 
there is some room for optimism in Hyderabad. Although political parties 
continue to interact with slum dwellers in a non-democratic fashion, urban 
bureaucrats now follow official, public agency protocols more often than 
they did in the past (Kar, 2014).
On the other hand, participants in the contemporary BVM must still 
often register representations with multiple agencies to address one issue. 
Policy efforts to revitalize the Urban Community Development of the 
Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation are likely to have the biggest 
positive effect on slum dwellers in the study areas. The department his-
torically functioned as a comprehensive forum for slum dwellers to register 
complaints regarding public sector service delivery and other civic rights. 
Moreover, endemic shortcomings suggest that local government agencies 
need to be reorganized to prioritize infrastructure maintenance in addition 
to new construction (Ramoji 2014). 
This study also contributes to a broader understanding of how low-
income resident platforms can effectively engage and secure basic service 
improvements from under-performing urban governance structures across 
LMICs. Other urban initiatives to improve basic service access for low-in-
come communities can adopt elements of the BVM’s constructive engage-
ment strategy and the flexible employment of a range of tactics based on 
detailed knowledge of the nuances of local public sector (dys)functioning. 
The development of the BVM in Hyderabad has taken place in the larger 
context of profound administrative and political change. Attempting to foster 
similar initiatives in more closed political and bureaucratic contexts, however, 
will require different strategies. In addition to learning from initiatives em-
ployed in open contexts such as the BVM, future policy can draw on insights 
from the literature on nonviolent protest formation to initiate effective en-
gagement strategies with local government agencies in autocracies.
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Citizenship and Water-Spigot Politics 
in Rio de Janeiro1
Douglas McRae
Georgetown University
ABSTRACT
This paper asks what have been the obstacles to extending water supply equita-
bly in Brazil’s largest cities? Specifically, how have the politics of water supply 
evolved over time and in relation to Brazil’s recent political history? The analy-
sis considers the defining role of neighborhood associations in Rio de Janeiro 
in shaping citizenship and political participation in the latter half of the past 
century. It reviews recent literature on citizenship in Brazil and relevant case 
studies related to access to water and sanitation to assess obstacles and advances 
in strengthening universal citizenship in urban Brazil.
In 1968, Brazil entered the most repressive phase of its 21-year military dicta-
torship. Following the issuance of Institutional Act 5 (AI-5), which outlawed 
political participation and expression outside the strict parameters set by the 
military government, the promise of democratic participation and social in-
clusion at the decade’s start seemed ever more distant. Brazil’s military dicta-
torship, which had overthrown president João Goulart in 1964, was the first 
of a wider regional pattern of authoritarian rule in Latin America, a wave 
sustained by conservative elites, military officials, and the frequent support 
of the U.S. government. Economic growth and political order dominated a 
1 I would like to thank Bryan McCann, Timothy Wickham-Crowley, and fellow graduate 
student participants in the Latin American History and Research Seminar (LAHRS), all at 
Georgetown University, for helpful feedback on earlier versions of this paper.
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system that in theory sought a renewal of Brazilian  democracy while simul-
taneously crushing dissent, seen as radical and destabilizing. As the military 
government propped up a façade of electoral democracy at the national level, 
older forms of politics persisted at the local level.
One illustrative example comes from Rio de Janeiro, a city that until 
1960 had been the capital of the Brazilian republic. Facing declining po-
litical centrality and economic dynamism, the newly established city-state 
encompassing Rio (known as Guanabara) found itself in the unique posi-
tion of being the only state with “opposition” governors during the years of 
military rule. In 1971, Antônio Padua de Chagas Freitas came to power as 
a member of the Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB), the nominal 
opposition party to the military’s Aliança para a Reconstrução Nacional 
(Arena). The name Chagas Freitas became associated with a form of clien-
telistic urban politics known as a política do bica d’agua, or “water-spigot 
politics.” In this configuration, a politician like Chagas Freitas would visit 
a favela community and offer some sort of basic infrastructure (usually a 
communal water spigot) in exchange for a promise for electoral support. If 
the community followed through and the candidate won, the improvement 
was delivered to the community, often in a ceremonious fashion (McCann 
2014, 43). Although this clientelism had long existed in Rio, in this phase it 
became synonymous with Chagas Freitas (Trinidade 2000).
Clientelism, while not strictly confined to Latin America, has histori-
cally shaped much of the urban political landscape in the region. Local 
variants in different countries evolved in response to the gradual incorpora-
tion of popular sectors into national political coalitions. Understanding the 
resulting patterns of political organization in Latin American cities is key to 
understanding how notions of citizenship transformed under authoritarian 
regimes and later during the transition to civilian rule. Such understanding 
is also needed to develop a more nuanced sense of the obstacles to install-
ing basic and sustainable improvements to sanitation infrastructure. The 
purpose of this paper is to rethink a notion like water-spigot politics and in-
corporate its implications into the study of citizenship in Brazil’s contempo-
rary democracy. The military years choked the development of citizenship 
rights in Brazil, already unevenly distributed in earlier periods of its history. 
Additionally, the forms of citizenship and rights found in Brazil differ from 
those found in other societies, a fact with which policy makers and social 
scientists must grapple when studying urbanization in contemporary Brazil.
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This paper looks at attempts by communities and associações de mora-
dores (neighborhood associations) to acquire and maintain water and sanita-
tion systems, especially in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, thus making their 
own version of water-spigot politics, I argue that neighborhood associa-
tions played a significant role in securing access to water and other services, 
though maintenance of these services was tenuous. Water supply will be 
the analytical lens for investigating citizenship and political participation 
in urban areas. As anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes observed in her 
ethnography of an urban periphery in Pernambuco: “Water is a key word, a 
Paulo Freirian ‘generative theme.’ It animates social life…and both divides 
and unites the social classes” (1992, 68). Thirst, drought, and general lack 
of clean water are stereotypical images of Brazil’s Northeast, yet these issues 
increasingly manifest in Brazil’s largest urban areas. Likewise, water can 
and continues to be “generative” for political action, beyond the clientelistic 
practices of local political machines. By taking a close look at the inter-
twined development of citizenship rights and basic water infrastructure in 
one of Brazil’s largest cities, we may understand better the modern chal-
lenges facing urban communities with precarious access to basic sanitation. 
DEFINING CITIZENSHIP IN MODERN BRAZIL
Citizenship, the rights and duties of a member of a community (a citizen), 
historically emerged alongside the rise of the modern city. With growing 
urban populations, political leaders sought to consolidate state power over 
a new base of legitimacy (Carvalho 1987, 11–12). The idea of the rights of 
citizenship dates back to the emergence of the nation-state as a viable politi-
cal unit in the nineteenth century. Membership in a modern political com-
munity (in this case, the Brazilian nation-state) assumes a two-way street of 
rights and duties associated with members of that community, its citizens. 
In Brazil, nineteenth-century proponents of liberalism theoretically em-
braced civil, political, and social rights for all Brazilians, though historically 
social groups enjoyed highly differentiated access to these rights. In fact, as 
anthropologist Roberto Da Matta observes for Brazil, one of the contradic-
tions of citizenship is that denoting all members of a society as citizens 
obscures inequalities based on factors such as social status, race, or gender 
(1997, 63–65). Subsequently, groups excluded from the full spectrum of 
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rights and duties encompassing citizenship, such as urban favelados (favela 
residents), have often worked outside the established but exclusionary legal 
frameworks, exercising in effect alternative forms of citizenship.
To understand the social processes by which favela communities peti-
tioned for and frequently acquired access to water services, it is helpful to 
begin with T.H. Marshall’s classic delineation of the progression of citizen-
ship rights in nineteenth-century industrial Britain. Marshall saw a gradual 
progression over the course of two centuries from civil rights to political 
rights and finally social rights (Marshall 1964). For Charles Tilly (1996), 
current trends towards the dismantling and restriction of previously “in-
eradicable perquisites of citizenship in Western countries” have led to cri-
tiques of Marshall’s teleological take on the rights of citizenship. In a re-
cent reflection on the comparative experience of citizenship rights in Latin 
American countries, Philip Oxhorn presents an alternate view of these 
rights in the context of recent democratic transitions: “the provision of uni-
versal political rights in the absence of civil rights and with social rights in 
decline” (Oxhorn 2003, 47). In the post-authoritarian period of democratic 
transition in Latin America, Oxhorn predicts: “The juxtaposition of uni-
versal political rights with such sharp limits to other aspects of citizenship 
will have important consequences for the quality of democracy” in the re-
gion (ibid., 53). Political shifts, privatization measures, and the subsequent 
restructuring of state power have contributed to the relative decline of the 
neighborhood associations and the proliferation of illegal drug trafficking 
networks, often with the complicity of agents of the state, from the police 
to politicians (Arias 2006). 
James Holston has described citizenship in Brazil as an entanglement of 
differentiated “entrenched” and “insurgent” types: the former is exclusion-
ary by nature, “a mechanism to distribute inequality,” (2008, 7) while the 
latter has emerged among urbanized working classes from the 1970s on-
wards as a way to assert rights in the face of informality and legal exclusion. 
Holston traces this distinction in São Paulo (Brazil’s largest metropolitan 
area), though the pattern could easily be expanded to Rio’s urban landscape 
and communities, offering another site for studying demands for the rights 
of citizenship. Looking at the Vargas era and the brief democratic period 
prior to 1964, historian Brodwyn Fischer argues that a significant expan-
sion of certain political and civil rights occurred, interwoven with “pover-
ties of rights” built into the Brazilian legal system. The military  government 
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subsequently undermined this expansion of rights (Fischer 2008, 309–310), 
or at least altered its course. These ruptures follow a pattern of historical dis-
juncture (versus homogeneous expansion) in the development of Brazilian 
citizenship. The relationship of such disjuncture to the most basic of urban 
infrastructures, water supply, is explored in the next section.
WATER AND THE BRAZILIAN CITY: OLD AND NEW STRUGGLES
The emergence of megacities (urban areas with ten million inhabitants or 
more) over the past century raises questions about the equality afforded by 
the idea of citizenship. A majority of the world’s urban growth and popula-
tion is now found in developing countries, Latin America being the most 
urbanized region after North America (Perlman 2010, 44–49). This long 
process of urbanization accelerated for Latin America in the early mid-
twentieth century, characterized in Brazil by the growth of two competing 
metropolises, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The arrival of a combined 108 
million inhabitants from impoverished rural areas to the largest urban cen-
ters of Brazil over the course of the twentieth century constituted one of the 
most dramatic shifts of rural-to-urban populations, a trend now reflected 
globally as over half the world’s population resides in urban environments 
(Davis 2006). Indeed, according to the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografía e 
Estatística Censo 2010, Brazil has nine metropolitan areas with over three 
million inhabitants, with Rio de Janeiro alone reporting over twelve mil-
lion, the largest after São Paulo. Social relations and access to resources and 
public services have historically been unequal in Brazil, cleaving sharply on 
race and class lines. Statistical analysis has additionally demonstrated in 
Brazilian cities an inverse correlation between city population size and dif-
ferences in quality of life, specifically as it relates to equal provision of urban 
services such as piped water (Da Matta et al. 2005). The issue of water as 
a basic social right and a necessity for human life subsequently motivated 
much of the initial mobilization and activism within the urban context.
In a megacity like Rio de Janeiro and elsewhere in Brazil, access to water 
continues to generate a hierarchy. All levels of society have a stake in this hi-
erarchy of access for survival, though it proves consistently unfavorable to the 
poor. Efforts of public administrators and engineers to supply water to Rio’s 
residents received a strong push with the construction of the Guandu water 
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treatment station in the 1960s. However, urbanization trends in Brazil have 
continued to exacerbate this issue, folding water into a host of issues that face 
the impoverished and often informal settlements that make up greater Rio’s 
urban metropolitan landscape, even as international events like the World 
Cup and the Olympics draw more attention to the city (Stefanini 2013). 
Globally, the risks of water shortages and lack of access for the urban poor 
is just as acute as the health risk of unchecked or low-quality expansion of 
water and sewer services in urban reservoirs (Davis 2006, 136–137). Water 
manifests as an important aspect of urban organizing and demand making, 
especially in suburban and favela communities, where neighborhood associa-
tions began to operate after the 1960s. Brazil’s oscillation between citizen and 
military authoritarian rule influenced the goals of nascent favela neighbor-
hood associations from resisting forced removal policies to accessing urban 
infrastructure and services. Access to water was a fundamental requirement 
to sustain settlements; additionally, its symbolic value made it a potential ral-
lying point for community demands for legal recognition. 
Occasional crises due to inadequate urban services along with periodic 
droughts have occurred since the founding of the Brazilian Republic in 
1889, consistently confirming a seeming inability by the government to de-
liver adequate solutions. One recent chronicler of Rio’s water supply spoke 
for his fellow cariocas (residents of Rio de Janeiro), describing them as suf-
fering from a “psychosis” stemming from this historical hyperawareness of 
water shortages (Santa Ritta 2009, 319). At the turn of twentieth century, 
Rio had established itself as Brazil’s most eminent city, having surpassed 
the important economic centers of the northeast (Salvador and Recife) 
while still competing for political and economic dominance with São Paulo 
to the south. As Rio simultaneously became both the nation’s capital and 
a conduit of global trade, urban elites imagined the city as a testament to 
civilization, a way to look beyond the stigma of slavery and monarchic rule 
that had defined Brazil from the beginning (Meade 1997, 18). To this end, 
reformers often expelled poor urban dwellers to peripheries (such as the sur-
rounding hills), simply removing what did not fit their concept of a modern 
city (Sedrez 2009, 92). 
Construction of public works related to water reflected this bias in 
urban planning; indeed, the material outcomes of the reforms benefited 
the wealthy while the moral outcome of such reforms sought to remove the 
unsightly and poor (Meade 1997, 94). As the city struggled with yellow 
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fever outbreaks in the early twentieth century (in addition to popular resis-
tance against obligatory vaccination campaigns), water works increasingly 
expanded for wealthier residents in the South Zone (Santa Ritta 2009, 
179–183). The period defined by the political regimes of Getúlio Vargas 
(1930–1945, 1951–1954) initiated the incorporation of a wider swath of 
Rio’s expanding population, though on highly asymmetric terms. It also 
laid the groundwork for popular organizations, though the Vargas regime 
initially severely limited political and civil rights. As residents of central 
favelas gradually began to refer to urban services as rights in demands that 
they made, women and children carrying heavy water jugs up steep steps 
became an important image in popular politics as the “ultimate hardship” 
(Fischer 2008, 68). Politicians answered these requests more often than 
not with favors or highly symbolic responses—recalling the latter-day 
methods of water-spigot politicians.
NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Although administrators and elites based their urban planning on philoso-
phies of civilization and modernity, pressure from the growing favela popu-
lation certainly shaped the final results. The wave of urban renewal at the 
turn of the twentieth century, in the form of public health campaigns and 
sanitation infrastructure, elicited resistance among the plebeian sections 
of Rio that, ultimately, the political sphere could not ignore. Vargas and 
his supporters relied on the military and secret police to maintain politi-
cal stability, while technocrats took care of administration. When elections 
took place in 1945 following Vargas’s forced resignation by the military, 
political organization reasserted itself on all levels. Amnesty for political 
dissidents and an initial period of political liberalization led to the forma-
tion of Comitês Democráticos e Populares (CDPs) throughout Brazil, often 
connected to the (briefly) unrestricted Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB) 
(Duarte 2009; Fischer 2014). The new regime and its public security forces 
were deeply suspicious of organizations connected to the PCB, eventually 
attempting to co-opt the CDPs once the government outlawed the PCB 
again in 1947. Although the CDPs allowed for opportunities to address 
grievances and provide political expression and ideology for a liberalizing 
urban society, another contemporary form of organization took on greater 
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significance. This process was echoed in many respects in other urban areas, 
with Rio undergoing an increase in local neighborhood associations. 
In this period, favelados faced clear restrictions on water availability, 
often waiting in line for hours to collect water from communal spigots, 
often far downhill from their barraco (shanty) homes. A lack of piped water 
also created vectors for mosquito-borne diseases such as yellow fever and 
malaria, due to the fact that water drawn from the communal spigot had 
to be stored in open cans or buckets in the household. The combination 
of ever-present grievances over water, compounded by rising neighborhood 
political organizations, supplied the impulse that allowed 15,589 shanty 
homes to be connected to the city water supply (Pino 1997, 53). Piped water 
furthermore had the potential to make informal squatter homes more per-
manent and linked to the wider city. 
Throughout the 1960s, though, poor water infrastructure still defined 
the favela landscape. Though Rio could claim that 76.7% of the city had 
access to city water in 1960, this coverage broke down in peripheral and 
favela neighborhoods, with coverage measured at 56% in far suburban 
communities and only 22% in favelas. Water spigots and other basic in-
frastructure given as populist favors often were poorly installed or never 
worked, and in any case such “populist payoffs…did not translate into par-
ticipation or permanence” (Fischer 2008, 60–67). In the former favela of 
Catacumba the vast majority of favelados still relied on low-pressure water 
spigots concentrated at the street level, far from the growing population 
center of the favela (Perlman 1976: 28). Symbolic gestures were just that: 
removal could be instituted even in communities with water pipes or sewer 
lines. Catacumba, inconveniently located near affluent South Zone neigh-
borhoods, was eventually demolished and its residents removed in 1970.
Not all suburban communities pined for water, at least initially. In testi-
mony collected from Nilza Rosa dos Santos, the lifelong resident of Morro 
de Formiga and former neighborhood association president, she described 
her childhood bathing, drinking, and fishing in the freshwater of a river 
(Pandolfi and Grynszpan 2003, 176). In the late 1970s the Companhia 
Estadual de Aguas e Esgotos (CEDAE), a reconfiguration of earlier state 
water companies created after the 1975 merging of Rio de Janeiro and 
Guanabara states, engaged with communities like Morro da Formiga and 
became the main administrator of water supply. Groups of approximately 
fifty neighbors organized different sociedades (associations) to maintain 
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water, though some sócios (water association members) in Morro da Formiga 
continued to rely on água de nascente (natural spring water) (ibid., 177–178). 
Residents of Vigário Geral, a North Zone favela, at first installed their own 
electric and water systems, though these later also came under the control 
of the neighborhood association (Arias 2006, 131–132). Informal neigh-
borhoods on the cusp between rural and urban could enjoy access to open 
springs, rivers, and streams, though mounting population pressures threat-
ened to create supply constraints and contamination.
The military coup, combined with accelerating urbanization (spurred in 
part by the ephemeral Brazilian economic “miracle” of the 1970s, though 
also building on waves of domestic migration from earlier decades), con-
tributed to the context in which favela neighborhood associations and 
residents contested citizenship. Brazil’s booming urban growth continued 
within a period of authoritarian military rule that severely restricted civil 
society and political autonomy. The military leadership grew to realize, 
however, that it needed legitimacy in order to achieve its goals of national 
development; domestic dissidence in particular threatened to undermine 
support for the perceived stability of military rule and suppression alone 
could not sustain the military regime. As a significant portion of the urban 
population, favela residents naturally stood to make up an important 
part of the political order, at least nominally. Assumptions that residents 
in informal or impoverished communities exist on the margins outside 
of the “core” urban society have long fallen out of favor, in part due to 
strong arguments that residents of favela communities are actually deeply 
integrated with wider urban society (Perlman 1976; 2010). The military 
government had attempted to graft their official political system through 
the Arena and MDB parties onto pre-existing urban society. Ultimately, 
though, community organizations that negotiated for public water services 
emerged strengthened from eviction struggles with the experience to peti-
tion on behalf of their communities.
The specific context of Rio provides myriad examples of communities 
and associations to study. During the most repressive period of the military 
dictatorship, some residents of Rio’s favelas still believed they could influ-
ence the government, particularly in regards to acquiring essential needs 
for urban life, for example: “influencing local government to put in a water 
standpipe, lay in a paved stairway up the hill, or provide materials for a 
drainage ditch” (Perlman 2010, 211). Beyond petitioning for these public 
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works, neighborhood associations gained newfound strength in struggles to 
resist the favela removal attempted by the military government. Maria José 
de Rezende (2001) has highlighted the military government’s “psychosocial 
strategies” to co-opt the population’s political consciousness, particularly 
through patriotic symbols and the promotion of social values favorable to 
the dictatorship. Rather than molding them into useful citizens desired by 
the military state, such exercises reinforced the desire of the residents of 
poorer neighborhoods for the rights of urban citizenship.
Systematic favela condemnation and removal has dominated urban pub-
lic policy in Brazil from the end of the nineteenth century to the present. 
Removal and resettlement programs promoted through various government 
organizations never fully achieved their goals, wasting political and mon-
etary capital through the construction of poorly maintained and managed 
conjuntos (public housing apartment buildings). Particularly after 1975, 
urban politicians in Rio interacted with favelas through neighborhood as-
sociations, reinstating clientelistic approaches to garner votes in exchange for 
favors for those associations that mobilized on their behalf. The monopoly 
of the Chagas Freitas political machine on state resources aided the consoli-
dation of political clienteles in Rio’s poorest neighborhoods (Gay 1990). A 
national water and sanitation initiative known as PLANASA provided the 
public institution in this period for water works, offering public subsidies 
to a substantial number of urban households nationwide (Merrick 1983). 
Though removal and eviction attempts have continued well into the present, 
the installation of water infrastructure lent a stronger sense of permanency 
as well as a base of political organization to contest threats of government 
removal. As the military government edged towards political liberalization 
after 1975, those neighborhood associations that successfully resisted re-
moval saw opportunities to stake a claim in the aforementioned urban fab-
ric, secured figuratively by thousands of kilometers of water pipeline.
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, SHIFTING RELATIONSHIPS
Electoral institutions and clientelistic politics allowed a degree of bargain-
ing and even contention in favelas through neighborhood associations. 
Experiences struggling against favela removal had strengthened neighbor-
hood association cohesiveness in Rio. The political coalitions formed in 
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working-class neighborhoods, in fact, became key sources of votes for the 
opposition Partido Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) in 1985, 
due in part to organizing efforts on the level of the neighborhood organi-
zations. This marked a return to overt political activity in neighborhood 
associations, though the clientelistic system still shaped many interactions.
 Neighborhood associations’ resistance to removal programs carried out 
in the South Zone of Rio had persisted throughout the mid-1970s, with 
umbrella groups of favela associations resembling a vital parallel congress 
for favelados (McCann 2014). Certain neighborhood associations found 
success in influencing the quality of attention that government organiza-
tions paid to urbanization projects, for example in the Brás de Pina favela 
in the Northern Zone (Cardoso 1984, 225–226). Brás de Pina “did not 
posses even those minimal sanitary conditions indispensable to human life” 
in the 1960s, including water connections and sewer systems. This lack of 
services became a rallying point especially as unsanitary conditions posed 
a threat for the younger generation (Pino 1997, 55). Other competing pub-
lic organizations focused on urbanization and public housing succeeded in 
moving some families to conjunto projects, which provided standard urban 
services and often an address, an important facet in achieving legal formal-
ity (Perlman 2010, 56). Attachment to land and communities associated 
with urban spaces complicated this relocation project, essentially creating a 
new space of social exclusion.
Collaborative efforts undertaken by government agencies, such as the 
Companhia de Desenvolvimento de Comunidades (Codesco), were success-
ful, initiating new ways of dealing with the government where previously 
there had been no avenue for neighborhood input (Perlman 1976, 235–
240). The favela Vidigal in the South Zone represented a unique example 
of the way in which neighborhood associations operated during the era of 
abertura (liberalization). The neighborhood association refused to allow pa-
tronage politics to affect voting patterns to the degree typical in most other 
favelas. Instead, it became adept at petitioning local government offices or 
halting traffic on the road near the entrance of the favela to draw attention 
to their demands. In this way, the two sides financed piped water and other 
public works. Public services that required more community contribution 
besides labor, like public education, had to be addressed by politicians, 
while immediate urban services necessary for survival could be provided di-
rectly through the association’s maneuvering (Gay 1990, 77–79). In a favela 
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with more clientelistic relations, residents saw the installation of water and 
other urban infrastructure as the duties of the association president, who 
in exchange for completion of the obra (public work) actively promoted 
electoral support for political candidates who sponsored the project (ibid., 
112). New interactions with vote-seeking politicians and the fulfillment of 
critical urban services also marked a shift in community mobilization.
Community activists remembered how high levels of popular participa-
tion had secured them access to water and other services. Francisca Honorata 
da Nóbrega Oliveira, resident of sprawling Rocinha, recalled the difficulties 
of carrying water from distant spigots, emphasizing as well that few peo-
ple could afford to boil or purify water. Though the different governments 
over the years carried out urban infrastructure projects in small pieces, the 
residents of Rocinha had to struggle to achieve services like piped water. In 
her view, recent participation by her sons demanding water for a sector of 
Rocinha located further up the hill reflected this spirit of popular struggle 
from earlier years (Pandolfi and Grynszpan 2003, 105–107). José Martins 
de Oliveira, the first president of the associação de moradores in the Rocinha 
neighborhood Bairro Barcelos, recalled competing with the president of the 
local electricity committee for influence in installing piped water. Rather 
than having the wealthier president of electricity buy materials, Martins 
convinced the vizinhos (residents of the neighborhood) to contribute a small 
fee to buy materials, as well as provide “sweat equity” to the state water 
company in order to install piped water (Pandolfi and Grynszpan 2003, 
37–39). This created a situation in which the fees for maintaining the water 
system were collected by the neighborhood and not by a sole influential in-
dividual. These varying experiences demonstrate a few of the ways in which 
neighborhood associations connected their communities to wider networks 
of water and power, networks that were far from stable in terms of guaran-
teed water supply and political influence.
The harnessing of sweat equity in favela communities coalesced with 
public policies initiated in the administration of Leonel Brizola. Two proj-
ects remembered favorably by organizers are the municipal work scheme 
Projeto Mutirão and the sanitation expansion initiative called the Programa 
de Favelas de Companhia Estadual de Águas e Esgotos (Proface), both 
founded in the early 1980s and forbears of the Favela-Bairro urbanization 
program in the 1990s. Projeto Mutirão (based on the word for a collec-
tive work group) institutionalized and paid residents who contributed labor 
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to sanitation projects (and later roads and community centers) in their re-
spective favelas (Perlman 2010, 274). Proface emphasized the expansion of 
water and sanitation specifically in favelas. Though the style of populism 
embodied in water-spigot politics had prevailed in urban politics, Proface 
broke from this paradigm. Proface partnered with neighborhood associa-
tions, not just in the coordination of construction but importantly in con-
solidating water payments under the CEDAE (Freire et al. 2009, 57). This 
unification, in addition to allowing residents to participate in debates over 
monthly water payments, also allowed neighborhood associations to estab-
lish their authority over water administration on the community level.
The significance of Brizola’s political maneuvering was a turning point 
for community leaders (McCann 2014). Jó Rezende, a former president of 
the Federação de Associação de Moradores do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 
(Famerj), declared that the city as well as the state of Rio de Janeiro were 
already brizolando (becoming Brizola supporters), moving more towards 
party politics and less towards the relations that associations had estab-
lished at the municipal level (Rezende 2001, 19–20). Although not weak-
ened to the point of irrelevance, the role of the neighborhood associations 
certainly was changed during Brizola’s administration. Brizola’s popularity 
and subsequent ability to consolidate infrastructure projects rose from wide 
urban support: favela removal had no place in the governor’s public policy, 
while loteamentos irregulares (irregular subdivisions) offered another source 
of political support (Freire 2008, 130–131). A pamphlet from 1985 touted 
Proface’s achievements, using on its cover an evocative favela image: a dark-
skinned girl balancing a water bucket, facing out into a view of the urban 
skyline, a view clearly from the favela hillside. The poster is notable for its 
declaration in the accompanying text: “We are working to make the water 
can a thing of the past, so it remains only a pretty samba” (Governo do 
Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 1985). The political rhetoric still present in the 
1980s continued to draw on fundamental images of water as it altered the 
forms of political engagement that worked towards ameliorating conditions 
of water access in the favelas.
As political participation spread, the channels through which the 
neighborhood associations worked lost importance. Itamar Silva, a com-
munity leader in Santa Marta, noted the relative decline in the organiz-
ing potential of the neighborhood association as basic needs came to be 
satisfied. After the propagation of Proface and Mutirão, the residents saw 
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that “the channel was open, it was only a question of negotiation” with 
political actors, working through representatives instead of through col-
lective mobilization (Pandolfi and Grynszpan 2003, 320). Although the 
association in Santa Marta and other favela neighborhoods continued 
monitoring activities, the associations had exhausted their immediate po-
litical purpose through early successes. Political participation proliferated 
through party politics, though a new reality emerged in favela communi-
ties: the drug trade. Infrastructure deteriorated over time and new settle-
ments continued to crop up around Rio de Janeiro: by the time new or 
updated infrastructure was needed for favelas, the system had completely 
changed. In one favela in the mid-1990s, the neighborhood association 
president acted as a source of advice and know-how for residents in a 
neighboring community on how to improve water services. In this new 
type of urban politics, however, neighborhood associations mediate be-
tween politicians, residents, and traffickers if indeed they are not totally 
co-opted by the last, which frequently maintain the local monopoly of 
violence (Arias 2006, 69–70).
CONCLUSION: WATER AND CONTINUING SOCIAL DIVISIONS
Favela and neighborhood associations began, by the end of the 1970s, to 
recover a degree of political rights, petitioning for water, sanitation, and 
related infrastructure. This action allowed them access to social rights 
through public services, even as they encountered severe restrictions on civil 
rights, including threats of repression and removal. The onset of drug traf-
ficking violence in the 1990s led to a further erosion of neighborhood as-
sociations, even a glorification of earlier solidarity and achievements. The 
clientelistic systems facilitated by local political machines and neighbor-
hood associations had provided a type of political right to residents. When 
they mobilized successfully, their actions created responses for providing 
water services in a booming urban center, often where water seemed like a 
scarce resource. 
What relevance does discussion of relatively abstract concepts, like citi-
zenship and participation, have for urban policy makers concerned with 
water and sanitation? Although any urban area presents specific challenges 
in terms of its environment and geography, these elements can be overstated 
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and displace concerns of citizenship rights. Political participation, though 
perhaps broader today than at any point in Brazilian history, is seen less 
positively and as less effective than it was for earlier generations of fave-
lados, in part due to an internalized tendency among the youngest voters 
to express “less faith in the ability of citizens to make wise selections in 
their candidates for public office” (Perlman 2010, 218). This lack of faith 
in the political system plays out in democratic Brazil’s post-abertura cli-
mate. While residents’ remembered with nostalgia elections that took place 
prior Brazil’s authoritarian regime, the now older activists (like Francisca 
Honorata cited above) remember fondly the victories won by the neighbor-
hood association in more unequal struggles. On the other hand, the specter 
of drug trafficking has substituted itself in the clientelistic model estab-
lished in earlier generations, often sparking violent conflict with neighbor-
hood associations. Attempts to dislodge traffickers through Unidades de 
Polícia Pacificadora (UPPs) (pacification police units) have the potential to 
restore order, but too often have brought a new brand of mistrust and re-
pression that has not contributed to the organizing needed to secure basic 
infrastructure on that neighborhood’s terms.
What better example than Rocinha, one of Rio’s largest and most iconic 
favelas? Despite undergoing the pacification process and gaining a degree 
of notoriety, Rocinha has one of the longest histories of community or-
ganizing. Today, however, it still faces basic infrastructure challenges, as 
well as infrastructure projects that more reflect Rio’s tourist image and less 
the needs of its long-term inhabitants. Longtime residents remember earlier 
struggles, as well as difficult years during both the dictatorship and the 
rise of drug trafficking (Hosek 2013). New forms of popular petition and 
neighborhood organization, building on the vestiges of older efforts, em-
phasize broader participation and awareness of citizenship rights. In many 
ways, emphasizing strong civil society, community organization, and the 
fundamental importance of social rights will be just as important as any 
technological innovation. Furthermore, understanding these processes al-
lows insight into simultaneous occurrences worldwide, as megacities and 
their peripheries become the reality of the world’s urban future. Water-
spigot politics may yet become something more than mere clientelism.
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Sharing São Paulo: Harnessing 
Collaborative Forces through 
Productive Housing Cooperatives  
in República
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ABSTRACT
Public policy and urban governance have seen a profound transition in de-
veloping countries as a result of technological advances and new pro-inclusive 
institutional provisions. This paper explores sharing as a force that could en-
hance equity, solidarity, and urban quality in truly smart cities, and seeks 
to expand the realm of sharing beyond a narrow set of presumptions into 
an understanding of richer, more complex forms of cooperation. Through the 
evaluation of a hypothetical hybrid tenure model for the district of República 
in São Paulo, it uncovers the spatial, institutional, and organizational poten-
tials of a shared smart city.
INTRODUCTION
Cities in developing countries are confronted with complex processes of 
modern economic growth that both create and reinforce existing sociospa-
tial inequalities. In response, Brazil took a fundamental step by establishing 
the social function of urban property, a progressive principle enshrined in 
the 1988 Constitution and consolidated in the 2001 City Statute (Fortes 
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and Cobbett 2010). This marked a shift from the inherent right to pri-
vate property to a change that included a collective responsibility (Maricato 
2010). More than ever, governance and public policy in São Paulo appear to 
advocate principles of participation and egalitarianism (UN-Habitat 2010). 
The city’s progressive outlook presents an opportunity to test the limits of a 
truly smart city, one that expands on systems that go beyond efficiencies to 
the creation of a new urban commons based on a culture of sharing. 
In Brazil, the introduction of pro-inclusive policies and social provisions, 
such as the national social housing program Minha Casa Minha Vida (My 
House, My Life—MCMV), represent important steps towards its vision of 
equality. Despite commendable effort and financial support, urban inequal-
ity in São Paulo remains among the highest in the world. This paper argues 
that institutional provisions are essential, yet insufficient in themselves, in 
resolving the structural problems of an historically unequal society; rather, 
their implementation can suspend social mobility and in some cases, invent 
clearer, more definitive sociospatial divisions. 
This paper posits that along with key roles played by public bodies, there 
must be reciprocal engagement from communities as self-organizers—
broad coalitions of people in which sharing and cooperation become in-
dispensable. Over the past decades new technologies have accelerated the 
flow and coordination of information, enabling an unprecedented level of 
exchange between entities. Yet today, although most modern organizations 
are in favor of cooperation, it is hindered in practice by, their structure 
(Sennett 2012). 
The questions raised here are:
1. To what extent can we learn about and build upon existing forms of 
sharing that focus less on ownership and accumulation and more on 
community and collaboration?
2. To what degree can the convergence of smart technological advances 
with highly networked and densely populated physical spaces lead to 
novel forms of sharing in cities?
3. How can public policies be redefined to provide the broader legal,  
social, and political context in which sharing platforms can evolve? 
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4. How can existing mechanisms in Brazil be reformulated to provide an 
alternative or complementary framework that would allow for more 
complex forms of cooperation?
METHODOLOGY
Based on a comparative place-based case study method, fieldwork was con-
ducted in the city of São Paulo between September 2014 and April 2015. 
The seven-month fieldwork was carried out at the Housing and Human 
Settlements Laboratory (LabHab) at the University of São Paulo. Data 
sources included first-hand observations, semi-structured interviews with 
experts, informal conversations, analyses of municipal plans and reports, 
and site surveys. 
This period included the author’s participation in Habitacidade, a cross-
disciplinary working group at Escola da Cidade. Formed in 2014 by mem-
bers of the “Habitation and City” post-graduate course, it has been working 
closely with social movements in a bid to explore strategies for providing 
social rental housing in República. Participation in the group consisted of 
attending weekly meetings with a diverse range of active members includ-
ing academics, economists, planners, architects, members and residents of 
social movements, environmental specialists, and NGO representatives. 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THEIR IMPACT ON URBAN POLICIES
Since the 1970s, social movements in Brazil have been at the forefront of 
urban reform, playing a vital role in ensuring that public policies and hous-
ing agendas have been inclusive and progressive (Caldeira 2003). As a result 
of years of pressure by social activists and powerful trade unions, institu-
tionalized sociopolitical transformations such as the Constitution and the 
City Statute have been set in place to initiate long-term reform (Fortes and 
Cobbett 2010). This marked the beginning of formal recognition of the tra-
ditionally marginalized population in the city’s decision-making processes. 
Located within the historic heart of São Paulo’s downtown area, 
República suffered dramatically from an exodus by the urban elite in the 
1970s (EMURB 2004). Once the site of the most elegant buildings in the 
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city, the district has become the least populated administrative region, cov-
ering an area of 2.3km2 and home to only 56,981 inhabitants (IGBE 2014). 
As the demographic profile shifted, República became equated with ne-
glect and desolation (UN-Habitat 2010). Today the district consists of a 
number of privately owned abandoned buildings simply waiting to be sold, 
entangled in disputes, or in some cases hanging on to reap the profits from 
an anticipated gentrification (ibid.).
In recent years, faced with a lack of legal housing alternatives, highly or-
ganized social movements began occupying vacant buildings in the center 
of São Paulo, demanding the democratization of access to housing and to 
the city (Rodrigues and Barbosa 2010). Abandoned for more than twenty 
years, the Hotel Columbia Palace is currently occupied by more than sixty 
families, all of which are members of the Frente de Luta por Moradia 
(FLM). Mildo Nascimento, a resident of the occupation, explained that a 
disagreement between three owners on the future of the property resulted 
in its idle state (personal communication March 12, 2015). Inheritance dis-
agreements, along with entanglements in ownership, legal, technical, finan-
cial, and structural disputes, are a few of the many reasons that buildings 
have been abandoned in the city center (UN-Habitat 2010).
CURRENT URBAN POLICIES TOWARDS AN INCLUSIVE SMART CITY 
In 2001, thirteen years after the declaration of the Constitution, the City 
Statute (Federal Law No. 10.257) was established. This unique set of legal 
instruments reinforced the Constitution by providing specific tools for its 
realization at the municipal level (Fortes and Cobbett 2010). In a single text 
it brought together a series of key themes on democratic governance, urban 
justice, public processes of participation, and environmental equilibrium 
in cities (Maricato 2010). Among the instruments introduced by the new 
Constitution and City Statute are: 
1. The Municipal Master Plan: Compulsory for cities with over 20,000 
inhabitants, master plans must be implemented through participatory 
planning processes, such as public hearings and workshops. The result 
is that decision-making is no longer in the hands of a few experts.
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2. Special Zones of Social Interest (ZEIS): A zoning mechanism used for 
regularizing informally occupied areas, this instrument is also used to 
earmark vacant or underutilized properties for use as social housing, 
allowing public authorities to set aside areas that benefit from good 
infrastructure. 
3. Compulsory Land Parcelling, Building, and Use (PEUC): PEUC was set 
in place to avoid the retention of vacant land, restrain property specula-
tion, and increase access to urbanized land by obliging owners to use 
underutilized or vacant properties. 
4. Progressive Property and Land Tax (IPTU): A progressive tax paid by 
owners that increases over five consecutive years. Noncompliance with 
PEUC after five years allows the municipality to charge IPTU at the 
maximum rate until the PEUC obligation is met. 
5. Expropriation with Payments in Public Debt Bonds: Noncompliance with 
PEUC after IPTU has been charged for five consecutive years can lead 
to the expropriation of property by the municipality with payments 
made in public debt bonds. 
These instruments present opportunities to explore collaborative tech-
niques that would address urban challenges by creating smarter ways to use 
resources while helping cities make better decisions. In São Paulo, partici-
patory processes have started to take root, as seen in the development of its 
current master plan. In addition to physical participatory activities, user-
friendly online platforms were set up to provide information on planning 
issues and engage with a wider group of people in the city’s decision-mak-
ing processes. In many cases however, the operational capacity of public 
bodies is limited. At present, up-to-date mapping of key information, such 
as the location and size of underused or occupied buildings, is unavailable 
even for large cities such as São Paulo. Crowdsourced maps provide a way 
to facilitate the mapping of important aspects of the city and help change 
the way both local authorities and the public perceive their environment 
(Saunders and Baeck 2015).
Nonetheless the success of these legal instruments has depended heavily 
on state and local governments, which are responsible for specifying in their 
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master plans the areas in which these tools are employed (Rodrigues and 
Barbosa 2010). Today there is a lack of fortitude in its application across mu-
nicipalities, including São Paulo (Reali and Alli 2010). The main instrument 
being employed is primarily ZEIS, which merely demarcates zones desig-
nated for social housing within central city areas (Rodrigues and Barbosa 
2010). The employment of just a single instrument has proven ineffective, as 
simply earmarking the areas has resulted in many private owners choosing to 
simply leave their property undeveloped because there are no consequences 
for their inaction. These essential instruments can, and should be, enforced 
intensively and collectively. Using PEUC and IPTU along with the estab-
lishment of ZEIS, for instance, would strengthen effectiveness by forcing 
owners of idle private land to ensure that their property fulfils a public func-
tion. Although still in embryonic stages, these instruments do provide the 
framework that allows for further policy changes towards a more equitable 
city, institutionalized changes that are unlikely to be reversed.
MINHA CASA, MINHA VIDA—BRAZIL’S MEGA LOW-INCOME 
HOUSING PROGRAM 
In 2009, soon after the global financial crisis, Brazil’s federal government 
launched an ambitious national social housing program, Minha Casa, 
Minha Vida (MCMV), a model based on the construction of low-cost units 
for homeownership (UN-Habitat 2013). The goal was to tackle the coun-
try’s housing deficit through to the year 2023 and at the same time quickly 
stimulate national economic growth through the mobilization of the pri-
vate sector (Labhab 2012). By 2011, one million units were built across the 
country. This target was increased in the second phase to a total of three 
million units by the end of 2014, bringing total investment to R$328.1 bil-
lion, roughly USD$93 billion (UN-Habitat 2013). 
MCMV is structured mainly under two operational models. The 
first is market oriented, undertaken by the private sector. This currently 
accounts for more than 90% of MCMV funds (Labhab 2012). The sec-
ond model is Minha Casa Minha Vida - Entidades (MCMV-E), a lesser 
known social-oriented sub-program. MCMV-E finances the acquisition 
of land and construction of housing units by self-organized families affili-
ated with nonprofit entities, trade unions, and cooperatives (UN-Habitat 
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2013). Throughout the program MCMV-E was responsible for only 6% 
of the total housing units produced in the second phase (Pasternak and 
D’Ottaviano 2014). Despite its availability, the production of collabora-
tive projects using this model has fallen short of expectations. Anaclaudia 
Rossbach, former advisor of the Ministry of Cities, explained that technical 
and institutional complexities, along with the lack of capacity of local com-
munities have hindered the reach of this subprogram (personal communi-
cation March 3, 2015).
HABITACIDADE AS A COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION 
With the retreat of the public sector—notably in long-term asset manage-
ment—and the inability of the private sector to cater to low-income groups, 
third-sector organizations have emerged as crucial actors (Ganapati 2014). 
Within this structure, national and local governments lay out wider insti-
tutional frameworks (e.g., mechanisms to access land, infrastructure, and 
financing opportunities) and communities act as self-organizers, with sup-
port from third-sector bodies. 
In Uruguay, for example, the Federacíon Uruguaya de Cooperativas 
Vivienda por Ayuda Mutua (FUCVAM) is an umbrella organization that 
supports the establishment of cooperatives. Its structure enabled the exten-
sive growth of cooperatives in the early 1970s, which represented more than 
40% of the housing stock (Khor and Lin 2001). The success of FUCVAM 
lies in its basic model that does not advocate replication. Instead it transfers 
a set principles that is then adapted to each context (ibid.). 
The MCMV-E offers an opportunity to explore alternative processes of 
housing production that could empower local communities in São Paulo. 
However, to expand on MCMV-E, emphasis must be placed on capacity 
building, mobilization, and knowledge sharing between entities. To this 
end, this paper proposes the creation of a third-sector supportive structure, 
the Community Development Association (CDA).
 At first, Habitacidade might initiate the formation of a CDA. The in-
tellectual capital and wealth of experience in this multidisciplinary group 
would provide a strong foundation for the formation of a research platform 
that could explore the use of digital technologies that connect and collabo-
rate with dispersed groups of people. Open source collaborative technologies 
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could be used as ways to integrate and mobilize collective knowledge by 
contributing to the creation of common tools that new cooperatives could 
appropriate (Saunders and Baeck 2015). Later the CDA could look beyond 
initial procurement stages to provide support for maintenance, which could 
be in the form of technical, administrative, legal, and procedural support. 
Such support could help cooperatives to overcome conflicts that arise be-
tween members, educate members about management practices, and estab-
lish routine procedures for everyday functioning (Ganapati 2014). The CDA 
could unlock access to land and finance through MCMV-E by acting as an 
intermediary between government officials, private enterprises, and commu-
nities. Ultimately the key role of the CDA would lie in its potential to drive 
cooperation and collaborative technologies by supporting knowledge shar-
ing between individual cooperatives.
Habitacidade could demonstrate feasibility through the completion of a 
pilot project, in this instance, the rehabilitation of Hotel Columbia Palace. 
This pilot project could be used as a means of navigating the complexities 
of financing and planning through to procurement, setting an example for 
future projects. Typical routes of acquisition for further MCMV-E funded 
projects in República could include: property bought directly from private 
owners; donation by public administrations (federal, state or municipal); 
negotiation with land owners who want to build social housing using 
MCMV’s resources; and property acquired through the implementation of 
urban planning tools (ZEIS, IPTU, etc).
RIGHT TO HOUSING VS THE RIGHT TO (MAKE AND REPAIR) THE CITY
Despite notable positive impacts, and as with any megascale national effort, 
MCMV faces many challenges. Among them is the scarcity of well-located 
urban land (Labhab 2012). Constrained by time and cost, privately-led 
projects often result in impersonal, repetitive housing clusters that are geo-
graphically isolated from the urban centers (ibid.), which increases frag-
mentation and further segregates poorer communities.
The introduction of ZEIS was intended to increase access to urban land. 
In São Paulo however, the proportion of land earmarked as ZEIS is small in 
comparison to the scale of the city and the magnitude of its housing deficit. 
Additionally, as a result of the ineffective enforcement of existing planning 
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tools, less than 50% of ZEIS areas have been successfully used for social 
housing projects since their demarcation in the 2003 master plan (Prefeitura 
de São Paulo 2013). Vacant buildings are underused assets within a city. If 
efficiency is at the heart of smart city visions, then the largest waste of a 
city’s resources lies in its idle buildings. A recent study highlighted that the 
number of vacant properties in the center of São Paulo is almost equal to 
the city’s housing deficit (Fundação João Pinheiro 2011). City governments 
should invest in technologies that track down the wasted resources and sup-
port collaborative means to make better use of their existing assets. By pro-
moting digitally-enabled collaborative economies, underused spaces can be 
identified and intelligently matched to demand. In Seoul, for instance, in 
a bid to promote collaborative schemes, 800 public buildings were opened 
up to the public for meetings and events when they are not in use (Saunders 
and Baeck 2015).
Nonetheless, top-down provisions such as MCMV raise questions about 
the right of the poor to participate equally in urban life (Baviskar 2010; 
Gherner 2010). They stand against Sen’s argument for positive development 
through the expansion of freedoms; this includes political freedom, eco-
nomic facilities, and social opportunities among other elemental freedoms 
such as the right to housing (Sen 1999). More than just rights, which im-
plies that there is a custodian of that right, the emphasis on freedoms builds 
capacity. Although the numerical side of the housing deficit is tackled, these 
provisions fail to address the root of inequality as progress is not assessed on 
whether the freedoms of people have been enhanced.
Housing is far more complex than just a place to live. Besides account-
ing for the largest single use of urban land, housing resonates with mean-
ing on many other levels (Adams 1988). It represents status and economic 
growth, the expression of private aspirations, social networks, and, above 
all, it provides the security and stability to build individual capacity. Today 
there is a striking contradiction in Brazil’s public initiatives. Although the 
City Statute strives to reinforce the social function of the city, housing pro-
grams continue to promote private homeownership as a way to provide ac-
cess to affordable housing. The Brazilian government is often reluctant to 
become directly involved in social rental housing as it lacks the capacity for 
long-term, large-scale asset management (UN-Habitat 2013; A. Rossbach, 
personal communication March 3, 2015). Rather than encouraging the 
expansion of private property or relying on state-owned rental housing, 
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alternative means that would address collective interests should first be 
explored with an understanding of the city as a shared space. In doing so, 
these programs could address issues beyond just the right to housing to-
wards the wider right to participate in the production of the city. 
COOPERATION AS A MODE OF PRODUCTION 
With modern technological advances, sharing assets, knowledge, services, 
and skills has become easier than ever and therefore possible on a much 
larger scale. In the past decade, there has been energetic debate over the 
feasibility of voluntary shared effort. Urban renewal projects, commu-
nity gardens, and labor-sharing practices are current examples of volun-
tary cooperation. More recently the concept of the “sharing economy” has 
taken root and is marginally associated with for-profit businesses, such as 
TaskRabbit, Airbnb, and Uber. The question here is: are there spatial, or-
ganizational, and institutional reforms that could be reinvented to allow 
a society to capture more of the benefits of cooperative exchange than we 
currently realize; and, if so, to what extent can this lead to novel ideas of 
how cities can be better made?
Over the years, there has been considerable enthusiasm for increasing 
labor-managed cooperative enterprises as opposed to conventional investor-
owned corporations (Hansmann 1996). Today, internet-based technologies 
and services provide innovative opportunities for stimulating co-produc-
tion while at the same time securing citizen engagement in the process of 
developing smart services. The foremost complication however is that these 
cooperatives are essentially operating within a capitalist economy; thus they 
must compete in order to survive. Set against aggressive competition, most 
cooperatives tend eventually to mimic and take on the role of the capitalist 
entrepreneur, a contradiction that accounts for the usual failure of produc-
tive cooperatives (Luxemburg, 1900; Harvey, 2012). 
From this it is clear that cooperative production units cannot survive 
in isolation. There must be a shift beyond the limits of the workplace 
that engages with the larger economic, social, and political systems they 
are embedded in. If urbanization is a product of co-production, then the 
prime site of production should be the city as a whole (Harvey 2012), and 
emphasis must be placed on geographical rather than sectoral forms of 
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organization (Fletcher and Gapasin 2008). As the distinction between 
work and community-based struggles start to disappear, the workplace is 
no longer defined as a place of production isolated from the site of social 
reproduction in the household (Pahl 1984; Harvey 2012). In São Paulo’s 
2014 master plan, ZEIS classifications were amended to include a category 
that allows up to 40% of certain ZEIS areas to be used for non-residential 
purposes (Prefeitura de São Paulo 2014). The loosening of this restriction 
reduces sectoral forms of organization and presents opportunities to cre-
atively mix uses within ZEIS areas, which enables the establishment of 
productive housing cooperatives.
THE PRODUCTIVE HOUSING COOPERATIVE: HOUSING  
BEYOND PROFIT
Sharing encompasses more than just the physicality of space or transactions 
of goods and services. By advancing cooperation in everyday shared experi-
ences, such as laundry and child care, the test of collaborative action has 
concrete implications for daily life. For the urban poor, it is not only the 
spatial dimension of inequality that restricts opportunities for social mo-
bility, but also the temporal dimension. In São Paulo it is not uncommon 
among the low-income population to spend four hours a day commuting. 
Workers living in this situation have little or no time to think about things 
outside of work. Their days are occupied with trying to make ends meet 
and providing food and shelter for their children. The individual burden 
could be eased by providing support through the mutual sharing of human 
and physical resources for the common good. Today digital technologies 
can enable people to connect with one another to make more efficient use 
of resources. In Singapore, for example, BlockPooling, a social network for 
communities, was set up with a grant from the government in 2013 to en-
able neighbors to share belongings and skills.
The productive housing cooperative resembles a traditional cooperative, 
which has neither buyers nor renters but is membership based. It builds 
on a fundamental principle that access to skills and assets triumphs over 
ownership. Rather than directly holding the title to their individual unit, 
residents purchase a share within the non-profit cooperative. The resale of a 
share is sold at a price determined by inflation and the cooperatives bylaws, 
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not at market value (Ganapati 2013). Each share grants the right to oc-
cupy one housing unit and constitutes one vote (Northcountry Cooperative 
Foundation 2003). In productive housing cooperatives, residents have a di-
rect role in decision-making processes behind both living and production. 
A productive housing cooperative could lead to a system based on shar-
ing and capacity-building. Each share could be obtained with both finan-
cial and sweat or knowledge equity. The time recaptured by living close to 
work could thus be redirected to sustaining the cooperative (Fig.1). A cook 
living in the building, for instance, could invest time by participating in the 
preparation of meals for the cooperative or conducting evening classes in a 
communal kitchen, an arrangement that already exists in housing occupa-
tions in República.
The intersection between physical and cyber-space provides a unique 
opportunity for more inclusive and environmentally efficient econo-
mies rooted in a sharing culture. A retired English teacher living in San 
Francisco could easily be connected to physical classrooms where she can 
conduct live English classes to underprivileged students. The retiree’s desire 
to stay involved and active is matched with the student’s desire to learn a 
new language. 
Fig. 1 Recaptured time is redirected into sustaining the productive 
housing cooperative
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A NEW URBAN COMMONS: DE-COMMODIFYING HOUSING  
AND THE CITY 
Over the past decades, housing and the quality of urban life have increas-
ingly become commodities; in turn, so has the city itself (Harvey 2003). 
The result is that predominant housing policies around the world, includ-
ing in Brazil, advocate the promotion of credit for homeownership (Rolnik 
2014). Such a policy may suit certain demographic profiles but it does not 
correspond to conditions faced by very low-income households that, in 
many cases, lack the capacity for asset management. 
Undoubtedly, no country is able to provide well-located low-income hous-
ing solely through homeownership. Community Land Trusts (CLT) offer an 
alternative tenure structure by removing land from the private, speculative 
market without disconnecting residents’ interest in owning and improving 
their property. A CLT holds the collective ownership of land in perpetuity 
and any building on it is leased to homeowners, non-profit entities, or in this 
case, productive housing cooperatives, at a rate that is permanently linked to 
local incomes (Lewis and Conaty 2012). Put simply, CLTs separate the own-
ership of property from the ownership of the land. They ensure that home-
owners have a sense of security and get a fair return on their investment while 
avoiding fluctuations in the land market (Peterson 1996). 
CLTs are managed by a board consisting of residents and members of 
the wider community such as neighbors, representatives of non-profit or-
ganizations, academics, or local business owners. In urban contexts they 
often operate on a local scale, addressing wider issues beyond housing af-
fordability, such as neighborhood stabilization and environmental sustain-
ability (Marcuse 2014; UN-Habitat, 2012). In some cases the flexibility of 
the model has enabled the inclusion of workforce training and childcare, 
among other social services.
Through FUCVAM, Montevideo’s municipal government allocates cen-
trally located property to cooperatives that in turn rehabilitate or build new 
affordable housing. In the 1990s, a “land bank” was established to acquire 
and hold properties within the core city for the development of low-income 
cooperatives (Ganapati 2014). In República the establishment of a district-
wide CLT could also assume the role of a land bank with urban land ac-
quired through the implementation of planning tools, such as PEUC and 
IPTU described above. This model could prove to be a robust framework 
69
A New Generation of Ideas
that would allow labor-managed productive housing cooperatives to endure 
and engage with the unrelenting cycles of the economic market. 
As people work together and the fruits of their collective labor material-
ize, such a network of cooperatives would become deeply embedded in the 
social identity of a community, thus becoming more resilient to external 
forces. By de-commodifying land through the CLT model and introduc-
ing labor-managed productive housing cooperatives, an “urban commons” 
sustained through collective activities can be created.
A RECAP OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SÃO PAULO
1. Empower communities by increasing their role in the design and  
development of new collaborative techniques.
2. Tap into the collective knowledge of people by opening up decision 
making and planning processes to a wider group of people.
3. Establish third-sector organizations that drive innovation in collabora-
tive technologies, connect dispersed groups of people, and mobilize 
collective knowledge.
4. Set up open source platforms to collect, map, and share data on the 
environment, particularly non-static conditions (e.g., location and sizes 
of buildings that are unused or occupied by squatters). 
5. Support socially oriented policies that redefine smart cities from the 
ground up and are based on the development of communities (e.g., 
MCMV-E).
6. Improve sustainability by identifying underused assets or services 
through open source collaborative technologies and intelligently match-
ing them to demand.
Nowhere in modern society is the heart of cooperation and sharing more 
evident than in cities. Not only is the city the prime site for sharing spaces, 
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objects, and services—it is in itself an historically shared entity, a product of 
co-creation and production (Agyeman 2014). Today technological innova-
tions are transforming how cities are run. As smart cities across the world 
invest in the potential of new efficient technologies, they often are more 
concerned with hardware than with people (Saunders and Baeck 2015). 
Truly successful smart cities could bring together the best aspects of tech-
nological innovation while harnessing the potential of collaborative forces, 
most importantly the people who empower them.
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ABSTRACT
This article looks at housing informality not only as a factor of vulnerability, but 
also as a phenomenon demonstrating resilience. It does so by synthesizing find-
ings from desktop and fieldwork research conducted in two inner-city precincts 
in Johannesburg. The findings show that the informal housing market provides 
low-income residents with opportunities through various forms of re-composi-
tion of space and management arrangements that allow for better flexibility and 
adaptability. This paper formulates several recommendations for policy makers 
to design policies supporting the positive effects of the informal housing market 
on urban resilience.
INTRODUCTION. INFORMAL HOUSING IN INNER CITIES: A PUBLIC 
POLICY CHALLENGE
The literature tends to situate informal housing within the context of rapid 
urban growth in the cities of developing countries (AlSayyad 1993), and the 
growth of informal settlements in peripheral areas of the city and relevant 
public policy interventions in these settlements has been extensively ana-
lyzed. The definition of housing informality primarily in terms of  insecurity 
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of tenure (De Soto 2000; Huchzermeyer 2008) has directed a large 
body of literature to focus on the illegal nature of informal settlements 
(AlSayyad 1993). However, this definition does not account for the diver-
sity of informal housing typologies. In fast-growing cities, a high number 
of migrants and poor households attempt to locate in central areas in 
order to access income-generating opportunities (Few et al. 2004). This 
phenomenon increases the demand for affordable housing, creating con-
ditions for the development of informal housing in inner cities (Custers 
2001). More often than not, such centrally located informal housing ty-
pologies take the form of rental housing arrangements, and thus require 
different grids of analysis (Rakodi 1995).
Housing informality is a particularly acute challenge in the inner city of 
Johannesburg, marked by an immense housing backlog in the low-income 
part of the market. It is estimated that the cheapest accommodation avail-
able on the formal market is a room at a rent of R1700 a month (Tissington 
2013, 55). This price is above the rental affordability level of the 49% of the 
inner-city households living on less than R3500 a month (ibid., 51). In this 
context, a high number of households live in informal types of accommo-
dation, such as backyard dwellings, rooms and spaces in subdivided flats, 
hijacked1 buildings, buildings run by slumlords, and informal settlements. 
Some residents accommodate themselves in “bad buildings,” overcrowded 
buildings where the basic requirements for water, electricity, and waste re-
moval services are unmet (Zack et al. 2010).
Despite the extent of the phenomenon, policy interventions conducted by 
the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (CoJ) have inadequately 
addressed the challenge. Since 1998, interventions have focused on the “bad 
buildings” issue through inner-city regeneration policies that have resulted 
in a high number of evictions. In this context, the courts have blamed the 
CoJ for its lack of planning for affordable housing delivery in the inner city 
(Tissington 2013). In recent years, the attempt to support affordable rental 
housing has failed to result in an adequate strategy and implementation plan at 
the scale of the challenge. The incomplete and inadequate policy response can 
be explained in two ways. First, there is a lack of understanding of the ways 
in which the informal housing market functions. Second, the predominant 
1 A building is considered hijacked when one or several parties, pretending to own the 
building, collects rent and/or performs several management functions. 
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conceptualization of housing informality as vulnerability overlooks the role it 
plays for low-income residents in the inner city. As a result, there is a need to 
adopt a more comprehensive approach in order to better inform policies.
This article aims at overcoming the restrictive understanding of infor-
mality as vulnerability by exploring the ways in which the inner-city infor-
mal housing market enhances or impedes residents’ ability to adapt to ever-
changing circumstances. It presents the results of desktop and fieldwork 
study on housing and living conditions of low-income residents in two in-
ner-city precincts, Yeoville and Jeppestown. Findings show that while many 
aspects of the informal market do produce vulnerabilities, its ability to 
adapt provides flexibility and affordability to low-income residents, filling 
in the formal market gap. This article presents the conceptual framework 
used, before detailing the desktop and fieldwork methodology. The findings 
are then presented and discussed.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: UNDERSTANDING URBAN RESILIENCE 
AND INFORMALITY
Government’s failures to address the challenges of informal housing are 
partly due to a lack of understanding of the dynamics in play. In this con-
text, there is a need for a new conceptualization of housing informality that 
can account for its complexities and the role it plays for the low-income 
population. This article uses the concept of evolutionary resilience, which 
describes the ability of an organism to constantly adapt to ever-changing 
circumstances (Simmie and Martin 2010). 
The concept of resilience emerged from the field of ecology in the 1960s 
and 1970s. It then expanded to various fields of study, turning resilience 
into a multidisciplinary and sometimes blurry concept (Simmie and Martin 
2010). In urban studies, theories of resilience consider cities as “human-
dominated social-ecological systems” (Walker and Salt 2006) composed 
of various interconnected subsystems (Holling, Gunderson, and Peterson 
2001). The literature distinguishes two main approaches to resilience. The 
“equilibrist” approach considers the ability of an organism to resist a shock 
and return to its original state. The “evolutionary” or “transformative” ap-
proach considers the ability of an organism to constantly adapt to ongoing 
changes in its environment (Simmie and Martin 2010). 
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In South Africa, the concept of resilience gained influence in both a 
research and a policy perspective. In 2011, the South African Cities 
Network released a report called “Towards Resilient Cities” (SACN 2011). 
Following this report, the City of Johannesburg’s “Joburg 2040: Growth 
and Development Strategy” (GDS) vision advocates a “resilient and adap-
tive society” for the future of the city (CoJ 2012). A few studies explored the 
link between informal settlements and resilience. A research conducted in 
Plastic View informal settlement in Tshwane stressed its positive role in en-
hancing resilience and adaptability of the community (Peres and Du Plessis 
2013). A study of the Kya Sands informal settlement in Johannesburg ar-
gues that although informal settlement displays some forms of vulnerabil-
ity, it also provides considerable benefits to its residents (Weakley 2013). 
However, no research has applied the concept of resilience to the inner-city 
informal housing environment. This article aims to fill that gap.
The concept of urban resilience is useful in three ways. First, it acknowl-
edges vulnerabilities while making room for the ability of systems and sub-
systems to overcome vulnerabilities and produce positive effects. In this 
regard, it provides a framework on which to overcome the restrictive con-
ceptualization of housing informality. Second, it also provides a framework 
for describing the interactions between residents’ livelihood strategies and 
the informal housing market. Third, this concept is coherent with long-
term policy goals and is used in a number of policy documents, including 
the Johannesburg GDS.
METHOD: DESKTOP RESEARCH AND FIELDWORK
This research was conducted in the context of a six-month internship in the 
CoJ Department of Housing, from January to July 2015. The proximity 
to local government directed the research process towards a practical aim, 
which was to answer the need for a better understanding of housing infor-
mality in order to inform policies. This embededness of the research process 
in local government action presented certain drawbacks. The first was the 
general and somewhat vague research question that constituted the point 
of departure. This work started from the need, expressed by the Housing 
Department, but also researchers and professionals, to better understand the 
inner-city informal housing market. The first research question was defined 
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collectively as: “what are the living and housing conditions of inner-city 
residents”? From this question, a number of themes of interest were defined, 
such as the use of space, housing management, access to services, tenants’ 
socio-economic profiles, etc. An individual analysis by the researcher was 
conducted to define a more precise and analytical research question. The 
second was the strong focus on government intervention which introduced 
a bias in the priorities in terms of actors and themes.
The desktop research was conducted with a view to identify, review, and 
synthesize available data on housing and living conditions of inner-city low-
income residents. It includes a large amount of policy documents and court 
cases that are useful to identify the CoJ’s responsibilities and objectives and 
to investigate how housing informality is conceptualized. In addition, a 
large, but mostly overlooked, amount of literature on housing and living 
conditions of inner-city residents was identified, mostly in the form of dis-
sertations and theses produced by local academics. The data extracted from 
the literature was organized by themes into a matrix; these themes were 
analyzed in light of the concept of resilience.
Building on the desktop research, the fieldwork focus was defined. 
Previous studies either focused on only one informal housing typology or 
on case studies. To fill this gap, the fieldwork was conducted across ty-
pologies and within two precincts. The goals were to gain an overall un-
derstanding of low-income residents’ living and housing conditions, and 
to understand informal arrangements, with a view to identifying which of 
them enhance residents’ resilience. The choice to focus on the Yeoville and 
Jeppestown precincts is twofold. First, the informal housing market in both 
precincts hosts a large part of the population and offers a wide diversity of 
housing typologies. Second, the precincts are different in terms of built en-
vironment. In Yeoville, there is a majority of low-rise semi-detached houses, 
while Jeppestown is marked old industrial buildings in reconversion. 
The fieldwork consisted of several phases. The first explored how accom-
modations are advertised as a point of entry into both the demand and 
supply sides of the market. In Yeoville, the “Shoprite Wall,” situated at the 
corner of Rocky Street and Bedford Road, is a key meeting place for ac-
tors in the informal housing market. This phase consisted of reading the 
notices, observing interactions, and conducting interviews. However, this 
provided access to only a section of the informal market. In order to fill this 
gap, the second phase consisted of interviewing people in public spaces, in 
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an attempt to grasp the links between housing location, income-generating 
strategies, and housing. The third phase consisted in entering buildings to 
conduct interviews and generate building profiles. Several methods were 
used, such as calling the numbers posted on the notices, using networks 
of relationships, and approaching security guards and caretakers at the en-
trance of buildings. In total, 33 semi-structured interviews were conduct-
ed.2 The length of interviews varied depending on respondents’ availability. 
The fieldwork faced a number of challenges. In April 2015, two waves of 
violence struck Jeppestown. The first, closely related to the topic of this arti-
cle, consisted of riots protesting against evictions. The second was a wave of 
xenophobic attacks that have to be understood within the national context 
at the time. As a result, the fieldwork in Jeppestown was paused for a few 
weeks. Due to time constraints and to the violent events occurring during 
the fieldwork research, the data gathered in Jeppestown is not thick enough 
to establish a strong comparison with Yeoville. 
FINDINGS
This section presents the findings of the desktop and fieldwork research. It 
explores the ways in which the informal housing market enhances or im-
pedes residents’ resilience. The findings are synthesized into three themes: 
access, asset management, and housing arrangements.
Negotiating access to affordable accommodation in the inner city
The issue of access is explored through three questions: Why do low-income 
residents choose to locate in the inner city? To what extent is accommoda-
tion available to them there? And, which strategies do residents develop to 
access accommodation opportunities? These questions are explored at both 
the inner-city scale and the precinct scale.
The literature stresses two sets of motivations for residents to move to 
the inner city. The first relates to the minimal decision-making power of 
residents faced with lack of opportunities where they come from (Mayson 
and Charlton 2015). The second relates to the search for better income-
generating opportunities (CASE 2006; COHRE 2005; Poulsen 2010). 
2 All interviews were confidential; the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement.
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Improved access to transport and proximity to place of work are also im-
portant motivations (Few et al. 2004; Gordon and Nell 2006), as well as 
improved access to amenities (Matjomane 2012). Other authors stress social 
motivations. This is particularly true for migrants, who tend to locate close 
to relatives, friends, or other networks of solidarity. A number of non-South 
Africans locate in the inner city in order to escape xenophobic attacks in the 
townships (Greenburg and Polzer 2008; Poulsen 2010). 
The findings also identify precinct effects in Yeoville, whereby residents 
choose to locate there because of certain characteristics that they value. 
However, this precinct effect is under-documented in the literature. It 
seems to be strong for accessing social networks. A number of migrants 
indicated that they came to Yeoville in the first place because of existing 
ethnic networks from which they could get support. Moreover, some pre-
cincts provide amenities valued by residents; for example, a migrant from 
Zimbabwe came in order to be close to his church (personal interview, 
March 30, 2015).
 Barriers to accessing accommodation are high, particularly in the for-
mal housing market, where prices and the “system check” (Tissington 
2013) are debilitating for the large part of the population earning less than 
R3500 a month. Non-South African migrants face even higher barriers to 
formal housing access (Greenburg and Polzer 2008). In this regard, infor-
mal accommodation appears to be more accessible, as there is no need for 
lease agreement, deposit, or paperwork; this is called the mastande system. 
The mastande is the main leaseholder; he or she rents the flat directly from 
the owner and sublets the unit through verbal agreements. The mastande 
advertises rooms and spaces within the flat, finds sublessees, collects rents 
from them, negotiates and deals with payment for services, ensures that 
the spaces are well maintained, and deals with conflicts (Mayson 2014). In 
some cases, the mastande lives in the unit and shares it with sublessees in 
order to be able to afford the rent. In others, he or she manages several units 
and lives in one of them, while subletting the others.
As indicated by Mastande R in Yeoville: “I don’t ask anyone for a de-
posit. I tell the price, it’s R1500. If you can afford to pay the R1500 I give 
you the room. I don’t want a deposit, I don’t want anything” (personal 
interview, March 30, 2015). 
However, there are still other kinds of barriers to access even in the in-
formal sector. The first is the lack of information about, for example, places 
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of advertisement, availability, etc. The second is the selection of prospec-
tive tenants by the owner or the mastande. Interviewee R, for example, re-
fuses to let his room to someone who drinks or smokes. Sometimes, notices 
on the wall indicate specific criteria, such as gender; some are written in 
French, which is a way to select French-speaking tenants. Mastande D de-
scribes how he selects the tenants: “I put up a notice, [then] I’ll meet you by 
the corner; I’ll assess you. . . . If I suspect something I’ll say no . . ., I don’t 
want two people I only want one person. There’s always a way to get out of 
it” (personal interview, April 27, 2015). 
This fieldwork research was conducted at the Shoprite Community 
Board, or “Shoprite Wall,” a central place for advertising rooms and spaces 
in the inner city. A few studies have used the Shoprite Wall as an indicator 
of the type and cost of rental accommodation available on the informal 
market (Tissington 2013; Mayson 2014). However, the postings there are 
not fully representative of the informal housing market, as only the rooms 
and spaces typology is advertised. The types of accommodation advertised 
fall into the following categories: spaces in beds, spaces in bedrooms, rooms, 
sitting rooms, balconies, rooms in cottages, and flats. The Shoprite Wall is 
not only a place where accommodation is advertised; most importantly, it 
is a place of interaction between the various actors in the housing market: 
prospective tenants, mastandes, landlords, and drivers. A high number of 
landlords or mastandes come to the wall in order to look for tenants. Not 
only do they post a notice there, they also stand in front of it and observe 
prospective tenants, or wait for tenants to approach them. If they see some-
one they like, they might approach him or her with an offer. In this way, 
mastandes or landlords can enter into direct contact with prospective ten-
ants and assess them. If an agreement is reached, a few trucks parked on the 
side of the road are ready to drive the tenants to their new accommodation. 
Asset management: the need for flexibility and adaptability
Asset management refers to the various assets used by residents to support 
their livelihood. Two questions are explored here: How do low-income res-
idents manage their assets? And how does the informal housing market 
contribute to enhancing these asset management strategies? The literature 
highlights four main types of assets in the urban context: financial capi-
tal, human capital, social capital, and physical capital (DFID 1999). More 
than the amount of assets that one possesses, the literature highlights the 
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crucial importance of how assets are mobilized and managed (Mayson and 
Charlton 2015). 
Financial Capital
A large number of inner-city inhabitants living in informal housing rely 
on low and unstable incomes (Mayson and Charlton 2015; Poulsen 2010; 
COHRE 2005). To the question: “What job do you have?” the most com-
mon answers were security guards, piece jobs (domestic work), informal self-
employment (dressmaking, street trading), small business (fruits and vege-
tables trading, small construction company), or employed in shops (barista, 
butler). Other answers included musician, technician, unemployed, and/or 
relying on husband or relatives. A number of respondents relied on “hustling” 
as a strategy—relying on relatives or friends to pay rent or other expenses. For 
example, Respondent S. was unemployed, but he managed to pay a monthly 
rent of R2300 thanks to his “hustling” strategy (personal interview, March 
30, 2015). A high number of residents choose to live in the cheapest possible 
accommodation, in order to send money back “home.” One interviewee was 
living in an extremely degraded building in Jeppestown. He was working as a 
security guard, but he could not move to a better accommodation because he 
was the only one providing for his mother, sister, and brother in the Eastern 
Cape (personal interview, April 12, 2015). 
Human Capital
Human capital is defined as the skills, ability to work, and health (DFID 
1999). The inner-city environment is not always supportive of human capi-
tal. When asked about blockages to employment, 67% of inner-city resi-
dents indicated that there were not enough jobs available (CASE 2006, 40). 
At the same time, the inner city seems to provide fewer barriers to informal 
work and more self-employment opportunities. Interestingly, the CASE sur-
vey showed that 17% of Joubert Park respondents indicated they were not 
interested in looking for a job, compared to 5% in Diepsloot and 13% in 
Zandspruit (2006, 40). This finding suggests that Joubert Park residents find 
it easier than township residents to make a living without having a formal job 
(through informal work, “hustling,” etc.). This seems to suggest that human 
capital is valued in different ways in the inner city. If qualifications and skills 
are not always fully rewarded on the formal market, they still provide poten-
tial access to more opportunities than where the migrants come from. 
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Social Capital
Social capital refers to social resources used to support livelihoods, such as 
connectedness and networks (DFID 1999). Findings indicate that inner-
city residents rely strongly on social capital, the main sources of which are 
networks of relatives, friends, and other social networks, in particular na-
tional or ethnic networks, churches, and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). Inner-city residents use their social capital for various purposes, 
such as accessing accommodation, work, or income; ensuring safety and 
security; and navigating bureaucracy and securing legal status (Mayson and 
Charlton 2015; Greenburg and Polzer 2008; Matjomane 2012). Living in 
informal conditions in the inner city has contrasting effects on one’s social 
capital. Mayson describes how life in some inner-city buildings can produce 
“destructive social ties” and a culture of “antisocial behaviour” (Mayson 
2014, 82). At the same time, living in rooms and spaces can also be sup-
portive of social ties. In a comparison of three inner-city buildings, Mayson 
showed that residents living in the most informally managed building 
developed stronger bonds with their neighbors (ibid.). In some cases, the 
flexibility of the rooms and spaces typology creates conditions for cross-
subsidization (Mayson and Charlton 2015); for example, when Mastande D 
in Yeoville could not pay the full electricity bill, a subtenant offered to pay 
the rest (personal interview, March 28, 2015).
Physical Capital
Physical capital refers to “the basic infrastructure and producer goods 
needed to support livelihoods” (DFID 1999, 13). In terms of tenure, rental 
in the informal housing market is more insecure and often leads to a “high 
degree of instability” (Greenburg and Polzer 2008, 3). At the same time, 
these “stories of continuous displacement from one accommodation to the 
next” (ibid.) should not be seen only in a negative light. Because income-
generating strategies are highly unstable, low-income residents need to be 
able to change accommodation quickly in order to adapt to changes. The 
informal market can respond to these needs because tenure arrangements 
are flexible. Indeed, a number of inner-city residents choose to rent because 
they can move out quickly if they need to (Hlangweni 2013). In terms 
of access to water, sanitation, and electricity, some buildings still fail to 
provide the most basic services. Many low-income buildings in the inner 
city are in a state of disrepair (Few et al. 2004). The case of the recyclers’ 
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building on Fox Street, in Jeppestown, shows how people deal with the 
lack of access to basic services such as electricity and water. The inhabit-
ants collected water from a broken pipe on the street opposite the building. 
Interviewee E said they had to go to the public park, where they paid R1 to 
use the toilets (personal interview, April 12, 2015). Although access to basic 
services is highly valued by residents, affordability and cost reliability are 
also crucial elements of satisfaction (Mayson 2014). A number of interview-
ees complained about the fluctuating prices of water and electricity, which 
contributed to their feeling of insecurity (some claimed that the manage-
ment company or the landowner was over-charging them). 
Housing arrangements
The aim of this section is to better understand how the informal hous-
ing market provides low-cost accommodation. The Yeoville Studio research 
suggested scales of analysis at the building and at the unit levels (Bénit‐
Gbaffou 2011). This method of analysis is used here for two themes: space 
and management.
Due to the high pressure on housing markets in the inner city, space 
in the informal market is continuously re-arranged in order to keep pro-
viding affordable housing opportunities. At the building scale, space ar-
rangements translate into three main patterns. The first is the develop-
ment of backyard dwellings, which are “informal shacks, typically erected 
by their occupiers in the yards of other properties” (Lemanski 2009, 472). 
Backyard dwellings are to be found in low-rise inner-city precincts such 
as Yeoville. A room in a backyard dwelling is typically rented by a single 
person or a couple, for R1000 to R1500 per month, including water and 
electricity. The second is the illegal reconversion of old industrial build-
ings for residential use in industrial precincts such as Jeppestown. Often, 
shacks are erected within the buildings to create living spaces. A shack in 
such buildings is rented for R500 to R1000 a month depending on the 
building, often without access to water and electricity. The third pattern 
is the illegal erection of walls on the top of or within high-rise build-
ings to create additional spaces. A three-story building on Auret Street in 
Jeppestown is a good example of such. Walls have been illegally erected in 
order to create 54 housing units within the building. In each unit, occu-
pants pay a rent of R350 to R550 to the hijacker. Occupants are illegally 
connected to water and electricity networks. 
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At the unit scale, spaces are subdivided and used in flexible ways. Flats 
are divided into accommodation spaces, balconies, door spaces, window 
spaces, or bed spaces. In some cases, living rooms, corridors, staircases, 
kitchens, or bathrooms become sleeping spaces at night. Numerous exam-
ples of such subdivision are to be found in the literature (Mayson 2014; 
COHRE 2005; Few et al. 2004; Bénit-Gbaffou 2011; Ngombe 2011). The 
fieldwork provides many examples of units being subdivided for subletting 
purposes. For instance, a women interviewed was staying in Jeppestown in 
a two-bedroom unit with her husband, her three children, and one sub-ten-
ant. She was paying R2000 per month for the unit. Her space was separated 
from her kids’ space by a curtain, and the sub-tenant was sleeping in the 
other room, which was also the kitchen (personal interview, May 15, 2015). 
On the Shopright Wall in Yeoville, the most expensive accommodation ad-
vertised was R3000 for a “big room with balcony”; while the cheapest was 
R500 for “a bed to share.” The most common types of arrangement were a 
“space to share” (R1000 to R1500) or a “bedroom to share” (±R2000). 
The literature describes a diversity of management arrangements within 
inner-city buildings. Management functions are often spread across several 
complementary or competing entities or individuals. At the building scale, 
the most formal setting includes a building caretaker employed by a man-
agement company. This formal management arrangement seems to work in 
terms of rent collection and maintenance of the building, but involves more 
barriers to access than informal types of management. In many cases, sub-
divisions occur at the unit scale within such formal building management 
settings. Informal management at the building scale often occurs when 
buildings are abandoned by their owners, which leaves room for alternative 
arrangements (Charlton Forthcoming 2016) or when the owners failed to 
maintain the buildings, leading to situations of slumlording (Poulsen, 2010 
and Matjomane, 2012). 
A number of buildings have been hijacked, meaning that one or several 
actors collect rent on behalf of the owner and perform various manage-
ment functions. The literature also explores several examples of sectional 
title buildings. Bénit-Gbaffou (2011) describes a “strong sense of vulner-
ability” in sectional title buildings, because of risks of default by both 
owners and tenants. Findings from the fieldwork show that confusion re-
garding roles and responsibilities is common in a number of buildings, re-
gardless of the type of management. For example, Da, a tenant  subletting 
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a space in a  formally managed building on Yeo Street, in Yeoville, was 
confused as to who was in charge (personal interview April 24, 2015). 
In the same building, several tenants complained about abusive practices 
from management such as increasing the rent above the levels allowed 
by the lease, charging for additional costs, and asking people to leave 
without giving them three month notice (Respondent Da, As and Dan, 
April 27, 2015). The tenants’ response to these abuses was to move out. 
When asked why tenants did not mobilize to go to court, Dan answered 
that tenants did not communicate with each other: “There is no body cor-
porate3. Because when there is a body corporate that’s where you discuss 
deep issues” (personal interview, April 27, 2015). 
In many buildings, a building management structure operates simulta-
neously with management arrangements at the unit scale, which is called 
the mastande system (Mayson, 2014; see above). The fieldwork shows that 
mastandes operate at small scales. They sometimes manage a few units, but 
hardly less than two or three. Most of the time, they manage units within 
a small geographic area in the same precinct. The fluctuating prices of elec-
tricity are an issue for mastandes, because they are the ones paying for it. 
The example of Ego Court shows how management structures can be bro-
ken down at several scales. The building caretaker is mainly in charge of 
controlling who stays in the building and ensuring maintenance. At the 
same time, the body corporate defines the rules to be followed in all units. 
Each mastande is then in charge of implementing them within his/her own 
unit. At the unit scale, the mastande manages the use of collective spaces 
within the unit along with the subtenants. This results in signs being put up 
in collective spaces (kitchen, bathroom, and corridor) reminding all about 
the common rules. 
3 The body corporate is the entity gathering all the property owners of a scheme. In this case, 
Dan uses the term “body corporate”, even if he is not the formal owner of the flat, because 
he considers himself the owner. He is saying that the absence of a collective decision-making 
arena facilitates abuses. 
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DISCUSSION: SUPPORTING DIRECT RELATIONSHIPS AND SMALL-
SCALE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
The findings suggest that residents chose to move to the inner city or to spe-
cific precincts because these locations were more supportive of their resilience 
than where they come from. However, their ability to find accommodation is 
greatly limited by high barriers to access in the formal market. The informal 
market partly fills this gap by reducing these barriers and valuing assets that 
low-income residents have, such as social capital. Low-income residents ac-
cess informal accommodation through various types of interactions that do 
not occur on the formal market. Low-income residents have highly unstable 
income-generating strategies, and rely greatly on social assets. They need to be 
able to quickly recompose their asset management strategy when faced with 
changing circumstances. In this regard, tenure arrangements used in infor-
mal markets provide low-income residents with flexibility and adaptability. 
At the same time, informal housing is also a source of vulnerability in 
terms of insecurity of tenure, lack of access to basic services, and unreli-
ability of prices. In a context of high demand, the informal housing market 
recomposes space and management arrangements in order to keep accom-
modation prices affordable. The erection of backyard dwellings, the illegal 
reconversion of old industrial building to residential use, and the illegal 
erection of walls within or on top of buildings are strategies used to create 
additional spaces at low cost. 
On the one hand, these arrangements are often breaking by-laws and 
create risks of overcrowding and lack of access to basic services (water, elec-
tricity, waste removal). On the other hand, certain aspects of these arrange-
ments seem to be working for the residents. At the unit scale, the mastande 
system functions relatively well because it creates conditions for direct rela-
tionships between the managing agent and tenants, facilitating the respect 
of common rules, solidarity, negotiation, and flexibility of arrangements.
FINDINGS 
From this discussion, a number of aspects of the informal housing market 
can be identified as enhancing or impeding residents’ resilience. A few of 
them are discussed below and translated into policy-based recommendations. 
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Findings from the literature and the fieldwork indicate that small-scale 
management practices are more likely to provide flexibility of tenure and 
prices while avoiding building degradation and management failures. 
Management failures, which are more likely to occur when there is no clear 
definition of roles and responsibilities, can be addressed in two ways: by fa-
cilitating direct relationships between tenants and management agents, and 
by supporting management arrangements at the unit scale. 
The existence of direct relationships between tenants and management 
agents reduces the risk of management failure at the building scale. The 
existence of a body corporate within the building provides a venue for com-
munication and exchange of information about management. In case of 
abusive practices, the body corporate facilitates residents’ mobilization. It 
also facilitates residents’ self-organization as a temporary solution to take 
over management and collectively pay for maintenance and services when 
management is failing. In some buildings, the body corporate is dysfunc-
tional or has disappeared as a result of a history of conflict and management 
failure. In such cases, the body corporate needs to be supported. The “Bad 
Buildings Strategy” recommends the appointment of administrators se-
lected by the CoJ to install leadership structures and communication before 
turning buildings over to residents (Zack et al. 2010). Small-scale manage-
ment practices can also be supported proactively through financial support 
(Gordon and Nell 2006). The Trust for Urban Housing Finance (TUHF) 
finances building renovations for small-scale landlords throughout the city. 
Their approach seems to be original and better suited to the needs of low-
income residents (Ngombe 2011). 
Going down to the unit scale, the mastande system of management func-
tions relatively well and could inspire policy design. Moreover, bad man-
agement of communal spaces is often a factor of vulnerability, in particular 
when these spaces are dirty and residents choose to cook and/or bathe in their 
rooms. In this regard, Mayson and Charlton (2015) show that communal 
spaces are more likely to remain clean when they are smaller and have more 
proximity, as people can control who is abusing or not cleaning the space. 
Such a finding could inform designs for affordable and subsidized rental 
housing projects, since it suggests that communal spaces should be central 
enough to be watched by “people with eyes,” and shared with a fairly small 
number of people. In this regard, two- to three-bedroom units that allow 
sharing or subletting between two to three families with just one bathroom 
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and a kitchen as the shared areas seems to be a better working setting than a 
succession of single rooms with bathrooms for each and a communal kitchen.
CONCLUSION
This article argues for a re-conceptualization of inner-city housing infor-
mality in order to better account for its complexity and the role it plays 
for residents. The concept of evolutionary urban resilience is used to iden-
tify which dynamics of the informal housing market enhance or impede 
residents’ needs as regard their livelihood strategies. By providing an under-
standing of the interactions between residents’ asset management strategies 
and the informal housing market, this research aims at informing policy in 
order to move towards more comprehensive interventions. Findings show 
that while many aspects of the informal market produce vulnerabilities (in-
security of tenure, overcrowding, lack of access to basic services, illegality, 
etc.) they also demonstrate the ability of the informal market to adapt in 
order to better fit residents’ needs in terms of affordability and flexibility. 
In this regard, they fill a gap by providing services that are not provided by 
the formal market (low-cost accommodation, flexible tenure arrangements, 
social proximity, and networks of solidarity). To be comprehensive, a policy 
towards informal housing has to address factors of vulnerability while sup-
porting factors of resilience. In this perspective, small-scale management 
practices should be supported by encouraging direct relationships between 
tenants and management agents, planning for informal subdivision and 
management of units in housing designs, and supporting small-scale land-
lords. Supporting small-scale management arrangements can be seen as 
both a preventive (against management failure and abuses) and proactive 
(supporting the positive effects of management) measure.
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How Do Decision Makers Adapt  
and Reconcile International Models to 
Local Urban Poor Contexts?  
Case Study of the Relocation Project 
in Kibera, Nairobi, Kenya
Adèle Charbonneau
Sciences Po Paris
ABSTRACT
International organizations such as the World Bank provide governments with 
models for safeguard policies to avoid forced evictions of informal encroach-
ers when developing urban infrastructure. Yet, these models tend to be some-
what rigid and ill-suited to the urban poor, a particularly vulnerable popula-
tion. Based on the case study of the railway Relocation Action Plan in Kibera, 
Nairobi, Kenya, this article argues that adapting international models to the 
local informal context requires a flexible and open-minded approach shared by 
all stakeholders and the assistance of an experienced community-based organi-
zation, such as Shack/Slum Dwellers International. 
In the cities of many developing countries, the lack of government resources 
dedicated to the poorest urban dwellers as well as a saturated urban land 
market have allowed the land reserved for future development to be progres-
sively encroached by slums. Historically, a flawed system of land allocation, 
combined with an ill-regulated land market, has discriminated against the 
urban poor, often forcing them to acquire land informally through illegal 
occupancy (Otiso 2002). Yet, almost any attempt to improve basic  services 
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and urban infrastructure requires the very land on which slum dwellers 
have made their homes (Patel, D’Cruz, and Burra 2002). Indeed, in the 
increasingly competitive global economy, cities have to constantly attract 
new enterprises and investors, which generates the redevelopment of urban 
land and modifications of its use (ibid.); when designing projects aimed 
at expanding their infrastructure network, many city councils and public 
agencies encounter slum populations settled in these areas. Resettlement is 
often a challenge, because finding well-located sites for those who are dis-
placed is difficult within already densely populated cities.
In Nairobi, the Kenya Railway Corporation (KRC) faced such chal-
lenges when implementing a project financed by a World Bank loan to 
improve the railway lines passing through Kibera, one of Africa’s biggest 
slums. Kibera covers around 2.38 km2 and hosts an estimated population 
of 200,000 inhabitants. The average density of the settlement is 87.500 in-
habitants per km2. The income per person ranges around 3977 KSH per 
month (40€), while the poverty line in Kenya has been established at 2645 
KSH per month (27€) (Desgroppes and Staupin 2011). Kibera is known for 
its volatile political situation as well as its high level of crime and violence, 
the last main event being the post-election violence in 2007–2008 (Osborn 
2008). Such density, violence, and concentration of poverty unfortunately 
characterize many informal settlements in the world, which makes the set-
tlement an interesting sample for the study of slums. Analyzing the railway 
Relocation Action Plan (RAP) in Kibera is an opportunity to understand 
the dynamics and the use of models for resettlement of the urban poor. The 
case study will focus on the challenges and difficulties faced by decision 
makers when adapting international models on resettlement to the local 
context, particularly to informal settlements. The article will contribute to 
the academic reflection on the sustainability of pro-poor urban policies de-
veloped within a set of international models and constraints.
CHALLENGES IN APPLYING WORLD BANK SAFEGUARD  
POLICIES IN KIBERA
Implementation of the World Bank international model  
for resettlement
Facing the challenge of developing railway lines where slum populations 
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had encroached on the reserved land, the first reaction of Kenya Railways 
Corporation (KRC) was to send out eviction notices in 2004. However, 
given their influence and financial participation, the World Bank pressured 
KRC to adopt a plan for relocating the populations concerned. Convincing 
KRC to develop such a plan was not an easy task and the idea was received 
with mixed feelings. But the combination of the World Bank’s policy and 
pressure from human rights and civil society organizations, as well as from 
organized slum dwellers, made it necessary to adopt a resettlement project. 
The World Bank, following its internal policy, would not have condoned 
the eviction of the slum dwellers. Indeed, acknowledging the risks imposed 
by development projects on displaced populations, the World Bank had 
adopted its first involuntary resettlement policy in 1980, which has been 
updated three times. The current version is the Operational Policy 4.12 (OP 
4.12), which was approved in December 2001 (World Bank 2001). This 
policy on resettlement and rehabilitation compelled KRC to abide by the 
World Bank rules as a condition for obtaining the funds they needed to 
modernize and upgrade the railway network. The obligation of the Kenyan 
A train passing in the encroached area in Kibera (Adèle Charbonneau, 2015)
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state to limit forced evictions also stems from international legal instru-
ments, which include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Art. 11, 
para. 1) (United Nations 1976, 2008). Decision makers within the Kenyan 
government were thus made to adopt a RAP to relocate slum dwellers as a 
precondition to expand their railway lines. 
Under OP 4.12, the World Bank and the borrowing states are com-
pelled to ensure that the affected populations are identified, consulted, and 
provided with enough support to restore them to living conditions that are 
equal to or better than before (World Bank 2012). If evictions are inevi-
table, they should be fully justified, given the negative impact they have on 
a wide range of human rights (ibid.). “Any eviction must be (a) authorized 
by law; (b) carried out in accordance with international human rights law; 
(c) undertaken solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare; 
(d) reasonable and proportional; (e) regulated so as to ensure full and fair 
compensation and rehabilitation; and (f) carried out in accordance with 
the present guidelines” (United Nations 2008). The safeguard policies are 
applicable to all affected populations irrespective of whether they hold 
legal land or property titles, and World Bank staffs regularly participate 
in meetings and visits to assess their respect. For example, REMU, the 
Railway implementation unit of the RAP project, had to produce regular 
reports for the World Bank to show the progress of the project as well as 
its compliance with the safeguard policies. A mission focused on safeguard 
and environmental policies also visited the Kenyan team in April 2015 as 
a way of assessing the due application of the rules and amending some ele-
ments of the RAP when they did not correspond with OP 4.12. 
Yet, some World Bank policies have proved contradictory or difficult to 
apply. Despite a monthly monitoring by the World Bank senior officer in 
charge of the project, the multiplicity of hired consultants throughout the 
implementation of the RAP project produced some confusion. For instance, 
some decisions made at the beginning were later considered inadequate by 
a different set of World Bank consultants. This created obstacles for the ef-
ficiency, coherence, and success of the project and generated administrative 
and financial challenges for decision makers (De Wet 2001). Indeed, they 
are expected “to hold together, and to keep apart, four key elements in a re-
settlement project: (a) The political realities and power differentials; (b) The 
logic and the bureaucracy of planning and implementation; (c) Funding; 
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[and] (d) The complexities of the processes that arise when [at the same time] 
we try to combine providing people with increased options through develop-
ment projects, with . . . depriving them of options by moving them, usually 
against their will” (ibid., 4645). In addition, the changing rules on safeguard 
policies have made it difficult to maintain coherence in the decisions taken. 
Unfortunately, this state of things does not seem to be unique to the 
RAP project in Nairobi. The World Bank admitted in 2015 that it had failed 
to respect its own regulations to protect deprived populations displaced 
by large infrastructure projects such as dams or roads (Chavkin, Hudson 
and Hallman 2015). An investigation by the International Consortium of 
Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), the Huffington Post, and more than twenty 
other media revealed that World Bank projects had “physically or eco-
nomically displaced an estimated 3.4 million people, forcing them from 
their homes, taking their land or damaging their livelihoods” (Chavkin, 
Hallman, Hudson, Schilis-Gallego and Shifflett 2015). In March 2015, the 
World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim acknowledged major prob-
lems  with its resettlement policies and promised to seek reforms (World 
Bank 2015a). These events highlight the inherent tensions within develop-
ment-induced relocation projects and the existing gaps between the interna-
tional and national guidelines and their actual implementation. 
World Bank safeguards policies ill-adapted to  
informal environments
Slums such as Kibera are places characterized by dire living conditions, in-
secure land tenure, and often violence (Desgroppes and Staupin 2011). The 
situation is aggravated by the saturated urban land market, defined by high 
land and real estate market prices and shortages of housing for the low-in-
come population. Although most of the land is owned by the state, individ-
uals have managed to negotiate informally with local authorities and have 
been progressively allowed to construct structures and collect rents (Weru 
2004). The consequence is that most slum dwellers are tenants, and owners 
have little incentive to maintain their structures or provide basic services. 
The rental business is quite lucrative and the influence of absentee owners 
who do not live in the slums but who own and rent many units illegally is 
strong (ibid.) Yet, the ambiguous tenure status of slum dwellers—structure 
owners and tenants alike—prevents them altogether from enjoying their 
rights as urban citizens (Goux 2003). They are not acknowledged officially 
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by the authorities and usually do not participate in the decision-making 
processes that affect them. Within a resettlement and slum-upgrading proj-
ect, structure owners and tenants have very different priorities: owners usu-
ally seek full compensation for their built structures; tenants aspire to the 
recognition of their right to live in the area and for the possibility of con-
structing their own houses (Weru 2004). 
 Unfortunately, the World Bank international model for compensation, 
resettlement, and safeguard policies lacks the flexibility to succeed in such 
a complex situation. It tends to favor a single relocation solution for every 
Project Affected Person (PAP) despite the plurality of situations and often to 
the advantage of the minority of structure owners. What’s more, the World 
Bank policies tend to transmit an essentialist vision of communities, over-
looking the multiplicity of positions within them. Indeed, “participatory 
projects have unwittingly built upon pre-existing power structures, rein-
forcing them . . . to the advantage of the ‘learning elites’ [see Wilson 2006]” 
(Rigon 2014, 259). Yet, this “often idealized view of harmonious ‘natural’ 
communities . . . suffers from a lack of understanding of power structures 
. . . and of how community representatives may also be motivated by indi-
vidual interests rather than the good of the collective” (ibid., 260).
This limited understanding renders it difficult for decision makers to 
really improve the lives of slum inhabitants. International organizations 
and government institutions are used to dealing with the formal and state 
spheres but are ill prepared for informal settlements and the urban poor. 
Yet, improving the living conditions of or resettling slum dwellers can be 
complicated by the potential conflicts between structure owners and ten-
ants and by the existing tensions between ethnic groups that have often 
been manipulated by powerful political interests (Goux 2003, Weru 
2004). Resettlement projects are thus characterized by high levels of failure 
“because of the inherent complexity of what is involved when we try to 
combine moving people with improving their conditions” (De Wet 2001, 
4642). For example, community representatives, who are mainly structure 
owners, can manipulate the project and decision makers to their advantage 
and to the detriment of tenants (Weru 2004). Therefore, success requires 
extensive flexibility in the design of resettlement projects in terms of plan-
ning, implementation, and budget, especially in an informal context. Such 
flexibility and an “adapt-as-you-go approach” (De Wett 2001, 4644) are 
important to increase the chances of success of resettlement and to ensure 
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that the  highest number of PAPs is benefiting. The difficulty arises from 
the necessity of local authorities and funders to give up part of their control 
over the project. Indeed, they are meant to “sacrifice the idea of a kind of 
‘one size fits all’ model of resettlement” (ibid.). In the RAP project, the 
5.3km of railway lines were divided into six districts, and different com-
pensation methods were created for residential, business, and institutional 
PAPs (KRC 2011). 
In Nairobi, the RAP is being implemented in very politicized neighbor-
hoods with histories of patronage politics and political violence, a capital 
consideration for decisions makers (Osborn 2008). Kibera is the arena of 
political struggles for acquiring the largest number of votes and the poli-
tics of patronage occupies a central place (ibid.). Tribal rivalries abound 
within Kibera, as the settlement is regularly the scene of community vio-
lence. For instance, Luo, Kikuyu, and Nubian communities have strong 
claims over the land and important political and economic antagonisms 
(Goux 2003). In Nairobi, within the different communities, many individ-
uals have resisted the RAP and some have even filed petitions in the High 
Court of Nairobi, delaying substantially the implementation of the RAP. 
This environment can be found in many, if not all, informal settlements 
in the world. Therefore, the risk is high that slum dwellers will mobilize 
and obstruct a project that is not properly designed and communicated. 
In Kibera, the principle of 1 PAP, 1 structure was particularly opposed by 
residents who were also structure owners, as it meant a reduction of their as-
sets and sources of income. So, in addition to one unit, they were also given 
cash compensation related to the number of houses they possessed before. 
But since those structure owners were also overwhelmingly the commu-
nity representatives it was important for REMU to try to understand the 
real interests of others and make informed decisions, especially considering 
the limited budget. Absentee structure owners who were not living in the 
railway reserve and who were not entitled to a residential unit, were given 
financial compensation for their demolished units. 
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COMBINING THE WORLD BANK MODEL WITH SHACK/SLUM 
DWELLERS INTERNATIONAL’S EXPERIENCE 
Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI), a crucial partner to help 
reconcile the RAP with the informal context
One of the solutions found by the KRC and the World Bank to help fill 
the gap of the safeguard model has been to involve another international 
actor capable of applying the policy to the informal context. As such, the 
inclusion of Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI) in the RAP has 
been highly beneficial for decision makers. SDI is an international non-
profit organization, regrouping national slum dwellers federations and 
their supportive NGOs. Federations are composed of community groups 
from informal settlements, and organized around savings schemes. Savings 
schemes are established to foster trust and solidarity between members and 
to enhance their financial resources. They are also the structures in which 
members discuss, identify their needs, and develop strategies to cater for 
them (Mitlin 2013). SDI supports “people-centred development, with or-
ganized communities leading and implementing activities to secure a pro-
poor urban transformation recognized and resourced by the state” (Mitlin 
2013, 484) Alongside the slum dwellers federations, NGOs are in charge 
of fundraising, financial management as well as advocacy, documentation, 
and linkages with professional agencies (ibid., 487). The structure of dual 
organizations (federation and support NGO) “emerged from SDI’s history 
and has remained as the preferred form to support a substantive grassroots 
process able to negotiate with local and national politicians, while also 
managing donor finance and building relations with officials” (bid., 488). 
Pamoja Trust has been for more than ten years the supportive NGO of the 
Kenyan slum dwellers federation, Muungano Wa Wanavijiji, and represen-
tative of SDI in the country. Although since 2010 it no longer belongs to 
the SDI network, it still applies most of its models. 
SDI was not primarily funded to manage relocation action plans, however 
it has gained experience in resettlement projects since its foundation. SDI 
first developed its international model around community organizations and 
slum dwellers federations in India. It is also there that SDI first had experi-
ence with a large-scale relocation plan, which would later help Kenyan stake-
holders. SDI participated in the Mumbai Urban Transport Project in 2002 
(Patel, D’Cruz and Burra 2002). The project has many  similarities with the 
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one in Kibera, as the Indian Railways and the government of Maharashtra 
also needed to clear the railway lines to make way for its expansion with 
the assistance of a World Bank loan (Giovannetti 2009). Muungano Wa 
Wanavijiji as well as REMU were directly exposed to and influenced by 
the Mumbai Transport Project through two international transmitters: the 
World Bank and SDI. 
The combination of the Indian experience with the existing federation of 
slum dwellers made SDI and Pamoja Trust important stakeholders to facili-
tate the implementation of the RAP. Muungano Wa Wanavijiji, supported 
by Pamoja Trust, created a related organization called Ngazi Ya Chini, 
dedicated to slum dwellers living along railway lines throughout the coun-
try. Those preexisting structures were later used as entry points for REMU 
when discussing and negotiating with the PAPs. They also encouraged trust 
and dialogue between the different actors as well as provided a common 
platform linking the two worlds: formal/informal, state/community. In 
that sense, the project was viewed as an opportunity to strengthen and or-
ganize the concerned communities (D’Cruz and Mitlin 2007). Indeed, it 
caters for improved housing conditions for the slum dwellers who will ben-
efit from permanent and stable housing in a place close to where they used 
to live. They will also enjoy access to water and sanitation through a legal 
and formal connection to Nairobi water and sewerage systems. In terms 
of empowerment, communities have been organized into cooperatives in 
order for them to manage the units and to sign lease agreements with KRC. 
SDI’s international model is based on different strategies applied in 
the RAP to gather and unite slum dwellers and to facilitate contacts with 
formal actors. Daily savings schemes are at the center of SDI’s: “The 
process of savings embeds practices of accountability and transparency 
within these local organizations” (D’Cruz and Mitlin 2013, 7). Therefore, 
in Kibera, PAPs were encouraged to conduct savings at the segment level 
so that they could discuss how to use the amounts they collected. Indeed, 
most slum dwellers “have lost the ability to trust their own community. 
Rebuilding this trust is essential for collective action” (ibid.). The second 
most important strategy of SDI for community learning and knowledge 
creation is the constant flow of information and exchange of experience 
between slum dweller communities through exchange visits (Mitlin 
2013), which create links between the different savings groups and be-
tween national federations (Patel, D’Cruz, and Burra 2002). For example, 
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members of Muungano Wa Wanavijiji visited Mumbai in order to learn 
from the completed railway project. 
Enumeration of all inhabitants living in the railway reserve was the third 
step of the Kenyan RAP. Self-enumeration aims at sharing with commu-
nity members the methods used to gather reliable and complete data about 
households in their own communities (Mitlin 2013). Federations with the 
support of their related NGO have structured these techniques into a series 
of steps to follow in order to create knowledge and capacity in their settle-
ments. Indeed, settlement profiles and enumerations are all-powerful tools 
in mobilizing communities and advocating for their rights (Patel, D’Cruz, 
and Burra 2002). In Nairobi, after the community collected the household 
details of each PAP, the information was entered in a database that was then 
posted in a public place in each segment for public verification. This process 
was important because it helped weed out some community members who 
had tried to be counted several times or had concealed their true informa-
tion. After its amendment, the verified database was handed over to the 
PAPs to support them in advocacy and voter registration. The database is 
Children relocating to new units in Soweto East, Kibera (Adèle Charbonneau, 2015)
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still the one being used by REMU for allocation of permanent houses or 
water and electricity connections. The data was also utilized to produce 
maps of the areas, the basis of the engineering and planning design. Finally 
throughout the project, REMU, together with Pamoja Trust, conducted 
public meetings with and visits to the communities to explain and inform 
the PAPs of the progress of or difficulties encountered in the project. SDI 
has thus provided tools for decision makers to reconcile the safeguard poli-
cies with the local context and the communities concerned, even reinforc-
ing their application.
A complex combination of models to ensure  
smoother resettlement
The application of the SDI model in the Kenyan resettlement project has 
been highly beneficial, however, it has required a complex repartitioning 
of roles and a continuous adjustment of the models. One of the first dif-
ficulties is the sometimes conflictive or competitive relationships between 
Pamoja Trust, Muungano Wa Wanavijiji, Ngazi Ya Chini, the PAPs, and 
the community. Indeed, they all intend to speak in the name of the “com-
munity,” yet they might have diverse discourses or positions. On the one 
hand, Pamoja Trust must “respect the autonomy of the community orga-
nizations and their ability to make decisions for themselves” (Mitlin 2013, 
488). Indeed, Pamoja Trust links the community to REMU, KRC, and the 
World Bank; it participates in the major meetings representing and protect-
ing the interests of the PAPs. On the other hand, Muungano Wa Wanavijiji 
and Ngazi Ya Chini have to determine their own positions and strategies to 
guarantee the PAPs’ space for participation and learning. 
Even between Muungano Wa Wanavijiji, Ngazi Ya Chini, and the com-
munity, be it PAPs or non-PAPs, conflicts can arise. For instance, in Kibera, 
rumors were circulating that accused community representatives of plotting 
with REMU and reserving permanent houses for their own benefit. Another 
major tension existed between residential and business PAPs; it took a lot of 
mediation from Pamoja Trust and REMU to bring them together in order 
for them to speak as one. Some disagreements even came to an extreme 
point with a court petition being filled in 2011 by Langata Youth Network 
against KRC and the World Bank regrouping PAPs and non-PAPS, claim-
ing that they could not evict the population and that the process was illegal. 
Politics within the community also turned around groups of PAPs taking 
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advantage of the confusion to get some financial gains by asking people for 
money when they were being enumerated. “Rather than one party being 
dominant, the challenge [for decision makers] is to recognize ways in which 
the benefits of collaboration can be maximized while recognizing that dif-
ferences in social status (and in some cases class position) means that more 
than good will is required” (Mitlin 2013, 492).
Grievance mechanisms are an interesting combination of models from 
SDI and the World Bank and an example of the effective repartition of 
roles within the actors. It is a requirement of the World Bank safeguard 
policies to have a complaint system to channel and resolve inquiries 
(World Bank 2015b). Yet, within the RAP, this was combined with an 
important community dimension: for each segment along the railway 
lines, a segment executive committee (SEC) was elected by the community 
to take care of the mobilization and sensitization of the PAPs. Together 
with REMU and Pamoja Trust, the SEC is also in charge of organizing 
public meetings and the processes of vetting and balloting. Distinct from 
the SEC, each segment hosts a grievance committee composed of elected 
members of the community. Each PAP has the right to enter a claim with 
REMU, claims that are later transferred to the grievance committee of 
the respective segment. The committee makes a decision on the case, with 
the support of a legal professional from REMU, by listening to witnesses 
and using the original collected data. The decision is then communicated 
to the persons concerned. This system allows tracing claims by the com-
munity itself while the presence of different members and the legal advisor 
avoids favoring any personal interest. If the case is too complex to be de-
cided by the committee, a second multisegment level has been established 
grouping members from the six segments in Kibera (Soweto East, Laini 
Saba, Gatwekera, Kianda, Kisumu Ndogo and Mashimoni). Finally, a 
third level of grievance gathers three representatives from REMU and two 
professionals appointed by them. They are to decide on the most compli-
cated cases that need professional input. Grievance mechanisms are a long 
process but they enable the community to make decision on most of the 
cases and get both training and power. They institutionalize complaints 
and reduce potential violent confrontations.
SDI, together with the World Bank, KRC, Pamoja Trust, and the dif-
ferent community structures, has thus managed to ensure the near com-
pletion of the project. In October 2015, some of the PAPs had already 
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relocated to the permanent buildings benefiting from water and electric-
ity connections. Yet, in not all projects is it “in the perceived interest 
of either of these parties (that is, funders and borrowers) to undertake 
resettlement properly, as this requires an essentially open-ended approach 
to the resettlement component of a project” (De Wet 2001, 4644). The 
obstacle lies in the power shift required from authorities and funders, who 
will lose part of their control over the decisions made. In addition, PAPs 
are usually from less powerful and more marginalized backgrounds, so 
their economic and social networks can take time to reconstruct. Such 
slow reconstruction has to be considered; protecting it implies an unusual 
commitment of effort and resources—a commitment that slum dwellers 
are rarely able to exact from their governments (De Wet 2001). 
In that sense, as the Kibera case illustrates, adding another actor, such 
as SDI, with experience and knowledge of the community concerned, has 
been critical to facilitate a smoother implementation of the resettlement 
project. This is also very useful in helping decision makers to apprehend the 
complex situation of the urban poor they must confront. Indeed, practices 
in the international development sphere tend to favor professionals who are 
moving between and within countries, taking with them their particular 
expertise, but who often lack a proper knowledge of the historical, social, 
and cultural context in which they are working (Wilson 2006). For deci-
sion makers, SDI was a very useful partner in the cases of Mumbai and 
Nairobi, although its model might not be applicable everywhere. Ideally, to 
reconcile international models with local urban poor contexts, the idea is 
to find a suitable collaborator for each large-scale resettlement project. This 
collaboration can be viewed as expensive, yet the costs can be much higher 
as a result of political resistance, considering the probable delays and dif-
ficulties that might be encountered. 
CONCLUSION
As illustrated in the Nairobi Railway RAP project, one of the solutions 
for decision makers to adapt the World Bank safeguard policies to Kibera 
and to maximize the positive impact on the urban poor was combining 
them with SDI’s model of community organization and slum upgrading. 
This interaction was not without negotiation and conflict. It did require a 
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flexible but clear repartition of roles between the various actors as well as a 
defined hierarchy and decision-making procedures. The RAP did not man-
age to avoid major oppositions, such as the court case that greatly delayed 
its implementation, but imagining the situation without the participation 
of Pamoja Trust shows the very high risks of obstruction or manipulation 
of the project. 
Even so, it provides important ideas for states and international organi-
zations, in particular for managing the resettlement of poor populations 
in a context of rapid urban change. Perhaps one of the key outputs of the 
Kenyan RAP relates to the importance to low-income communities of 
being organized and being able to participate directly in the development 
and management of their resettlement projects. Such participation cannot 
be achieved easily or rapidly and requires more than good will. A knowl-
edgeable institution with previous experience in the community concerned 
is thus a critical requirement when developing resettlement policies if safe-
guard policies are to be respected.
REFERENCES
Chavkin, Sasha, Ben Hallman, Michael Hudson, Cécile Schilis-Gallego, and Shane Shifflett. 
2015. “How the World Bank Broke Its Promise to Protect the Poor.” The International 
Consortium of Investigative Journalists and Huffington Post, April 16, available at http://
www.icij.org/project/world-bank/how-world-bank-broke-its-promise-protect-poor
Chavkin, Sasha, Michael Hudson, and Ben Hallman. 2015. “As World Bank Admits 
Failures, Safeguards, Questions Remain.” The International Consortium of Investigative 
Journalists and Huffington Post, March 5, available at http://www.icij.org/blog/2015/03/
world-bank-admits-failures-safeguards-questions-remain 
D’Cruz, Celine, and Diana Mitlin. 2007. “Shack/Slum Dwellers International: One Experience 
of the Contribution of Membership Organizations to Pro-poor Urban Development.” In 
Membership Based Organizations of the Poor, R. Kanbur, M. Chen, R. Jhabvala and C. 
Richards (eds), 221– 239. Abingdon, UK; New York: Routledge.
Desgroppes, Amélie, and Sophie Staupin. 2011. “Kibera: The Biggest Slum in Africa?” Les 
Cahiers de l’Afrique de l’Est 44 (September - December): 23–34.
De Wet, Chris. 2001. “Economic Development and Population Displacement: Can Everybody 
Win?” Economic and Political Weekly 36(50): 4637–4645.
Esser, Daniel E. 2012. “‘When we launched the government’s agenda…’: Aid Agencies and 
Local Politics in Urban Africa.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 50 (September): 
397–420.
Giovannetti, Frédéric . 2009. Guidance Note on Urban Resettlement, Mumbai Urban Transport 
104
Urban Solutions: Metropolitan Approaches, Innovation in Urban Water and Sanitation, and Inclusive Smart Cities
Project. The World Bank and the Government of Maharashtra, Report Nº49000-IN, January.
Goux, Marie-Ange. 2003. “Guerre des loyers dans les bidonvilles de Nairobi.” Politique Africaine 
91(3): 68–82.
Kenya Railways Corporation. 2011. Resettlement advisory services for the review of the relocation 
action plan (RAP) in Kibera & Mukuru, Nairobi, Final Report, January. 
Mitlin, Diana. 2013. “A Class Act: Professional Support to People’s Organizations in Towns and 
Cities of the Global South.” Environment and Urbanization 25: 483–499.
Osborn, Michelle. “Fuelling the Flames: Rumour and Politics in Kibera.” Journal of Eastern 
Africa 2(2): 315–327.
Otiso, Kefa M. 2002. “Forced Evictions in Kenyan cities.” Singapore Journal of Tropical 
Geography 23(3): 252–267.
Patel, Sheela, Celine D’Cruz, and Sundar Burra. 2002. “Beyond Evictions in a Global City: 
People Managed Resettlement in Mumbai.” Environment and Urbanization 14(1): 159–172.
Rigon, Andrea. 2014. “Building Local Governance: Participation and Elite Capture in Slum-
Upgrading in Kenya.” Development and Change 45(2): 257–283.
United Nations. 1976. ICESCR, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/
Pages/CESCR.aspx
___. 2008. Basic principles and guidelines on development-based evictions and displacement, Annex 
1 of the report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an 
adequate standard of living, A/HRC/4/18, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Issues/Housing/Guidelines_en.pdf 
Weru, Jane. 2004. “Community Federations and City Upgrading: The Work of Pamoja Trust 
and Muungano in Kenya.” Environment and Urbanization 16(1): 47–62.
Wilson, Gordon. 2006. “Beyond the Technocrat? The Professional Expert in Development 
Practices.” Development and Change 37(3): 501–523.
World Bank. 2001. Operational Policy 4.12, available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,contentMDK:20064
610~menuPK:64701637~pagePK:64709096~piPK:64709108~theSitePK:502184~isCUR
L:Y,00.html
___. 2012. Social Development Department, “Involuntary Resettlement portfolio Review 
Phase I and II”, May, Washington, available at http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/pubdocs/
publicdoc/2015/3/517941425483120301/involuntary-resettlement-portfolio-review-phase1.
pdf and http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/pubdocs/publicdoc/2015/3/96781425483120443/
involuntary-resettlement-portfolio-review-phase2.pdf
___. 2015a. “World Bank Acknowledges Shortcomings in Resettlement Projects, Announces 
Action Plan to Fix Problems,” March 4, available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/
press-release/2015/03/04/world-bank-shortcomings-resettlement-projects-plan-fix-problems 
___. 2015b. Action Plan: Improving the management of safeguards and resettlement 
practices and outcomes, March 4, available at http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/pubdocs/
publicdoc/2015/3/71481425483119932/action-plan-safeguards-resettlement.pdf
105
Pacified Inclusion: Digital Inclusion in 
Brazil’s Most Violent Favelas
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University of Colorado-Boulder
ABSTRACT
Starting in 2008, the city of Rio de Janeiro began to “pacify” its gang-ridden 
favelas and invest billions of dollars in economic development. Pacified favelas 
became more integrated within the broader Brazilian political system while 
innocent bystanders fell victim to daily police-trafficker shootouts. During this 
time, digital technology became a ubiquitous tool for favela activists who sought 
to critique pacification policy as a reproduction of structural inequalities. The 
discussion of violence helped to form a network between online favela activists 
and powerful institutions in the Brazilian state. This network embraced par-
ticipatory politics in the form of Paulo Freire’s ideas of “critical pedagogy” as 
well as state-aligned ideas of entrepreneurship and economic formalization. The 
friction between state- and community-oriented goals in Rio’s favelas demon-
strates that structural violence is an essential aspect of how communities experi-
ence digital inclusion. 
INTRODUCTION
In 2010, the Brazilian military and state police removed a decades-old 
parallel state controlled by imperialistic drug gangs and “pacified” the 
Complexo do Alemão, one of Rio de Janeiro’s most violent favelas. Through 
the use of online social networks, favela activists critiqued, networked with, 
and worked alongside newly established state institutions. Notably, these 
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activists embraced locally produced digital imagery that depicted police 
abuse, gang violence, and state neglect. These same networks encouraged 
digital inclusion projects that trained locals in a critical form of digital lit-
eracy. Community policing policies and citizen journalism interacted to 
help construct a new type of Brazilian state and citizen within the favela. I 
suggest that favela residents constructed a unique form of pacified citizen-
ship through the simultaneous embrace and critique of authoritative insti-
tutions. This conflict demonstrates how everyday violence becomes a vital 
element of digital inclusion in marginalized urban communities.
Pacified Citizenship: “If You Catch a Bullet, I Won’t Rescue You” 
By July 2015, Complexo residents understood that it would be the deadliest 
year since pacification in 2010. The police had already killed fifteen locals 
while losing two within their own ranks. On a Saturday night in late July, 
7,000 residents filled a venue for an annual winter festival. A flatbed full of 
speakers blasted the locally popular funk music. Police feared that the local 
gang had assembled nearby in order to sell drugs or, worse, target police in a 
revenge attack. Police silenced the music, which had often been accused by 
more traditional parts of society as offering an apology or excuse for drug 
trafficking. Officers pointed automatic rifles at a crowd that included the 
elderly and young children. Beto—a 20-something self-fashioned activist 
from the Complexo—jumped off a stage and walked nervously towards the 
police. His childhood friend and colleague, Bruninho, followed a half step 
behind. Beto held his hands in front of him and begged for restraint. An 
officer warned the two: “If you catch a bullet, I won’t rescue you.” A few 
moments later, police cleared the venue. 
Over the next five days, the police killed three people in the Complexo. 
The Monday following the festival, Bruninho returned to his job at Rio’s 
city hall and Beto carried out interviews for his Complexo-based newspa-
per. Photographs and videos of the festival had circulated online for over 
24 hours and the Complexo’s dense alleyways echoed with alarm for those 
involved. Beto began a 900-word Facebook post with, “I think that all of 
you should be startled by the wait for this post.” As a community journal-
ist, Beto was known among activists for his online critique of pacification, 
mainstream media, and government corruption. He had been featured in a 
New York Times article and his newspaper had received funding from media 
conglomerates, multinational corporations, and the municipal  government. 
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He represented a novel yet essential form of institutional engagement 
within the favela that was made possible through his use of digital medi-
ums. Like many of their colleagues in the favela, Beto and Bruninho began 
their careers as educados (students, or, more literary, the educated) in gov-
ernment-funded projects that focused on digital photography. They later 
became educadores (educators) for projects that encouraged people of all 
ages, but mostly youth, in the Complexo to translate the structural violence 
that they witnessed and experienced through the use of digital mediums. 
Digital technology encouraged a transformative form of citizenship that 
challenged socio-economic and political marginalization while seeking in-
clusion within Brazil’s plural democracy. 
QUESTIONS AND OUTLINE
This article asks three central questions. First, how is digital technology uti-
lized under conditions of structural violence? The Complexo is a unique ethno-
graphic space principally defined by post-colonial urban exclusion. Inspired 
by the liberation theologian Paulo Freire’s critical pedagogy (1970/1993), 
favela residents are taught to “read”—to learn the technical aspects of digi-
tal or traditional literacy but also to “read the world” by critically examin-
ing forms of authority. Second, how can critics of violence form networks with 
dominant state institutions? Institutional incursion by the state influences the 
practices and priorities of favela residents through technological collabora-
tions that follow the form of information-driven network societies discussed 
by Manual Castells (1996) and modify a form of “insurgent citizenship” de-
scribed by James Holston (2008). Finally, what are the limitations of digital 
inclusion projects? I focus on ethnographic concerns relating to plurality and 
cultural authority. Problematically, although these networks promote non-hi-
erarchical ideals, local activists depend on outside institutions that have only 
brief economic or political ambitions in the community. 
ONLINE ETHNOGRPAHY OF AN URBAN SPACE
I lived and conducted ethnographic research for two years (2014–2015) in 
the Complexo do Alemão. I interviewed over 150 activists and residents 
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with questions focusing on individual institutional affiliations, personal 
histories relating to structural violence, philosophies concerning technol-
ogy, and interpretation of the pacification policy in the favela. I recorded 
over one thousand hours of classroom observation of digital inclusion proj-
ects and volunteered for twenty hours a week over the course of a year at a 
multinational digital inclusion NGO based in Rio. I analyzed and archived 
social networking content of several dozen digital online-activists from the 
Complexo and attended the events (i.e., workshops, meetings, and frequent 
protests) that these groups organized. 
Stephen Graham (2004) argues that the Internet has become a banal 
cultural object with an assumed set of globally recognized functions. This 
banality opposes a more utopic view of “cyberspace” that envisions an al-
ternative social space remote from everyday life. Scholars have discussed 
how both banality (Mbembe 1992) and utopia (Jameson 1979) should be 
seen as suspect because they subtly reassert dominant authority. The case 
of the Complexo demonstrates that digital technology is physically embed-
ded in a moral, political, and cultural context in which users evoke unique 
forms of learning and community (Hine 2015). My ethnographic method 
follows scholarship that examines how “participatory modes of circulation 
online have an often obscured political charge that an ethnography com-
bining online and offline sociopolitical worlds can elucidate” (Fattal 2014, 
321). Online content both supports and challenges dominant ideologies, 
and activist engagements with powerful Brazilian institutions demonstrate 
a multi-sided network of allegiance. Ultimately, this paper interrogates 
the cultural importance of online imagery as experienced and acted upon 
within marginalized urban communities. 
Rio de Janeiro, a modern metropolis of eight million, is an incredibly 
salient urban location in which to test how the Internet is engaged as a 
cultural object in the Global South. My research constructed an online 
ethnographic space of global ideas and local practices. In this space, I 
analyzed the embodied forms of structural violence that represented an 
intersection of socioeconomic, racial, and cultural inequalities prevalent 
in many postcolonial societies. According to Paul Farmer (2004), eras-
ing history through censorship and silence is the predominant method 
for dominant actors to enforce these structural inequalities. In modern 
liberal democracies, dominant social actors are invested in fostering more 
pluralistic political dialogue. Digital technology becomes transformative 
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of previous social structures and fetishized as a politically neutral tool 
(Mazzarella 2010). 
Through online networks, residents challenged various forms of censor-
ship by re-conceptualizing ignored or silenced subjects. The Internet pro-
vided unprecedented ability to broadcast a previously “hidden transcript” 
(Scott 1990) that challenged hegemonic forms of discourse and subverted 
the prejudicial assumptions of the dominant classes. Subjects like race, vio-
lence, and poverty were not only discussed in bars and living rooms but 
were presented openly online. Previously observed forms of self-censorship 
and outright silence concerning historical inequalities by Brazil’s marginal-
ized citizens (Sherriff 2000) took novel shapes both on- and off-line. The 
police and politicians were common targets for on-line commentary but 
activists also often critiqued drug gangs, benefactors, and colleagues, al-
though in private and with the promise of anonymity. 
One informant who ran a corporately funded computer lab in the 
Complexo told me: “I don’t say anything about other projects. It’s all 
a novela (soap opera). They all want to show violence and travel abroad 
and visit universities, but then the political action never comes. I go on 
Facebook and ask people if they need help with food or school or if they 
need my shoulder to cry on. If I talk about a shootout, I show a picture of 
when they were alive, not of their blood on the street.” Asked if she believed 
that sharing images of violence had a positive effect in the community, she 
responded: “Of course. Outsiders come here and take pictures of smiling 
children at my NGO so they can go back to their multinational and say 
they are doing something good. The police show pictures of dead bandits 
but never the innocent victims. We need to show that the favela is human.” 
Much of my data came from informal street-level conversations. An 
ethnographic intimacy “grounded” the narrative presented online. This 
was important not only to understand the practical mobility of con-
tent and technology but also to build trust and intimacy with my in-
formants. Henrique, an organizer for Ocupa Alemão (Occupy Alemão), 
often lamented the dozens of daytime visits to the community by gov-
ernment investigators, university researchers, and middle-class NGO 
workers. Henrique passed by my home in the Complexo about once a 
week. I would ask him about his politically oriented Facebook posts that 
regularly received hundreds of “comments” and “likes”. He once joked: 
“I have a business and my own social projects. I can’t hold everyone’s 
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hand and walk with them.” He considered outsider interventions as half-
hearted engagements with dubious intentions. Towards the end of my 
research, Henrique posted to Facebook: “I’m fed up with these alienated 
folks! They don’t live in the favela and they want to be a doctor…give a 
thousand solutions to the problem. Come here and live for one month.” 
Henrique’s opinion of outsiders reflects a radical inversion of expertise 
and knowledge in the age of social media (Eysenbach 2008). Social media 
allow marginalized individuals to become culturally authoritative experts 
who challenge traditional knowledge hierarchies. “Reading” this margin-
alized expertise, one could argue, requires as much training as reading 
more historically authoritative sources. 
INEQUALITIES IN THE COMPLEXO DO ALEMÃO
By 2014, more than 11.4 million people, or six percent of the population, 
lived in favelas across Brazil with Rio having more than 763 favelas housing 
1.4 million. The Complexo, with over 69,000 residents and in the heart of 
Rio de Janeiro’s metropolis, reflects one of the more severe forms of margin-
ality associated with favelas. Dominant opinions concerning informality, 
race, and class helped to make the favela a marginalized space that reflected 
state neglect and fostered the rise of drug gangs. Pacification policy con-
sciously engaged this history but also reproduced forms of censorship and 
violence that had existed before the state arrived. 
Institutional authority is most visible when states impose formality on 
traditionally informal communities (Guyer 2004). The distinction between 
o asfalto (asphalt) and o morro (hill or favela), although physical, is main-
tained by legally sanctioned ideologies that confer formality on the for-
mer and informality on the latter. Guillermo O’Donnell (1993) makes the 
distinction between “blue zones,” with a strong state presence that effec-
tively normalizes legal, economic, and social activity, and “brown zones,” 
defined by illicit markets, dominant violent non-state actors, substandard 
housing, and limited infrastructure. Brown zones are neglected or directly 
excluded from state institutions. Over the last hundred years, favelas have 
had various political categorizations: gueto (ghetto), ilegal (illegal), invadida 
(invaded), informal (informal), não planejada (unplanned), marginal (mar-
ginal), and algomerados submornais (subnormal agglomerates). These terms 
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carry varying degrees of political and social recognition, with pacificada 
(pacified) being the newest and most legitimate favela classification. 
 The Complexo occupies a former royal fazenda (ranch) that was parceled 
into factories after WWI. These factories later informally sold off small lots 
to workers who continued to divide the land until legal records became 
unreliable. Residents who arrived in the 1960s told me about expansive gar-
dens and grazing livestock dotting the community’s low-lying mountains. 
This image contrasts with the dense cluster of mismatched concrete homes 
that now crowd the postindustrial cityscape. Until pacification, politically 
connected but legally weak neighborhood associations kept a largely infor-
mal record of real estate transactions. Local businesses and employment 
were rarely licensed. Electricity and water were illegally siphoned from in-
frastructure outside of the community. Telephone, cable, and Internet pro-
viders avoided direct investment and instead relied on local proxies. During 
the 1990s policy makers designated large swaths of favela land as areas of 
environmental risk and built walls around them in order to contain com-
munity growth. Bus routes skirted the community but never entered. These 
informalities and risk designations can be seen today in the form of heavy-
handed economic development policies and violent policing strategies. 
Class in an informal community becomes the most significant obstacle 
to social inclusion and mobility. The vast majority of Complexo residents 
make less than Brazil’s minimum wage (R$788 or ~US$225) (UPP Social 
2014). One percent of them have a university degree, while 8 percent of 
the community is illiterate. Many non-trafficker men there consider them-
selves trabalhadores (workers or laborers). Almost half of the adult women in 
the Complexo declare themselves donas de casa (housewives). The majority 
of Rio’s empregadas (maids) and babás (nannies) come from Rio’s favelas, 
and this gendered valuation of labor sustains a sense of inferiority among 
Brazil’s marginalized (Goldstein 2003). 
The emergence of online activists, artists, and technicians represents a 
visible shift in the class and gender connotations of work. Alicia, a 17-year-
old orientadora (advisor), who had already been an educada, worked for a 
digital videography program. She began working with NGOs within the 
community and preferred to go by the term militante (militant) instead 
of activist. When asked about digital technology, Alicia immediately al-
luded to the activist network that she took part in: “I always thought that 
I would leave the community, go to the asphalt. Some older guys are going 
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to Europe after a multinational saw a rap they did on Facebook about a 
shootout. So, now I know I’m going to help the community by staying here 
and I don’t have to feel isolated, or a victim, or a poor person, because it’s a 
favela.” Alicia embraced a cosmopolitan aspiration common among activ-
ists that challenged the worker-trafficker dichotomy. 
As the dominant group in Brazil, many whites utilize the concept of 
“racial democracy” (Twine 1998; Goldstein 1999; Htun 2004) to avoid cri-
tiques of structural racism. However, the vast majority of the Complexo 
self-declare as negro (black) or pardo (brown) (Barbosa et al. 2013) and 
understand racism as a primary form of exclusion in Brazil. Robin Sheriff 
notes that favela activists take a conversational but non-confrontational 
approach towards racism, which helps to construct individual theoreti-
cal perspectives but fails to address structural inequalities (Sheriff 2001, 
127). Sheriff describes the need for a discourse “that supplies a coherent and 
more explicit narrative that resonates with what poor Brazilians of African 
descent already know” (ibid.). Activists in the Complexo discussed racial 
violence against blacks in other parts of the world, and they compared the 
media coverage of trafficking for criminals inside and outside of the favela. 
Through image and text, whites from the asphalt were referred to by educa-
tion and class (“university students from the upper-middle class are arrested 
for drug trafficking”), while dark skinned favela youth were depicted simply 
as bandidos (bandits) or traficantes (traffickers). 
Parallel States and Censorship
The lack of economic opportunities and political recognition was com-
pounded by a rise in favela gangs. In the 25 years before pacification, impe-
rialistic drug gangs waged inter-faction wars for pseudo-judicial and market 
sovereignty in Rio’s favelas. Scholars dubbed these “parallel states” (Zaluar 
1992; Leeds 1994; Goldstein 2003), which insulate the favela from dom-
inant state repression and develop internal political mechanisms that re-
spond to local needs. Drug traffickers gradually gained influence outside of 
the favela by running political campaigns and bribing police (Arias 2006). 
Outsiders commonly accuse favela residents of aiding these parallel states, 
but even by official estimates only 1 percent of the Complexo participated 
in trafficking before pacification (Salles 2010). 
The most overt and violent form of censorship in the favela is the lei 
do morro (law of the hill) (Penglase 2010). Drug factions, the dominant 
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 political and economic authority, retaliated against locals who openly spoke 
to journalists and police. One notable case was the death of award-winning 
journalist Tim Lopes. Lopes filmed a boca (drug distribution point) in the 
Complexo and presented the footage on national television. Shortly there-
after he was kidnapped by traffickers, quartered with a katana blade, and 
placed in a micro-onda (burning stack of tires) at the top of the Complexo. 
This story was repeated to me several times when informants discussed 
being cautious about whom I should talk to and what I should say. Police 
operations in the community typically took place after such violently dra-
matic events. These operations offered the only form of contact that com-
munity residents had with dominant state institutions. Fluid allegiances 
divided favela territory among violent non-state actors. Outsiders were seen 
as suspicious. There was little incentive to speak to police about drug traf-
ficking and, without participatory mediums such as Facebook and Twitter 
available to share these events anonymously, outsiders became estranged 
from violence in the favela. 
A PACIFIED COMPLEXO 
More than one in ten of the world’s homicides take place in Brazil (Notícias.
r7 2015) and over half of those are connected to favela-based drug traf-
ficking (Instituto Igarapé 2015). Rio de Janeiro had 4,939 homicides in 
2014 of which 244 were homocídios decorrentes de intervenção policial (ho-
micides due to police intervention) (Anistia.org. 2015; Globo.com 2014). 
The government moved to “pacify” the favelas. Pacification, more specifi-
cally, is a militarized policing strategy inspired by models in Medellín, New 
York, Port-au-Prince, and Baghdad to destabilize non-state armed groups 
(gangs and illegal police militias) while installing economic formalization 
programs in the community. The pacification policy implied the arrival of 
armed forces as well as plans for or the installation of a Unidade de Policía 
Pacificador (UPP), or Pacification Police Unit. The government framed 
pacification as a reocupar, a “re-occupation” of favelas, but this erroneously 
suggested that the Brazilian state had institutional and judicial control 
there. These transformations are significant only because the state institu-
tions were previously absent in almost all practical ways. Importantly, the 
pacification police never set out to end violence but instead to destabilize 
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imperialistic drug gangs, reduce violent crimes, and introduce a new gov-
erning modality in previously excluded communities.
In the Complexo, the UPP killed 14 residents and shot 13 more (Instituto 
de Segurança Pública 2015). Police defensively claimed that they, too, were 
victims with 3 killed and 46 shot in 2014 (Casas Novas 2015). This claim 
could be seen as dubious given the aggressive nightly police-civilian en-
counters, similar to stop-and-frisk tactics in New York City, and the fact 
that one officer was shot in the back by friendly fire. Despite a homicide 
rate that fell by 65.5%, deaths linked to the UPP were more commonplace. 
In the opinion of residents, the police had deposed gangs as the chief state 
actors in the favela as well as the principle agents of violence. The UPP 
Social—the name was later changed to Rio+Social because of a negative as-
sociation with its judicial counterpart—was established to guide billions of 
dollars into social programs and economic development across the city. By 
2015, 37 UPP units covered 711,699 residents in 208 pacified favelas over 
20 square kilometers (Rio+Social 2015).
Although civil society (e.g., NGOs, multinational corporations, and 
foreign governments) had invested millions in local organizations that 
predated pacification, pacification economically formalized the favela, in-
creased a social safety net, and promised permanent police occupation. Real 
estate received legal titles and businesses required licenses and tax docu-
ments. Workers enrolled for public unemployment benefits and health care. 
Infrastructural investment improved roads, sanitation, electricity, and tele-
communications (Gazetadopovo.com.br 2015). In the Complexo alone the 
federal, state, and city governments invested over a half billion dollars in 
infrastructure including a ~US$100 million dollar cable car network meant 
to provide public transportation. The UPP built seven police stations along 
the cable car route and placed armored storage containers that housed po-
lice outposts along major thoroughfares. The cable car formed the infra-
structural backbone for UPP Social-sponsored citizenship, digital literacy, 
and community journalism projects. 
According to my informants, the Complexo had hosted only five digital in-
clusion projects in the twenty years before pacification. Since pacification, the 
number has risen to as high as six concurrent programs and thirteen in total. 
Most were staffed by locals but designed and funded by outsiders. Increased 
investment by cable and telephone companies established (relatively) reliable 
Internet connections for the first time and a booming Brazilian economy 
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allowed many to buy inexpensive smartphones on newly available forms of 
credit. At least in the Complexo, digital activists supplanted neighborhood 
associations as intermediaries between the Complexo and Brazil’s broader po-
litical apparatus. Activists critiqued these interventions with phrases like “a 
UPP Social é 100% maquiagem” (the UPP Social is 100% makeup). 
Heavily armed gang members could still be seen in back alleys around 
the Complexo but they mostly stayed hidden. Censorship, prejudice, and 
everyday violence carried over from the parallel state structure and the lei 
do morro, at least in terms of traffickers, continued. Even those activists 
considered politically neutral were targets of retaliation because of public 
comments about violence. The Complexo branch of the Grupo Cultural 
Afro Reggae, an NGO of former drug traffickers, had been firebombed in 
2013 after the group’s founder expressed on Facebook that he valued the 
lives of police and traffickers equally. No group claimed responsibility for 
the bombing but, given historical forms of censorship, most assumed it to 
be local traffickers. 
The state did not enforce a violent form of censorship but still crept close 
to political abuse. As antigovernment protests drew millions into the streets 
of Rio, the federal police investigated three local Facebook groups for their 
support of the protests. No one was arrested in the Complexo, but 23 “mili-
tant” educators were held without charges for several days. One woman, 
who found out she was being investigated after her Facebook page was 
listed in a newspaper article, stated: “I almost gave up. Most of my posts are 
about cultural events in the community. When everyone else posts images 
of a shootout, I usually post [a picture of] a sunset over the hill (“o morro,” 
slang for “the community”). I end most of my Facebook posts with ‘peace’.” 
After pacification, the police went from being agents of brief and deadly 
force to the dominant violent actors in the community. As representatives 
of a liberal democratic government, both local and outside journalists ex-
perienced unprecedented access to the community. Reporters from Brazil’s 
largest outlets donned bulletproof vests to broadcast from inside the com-
munity several times a week. Citizen journalists sought, for the first time, 
to openly criticize the dominant local actors without risk of reprisal. 
The Network Society and the Pacified Favela
One of my informants, Ricardo, a 40-something native of Rio’s wealthy 
Zona Sul, had spent twenty years constructing what he called a “digital 
116
Urban Solutions: Metropolitan Approaches, Innovation in Urban Water and Sanitation, and Inclusive Smart Cities
utopia.” Growing his NGO out of a nineteenth-century mansion in one 
of Rio’s most elite neighborhoods, he shepherded millions of dollars from 
multinationals into hundreds of computer labs in impoverished commu-
nities and claimed to have given more than one million people access to 
the Internet. He also partnered with state officials in education, security, 
and telecommunications. His organization had carried out at least five proj-
ects in the Complexo in which many local activists had participated. In 
part because of the 2008 global financial crisis, Ricardo temporarily lost 
his corporate sponsorships and restructured the NGO towards mobile ap-
plications. By 2014, mobile technology had become the principle means by 
which Brazilians accessed the Internet (Sandaña 2015). In interviews with 
Ricardo’s subordinates, most of whom were from middle- or upper-class 
families, some complained that the NGO was losing touch with the favela. 
I asked Ricardo what he thought about his subordinates’ critique. He an-
swered defiantly: “You didn’t see the favela, Rio, Brazil twenty years ago. 
No one had access to the Internet. Maybe only the rich. We were able to 
bring computers to places that didn’t even have water. Our biggest problem 
was the lack of electricity in (some of the) schools. Things have changed. 
The school is no longer the main problem. Even technology is not the prob-
lem. We need to find the new citizens for a digital revolution.” Ricardo 
sought to adapt technology to favela society and hoped that marginalized 
society would adopt his technological revolution.
Ricardo, like most of those who espoused digital inclusion, embraced the 
methodologies of Paulo Freire, a Brazilian liberation theologian who was ex-
iled during Brazil’s military dictatorship (1964–1985). Freire gained recogni-
tion through teaching sugar cane cutters how to read, write, and, above all, 
contextualize their values within a broader society. This “critical pedagogy” 
(Freire [1970/1993) encouraged marginalized groups to understand what 
they valued, why they valued it, and how to express that value to oppres-
sive institutions. Traditional pedagogical institutions, when made available 
to the poor, conferred the mere technical skills of reading and writing but 
did nothing to help upset forms of oppression. For Freire, there were only 
educators and educated as the teacher/student relationship was hierarchically 
exclusionary. I had frequent discussions about Freire with teachers in public 
schools, informal educadores, and newly “literate” educados. 
When applied to digital technology, this type of critical pedagogy seeks 
to give not only the technical skills required to navigate the Internet but 
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also a socioeconomic perspective that encourages the oppressed to “read the 
world,” organize around a set of local values, and disseminate those values 
in order to effect social change. Some scholars have called the content-based 
struggle of marginalized community’s “counterpublics” (Hirschkind 2002; 
Warner 2002; Fattal 2014) or “recursive publics” (Kelty 2008). These pub-
lics are technologically informed subcultures with collective identities that 
challenge dominant social and political structures. These publics also form 
a “network society” (Castells 1996) in which technology subverts the tra-
ditional limitations of geography and places increased economic value on 
the exchange of information. The commodification of knowledge and the 
elimination of previously insurmountable social and physical obstacles are 
characteristics shared with modern liberal democracies that rely on global 
capital. The network society is fundamentally a state-building process 
through its instillation of newly inclusive economic and social values. 
Digital technology develops inclusive economic practices and concepts 
of identity while even the most collectivist Freirian contextualization priori-
tizes the individual attainment of knowledge. The individual—the activist, 
worker, trafficker, housewife—is ultimately prioritized by digital inclusion 
and pacification. When I asked Ricardo about any possible conflicts be-
tween the government and his clients, he responded: “The big guys have 
the money and the mission. The revolution doesn’t disappear because the 
government is involved. The militants can still have freedom, just freedom 
within a larger technological ecosystem.” 
FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE ACTIVIST 
Much of the activism that is witnessed in the favela is a transformative form 
of what James Holston calls “insurgent citizenship.” Economic formality, 
aggressive security tactics, and individual inclusion within powerful insti-
tutions allow the state to upset those forms of “insurgency” that margin-
alized populations have carved out. The most influential residents within 
the community become conducive to the state-building process through 
engagement with dominant institutions and discourse. Pacification subdues 
the militancy while redirecting it towards state-sponsored goals. The overt 
governmentalizing and statizing effects of pacification—through econom-
ics, real estate codification, and dramatic uses of embodied violence—are 
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coupled with a concerted effort to create a local civil society embedded 
within a dominant one. 
I attended a protest for a child who had been killed by the police and 
spoke to a 23-year old named Marcela who lived with her parents and was 
planning, until only recently, to take the entrance examination for Rio’s 
free federal university. “I’m scared. I don’t want to work in a kitchen,” she 
told me. The political party that supported a small NGO where she was 
employed as an educadora had lost congressional seats in a recent election 
and, in turn, had to defund her project. I asked her what she thought about 
the ambitions and sincerity of the state. She quickly shifted the topic to po-
litical activism and took a playful tone: “We’re rats in the favela. Rats don’t 
scare anyone if no one knows they exist. And when they know they exist, 
their first instinct isn’t to feed them. We can bring the world to us with this 
kind of movement, make them see that we rats exist; then we could really 
scare them. I got the government to give me work, didn’t I? They will do it 
again and I will bring others with me.” Marcela was alluding to the negoti-
ated nature of the state in a pacified favela. She and her colleagues formed a 
local node of a larger network and structure of ideologies. The Internet, and 
more specifically digital imagery, was connected with institutional recogni-
tion. She formed her marginalized identity, not around the kitchen, but 
through a set of technologies governed by a newly installed state.
The Educator and Educated
While in the classroom of Eco-cine, a digital inclusion project that com-
bined ecology, digital filmmaking, and citizenship, I heard an educador 
ask: “Do you know the history of the favela?” He was a middle-class, uni-
versity-educated Brazilian who learned about the course through political 
party connections. The educados, normally talkative teenagers from the 
favela, sat silent. The educador proceeded to ask if they had seen any movies 
about the favela. One named the internationally acclaimed film Cidade de 
Deus, while others made reference to popular Brazilian novelas. All of the 
examples contained violent depictions of drug culture while being geared 
towards an audience outside of the favela. 
The educador asked if those representations were indicative of their lives. 
One educado chuckled: “It’s completely different. I mean, it’s worse than 
the films.” The educados debated race, class, and cultural representation for 
the next hour. By the end of the day, the group had brainstormed the basic 
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premise for a short film. A month later the group was in an auditorium 
with a thousand people in attendance presenting a satirical short film about 
a youth with a hairstyle typical of the morro who was attempting to seek 
employment on the asfalto. The message of the film related everyday experi-
ences of prejudice to a racialized and classed physical appearance. 
After the course, most of the students planned on studying more about 
film and carrying out projects with their smartphone cameras. A few had 
already agreed to be orientadores for the next term of Eco-cine, promising to 
continue the cycle of citizenship building in the pacified favela. All of the 
educados expressed a desire to build a life in the community and make the 
community more visible to outsiders. A few months later, a student joined 
Beto—the activist discussed at the beginning of this article—as a volunteer 
at his newspaper. Others used their audiovisual skills for church, business, 
and independent activism. These ambitions and actions suggested the emer-
gence of a new generation of favela residents who viewed their world in 
terms of technology. Most importantly, they would use technology to ask 
their community and the world: “Do you know the history of the favela?”
CONCLUSION
Digital inclusion has brought pluralism and accountability to the favela but 
in a way that is often conducive to the Brazilian state’s goal of pacifica-
tion. The Internet, as part of building the state in the favela, has created an 
intersection between pedagogical individuality and institutional involve-
ment. Through this form of institutional recognition, residents are negoti-
ating a pacified space and embodying a transformative form of informality. 
Pacification’s impact is not limited to pacified favelas but extends to its citi-
zens and other marginalized communities struggling with drug violence. 
Technology and everyday violence will continue to exist alongside one 
another. In Rio’s favelas, the UPP has become a prerequisite to any form 
of major government investment and many residents in non-pacified fave-
las express anxiety over the give-and-take of militarized economic develop-
ment. Digital inclusion will remain an essential social aspect of pacification 
as the policy progresses and other governments adopt the policy. The UPP 
has spread to Rio de Janeiro state and the pacification policy is being cop-
ied throughout Brazil and Latin America. The type of pacified citizenship 
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discussed above can build digital bridges between marginalized commu-
nities while solidifying the formalizing goals of the state. As pacification 
continues as an influential means of state intervention in Latin America, 
researchers must continue to examine digital technology as a local mediator 
of structural violence. 
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